My associate, John Inniger, does a nice job of covering the basics of the Thicke/Williams litigation against the estate of Marvin Gaye in this LOR post. But since a jury verdict in favor of the Gaye Estate rendered a $7.1M verdict earlier this month, the social media and blogosphere has been abuzz with commentary pro and con on the merits of the case.  So an editorial post-mortem is in order.

One example of the Internet ramblings is Moses Avalon, one of my fellow bloggers and a self-styled “music business expert.”  Mr. Avalon denounced the verdict both in print and in an interview on Fox as being based on the “sound of the Gay recording, featuring a somewhat similar bass line.” On his blog, he makes the assertion that “[a] bass line has never been considered part of a composition’s copyright.” You can read Moses’ article here on his website.  I generally find Moses’ articles and newsletters to be entertaining and informative, and always applaud the efforts of a fellow member of the community who makes great strides in communicating with the public as he does.  I must say, however, that I disagree with Moses’ assessment of the outcome in this case as well as with his characterization of it as based on a “sound.”  He is also wrong about bass lines, by the way, but more on that later.  I will say that the one thing Avalon did say in the referenced article that is correct is his conclusion that the only group of people “in the world [who] can tell you if you stole a song— [is] called a civil jury.”  So that’s where we’ll begin.

In regard to jury trials, this is one area of the law where “lay people,” i.e., people who are not lawyers, get confused when it comes to verdicts like this one, perhaps as a result of watching too many episodes of Law & Order, Boston Legal (for the Shatner/Spader fans)  or L.A. Law  (for those who go as far back as I do).  Real jury verdicts are not generally based on emotions and drama, but rather on a particular set of (sometime mundane) facts, introduced into evidence through witnesses, whose credibility and reliability are evaluated by those jurors in the deliberation.  So, before someone criticizes a jury’s verdict for being based on “the legacy of a beloved artist [such as] Marvin Gaye,” as Mr. Avalon did here, it would be beneficial to review the evidence that was submitted to that jury and try to get into their minds to determine how they arrived at that decision.

Not to belabor this point, but in a jury trial, the jury evaluates the fact and the judge rules on the law.  As for copyright infringement cases, not to oversimplify it, the plaintiff must offer evidence that proves the following: (1) that he/she is the copyright owner; (2) that the alleged infringer had access to the work; and (3) that protected elements of the original work were misappropriated. These elements would be presented to the jury at the beginning and end of a trial, in the form of jury instructions from the judge, and they would make a determination as to whether the facts support these elements.  Of course, as an aside, there are many related elements contained within those prongs, such as whether the works are “substantially similar,” or whether the two works were created independently, or whether the similarities are based on basic building blocks, i..e., elements that cannot be protected by copyright.  Apparently, the latter defense is what swayed Avalon to come down on the side of Thicke/Williams.  Moses believes that the jury verdict was based on a mere “bass line” and rhythm, which are ostensibly only building blocks and can never be protected. But this assessment would be incorrect:  there are times when these elements meld into the melody and/or become distinctive enough, as the experts here testified they did.  For example, in the seminal case involving parody, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994), the Supreme Court spent a great deal of the opinion discussing the “characteristic” bass line of Pretty Woman, describing it as the “heart” of the song, and on remand ask the lower court to retry the issue of whether too much of the bass line was used to achieve the transformative purpose of the parody (ultimately, Acuff-Rose licensed the song to 2 Live Crew in a settlement).  In the case at hand, there was testimony from an expert witness that the bass line from the Marvin Gaye song was an unusual variety in Motown music and very characteristic of Gaye’s style.

But before we delve too deeply into the evidence presented to the jury, there is another aspect of the Thicke case that is often mischaracterized by bloggers, media and press.  Many imply or even report that it was the Gaye family who started this litigation.  Let clear that up:  this is not an infringement action filed by the Gaye family, but rather this case was filed by Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams, among others, against Marvin Gaye’s estate, not the other way around.  In a somewhat aggressive move by their flamboyant California lawyer Howard King, they filed a preemptive action for declaratory relief, asking the court to declare that they song was not an infringement.  At the very least, this move was risky – as can be seen from the outcome – and at worst, it was arrogantly misguided. This “strategic” move, perhaps inspired by the Gaye family’s inquiry to its publisher after reading Thicke’s comments on the song, has also been hotly debated in the blogs and on the Internet as well:

Robert Jacobs, co-chair of entertainment & media at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, had this to say about the declaratory judgment:

The move could have been precedent setting if Thicke and Williams had prevailed, then other songwriters and lawyers may have started using the pre-emptive lawsuit as a strategy to push back on spurious claims.

This “pre-emptive” strategy is reminds me of the tactic employed by some lawyers using the procedures in F.R.C.P. Rule 11 involving frivolous lawsuits as an overtly offensive strategy to persuade their opponents to drop certain allegations in a case or various counts in the complaint.  This tactic has become commonplace in both State and Federal courts and is sometimes rewarded by more conservative judges.  Harvey Geller, with the Los Angeles law firm of Gradstein & Marzano, agreed King’s unorthodox strategy here might be an interesting approach, but seriously questioned the strategy:

If they want to settle and you instead sue, you are guaranteeing yourself a long and nasty legal battle. It was a really odd procedural maneuver. When you sue somebody, the one thing you can practically guarantee is you will get a cross complaint.

My local home boy and fellow member of the Nashville bar Richard Busch, attorney for the Gaye family, agreed that the strategy backfired, saying:

I was surprised. When Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams decided to launch a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief that “Blurred Lines” wasn’t a copyright infringement of Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up,” I didn’t know they’d do this. My opinion is that they believed the Gaye’s didn’t have resources and the wherewithal to fight. My belief then was they were being bullies. I bet now they regret it.”

So now that we have those strategic and political back stories aired, let’s examine the evidence presented to the jury.

Perhaps the most damning type of evidence in any case is an admission from the alleged perpetrator that he/she is guilty. This case is not an exception. Long before to the litigation arose and before the Gaye Estate was alerted to the similarities, Robin Thicke bragged in an interview in GQ magazine about how much of a fan he was of Marvin Gaye. In fact, the rumor was that Thicke had a “fixation” on Gaye. Thicke continued to pontificate about how he had literally instructed Pharrell Williams to write a song just like Got to give it up. In fact, he said that Williams even “pretended” that he was Marvin Gaye as he wrote Blurred Lines. Starting with that confession, a jury doesn’t really need a lawyer telling them that they will find in favor of Gaye as to all three elements: ownership, access and misappropriation.

Of course, by the time the litigation was in full swing in April 2014, Thicke was claiming in a deposition that he was drunk and high on Vicodin when he recorded Blurred Lines and that he barely remembered anything, and was barely involved in its production.  He claimed that Williams wrote “almost every single part of the song.” As for his claims in GQ, he attempted to discount their validity, stating that he was jealous and “wanted some of the credit.” To make matters worse, when he testified in court, Thicke tried to generate jury sympathy with a self-deprecating characterization of himself, testifying that he had lied repeatedly in interviews and in sworn legal documents in an attempt to claim co-writing credit for the song that is the biggest hit of his career thus far.  That kind of dishonesty doesn’t play well with a jury, as it’s difficult to know which statements made by the witness are true and which are false.  It’s King’s worse nightmare and a dream come true for Bosch.

In King’s opening comments of the trial he emphasized how artists needed wide berth in their creative pursuits, trying to implant in the minds of the jury the theme he had set out as fact in the complaint, that “[t]he intent of “Blurred Lines” was to evoke an era” and therefore the songs were “starkly different.” During his opening statement, he reinforced his theme of his case just as he, Williams and Thicke had reinforced it publicly in the press, on the Internet, and social in media: “We’re going to show you what you already know: that no one owns a genre or a style or a groove. To be inspired by Marvin Gaye is an honorable thing.”  In fact, the team is still pushing this idea that being an inspiration to current artists is an honorable thing.  While that statement is definitely true, what they ultimately discovered is that this inspiration looks a whole lot different than misappropriation.  By virtue of the Progress Clause of the Constitution, artists already have wide berth to be inspired by the creative ideas of others – indeed that is the very purpose of Copyright Law – but that does not mean that they can appropriate the expression of those ideas and call them their own!

Throughout this ordeal, Williams seems to be the most honest and sincere of the bunch, which is a tribute to his character, especially considering that Thicke basically threw him under the bus on multiple occasions during the course of the litigation. In his own testimony, Williams estimated that he has written thousands of songs in his 20-year career and believed that although Blurred Lines may have the “feel” of Gaye and the that genre of the late ’70s, it was nonetheless a wholly original creation.  Unfortunately for Pharell, however, Thicke and King had already set him up failure on this score by promoting their theme of the case on every social media outlet and online media that would print it.  While it may track well with the “all-information-on-the-Internet-should-be-free” crowd, the idea that Blurred Lines was a tribute to a generation, rather than an appropriation of Gaye, did not align with the facts at all, particularly the expert testimony we’ll examine below.

The exploitation of King’s case theory prior to the trial may have been successful from a publicity standpoint, but it gave Busch a significant advantage when it came to trial strategy and preparation, as can be gleaned from Busch’s assessment here:

[I]t was our opinion that Pharrell Williams and his lawyer Howard King wanted to litigate this in the press by continually saying that all they did was take a feeling. And if they did any copying, it was only a genre. We didn’t view it like this at all. Yes, it involved a big, popular song, but this was a straight-up copyright claim over com positional elements that we believed had been taken.

Once Thicke and Williams filed suit against them, the Gaye family counter sued, as almost anyone would expect, alleging that the song Blurred Lines misappropriated multiple protected elements of Got to Give it Up.  But these efforts were stymied early on by judge’s ruling on a summary judgment proceedings in the case.  Gaye’s attorney, Busch, filed a “mash up” of recordings of the two songs, claiming that the two “sound[ed] like a perfect, natural match because it blend[ed] sonically” and that the mash up was a “concrete musical illustration of the substantial similarities” between the two songs.

But in his response, King threw up the curveball argument that the Gaye family did not own their father’s commercially released sound recordings featured in the mash up, but instead owned the composition contained in the “lead sheet,” the sheet music that was filed with the application as the best copy.  The Gaye recordings belong to Motown Records, which is owned by Universal, which in turn owns Interscope — the record company that released Blurred Lines and a defendant in the Gayes’ countersuit.

Judge John Kronstadt agreed with King in a ruling in January and reaffirmed the ruling following an appeal from the Busch. His decision enforced that the Marvin Gaye recordings of “Got To Give It Up” and “After The Dance” couldn’t be heard in court. Instead, he required that the attorneys use only stripped-down instrumentals of both songs.  This was a significant victory for the Thicke team, as presentation of their recording against the banal sheet music of the original would most certainly reinforce the theme of their case that they were trying to replicate an era, not a song.  Further, it ostensibly hamstruck Busch, who could not longer let the jury hear some of the most obvious similarities between the recordings.

Busch said of this about the disability:

image “[W]e tried this case with one-and-a-half arms tied behind our back thanks to the judge’s ruling to not allow the full Gaye recording to be played to the jury. The court held that our claim was limited to elements found on the lead sheet deposited with the Copyright Office, and had we lost, there certainly would have been an appeal. But we were able to overcome the disadvantage by preparing excerpts from the recording of what the court found to be arguably protected and have it compared to excerpts from “Blurred Lines.” In the end, this focused the jury on the music and allowed for a good comparison.”

“The court’s ruling may have contributed to the other side’s biggest mistake in my view,” Busch continued. “They focused heavily on allegedly specific note-for-note differences between the lead sheets and the recording.

So what was initially a huge defeat for the Gaye family actually turned in their favor, again thanks to the ill-fated theme of the case developed by King.  That brings us to the “always-present-in- copyright- infringement-actions” dueling musicologists! Copyright infringement actions traditional rely heavily on the testimony of such experts and this case was no exception.  The Gaye Estate relied on Berkeley professor and music expert, Judith Finnell & Harvard professor of African-American music Ingrid Monson, while the plaintiffs relied on Sandy Wilbur. And as Busch pointed out, due in large part to the theme of the case we’ve discussed above, the expert for Thicke and Gaye focused heavily on the “trees,” whereas the experts for the Gaye family took a broader approach, combining to focus on the “forest” as it were.

The jury heard testimony from Finell alleging that the two songs were substantially similar in a number of regards, despite the characterization by many, including Wilbur, that any similarities were relegated to common building blocks like drum beats and bass notes.  To begin, Finnell examined melodies and lyrics to several lines of both songs: “I used to go out to parties” in Gaye’s Got To Give It Up” and the chorus opener “And that’s why I’m gon’ take a good girl” in Blurred Lines.  She found the similarities in the melodies to those two phrases “pretty stunning” and “highly unusual.”  Both begin with a repetition of the same note, she opined — “one of the most important considerations in comparing melodies” — and end with a single word (“girl” and “dancing”) sung over several notes.  This effect is called a melisma, or the singing of a single syllable of text while moving between several different notes in succession.

Finell also noted that thematically the songs were similar in that they both described a type of transformation. The narrator of Got To Give It Up transforms from a wall hugger to an enthusiastic dancer, while in Blurred Lines, “the ‘good girl’ transforms into a more sexually liberated girl,” according to Finell.  Line by line, the Wilbur and Finell continued to compare the lyrics to song, including the line from Gaye “move it up / Turn it ’round / Shake it down” which is similar in melody and lyric to Thicke’s “Shake around / Get down / Get up.”

In his testimony, Williams, who wrote the lyrics to Blurred Lines, denied that “Shake around, get up, get down” closely resembled Gaye’s line “Move it up, turn it round, shake it down,” saying that “[i]n the average black family of the Seventies, that’s what we do when a song comes on. That’s what my dad used to say.”image

Next, the expert compared what was variously described as the “signature phrases” of the two compositions: “Take a good girl” in Got to Give it Up and “Keep on dancin’ in Blurred Lines.”  Finell argued that “[i]n the case of these two hooks, the key words of the hook, the money words — ‘good girl’ and ‘dancing’ — [each] come immediately after the bar line,” referring to the timing of the lyrics. She also noted that the two phrases share three of their four notes.

Using example after example, Finell continued to drive home the fact that the similarities in the lyrics were too substantial to be any other than actual copying, dispelling the Thicke team’s mantra that they were simply copying a “feeling.”  The rap verse in Blurred Lines begins and ends, she testified, at the same point in the song as the Gaye song’s “parlando” — a lyrical chanting Finell described as “a precursor to rap.” Busch and Finell compared lyrics from the parlando and the rap verse, pairing Gaye’s “Let me step into/ to your erotic zone” with the repulsive line “I’ll give you something big enough to tear your @#$ in two”

After exhaustively parsing the lyrics and melodies, the experts finally arrive at what Avalon and most others focus on in this case, the interplay between the keyboard, bass and drums.  Both songs, Finell testified, feature remarkably similar bobbing keyboards and bass lines playing to similar rhythms and moments of silence. Finell noted that both of these underlying melodies use the E and A chord progressions and, of course, noted these similarities are also so extreme as to be beyond coincidence. Plaintiff’s expert Wilbur pointed out that chord progressions aren’t identical at all, since Got To Give It Up uses eight chords while Blurred Lines uses just two.  In an attempt to diminish the similarities, Thicke, during during his turn on the stand, played a medley of pop songs on a keyboard in order to demonstrate that many share the same chord progression and therefore can sound similar.

Now we come to my favorite part.  Since the theme of King’s case – i.e., that the two songs only possessed a similar style because Williams was “inspired” to create a tribute to the genre – had been widely publicized through their own efforts, this afforded Bosch the opportunity to build a counter attach. Wisely, in direct response, Busch brought in an expert to contradict this theory, and it is perhaps her testimony that helped sway the facts in favor of the jury’s finding of substantial similarity. The Gayes’ additional musical expert, Harvard professor of African-American music Ingrid Monson, bolstered Finell’s arguments about the similarities between the rhythm and bass line.  Monson testified that Gaye’s bass line, paired with a reggae- or ragtime-influenced keyboard melody, was highly unusual in Motown music, and very unique to Gaye.  That testimony made it difficult for the jury to accept the claim that Williams was merely influenced by a genre or generation of music in general instead of the Gaye’s composition specifically.  Monson opined that the similarities in this regard were substantial, leading her to suggest that while Blurred Lines was being written, Got To Give It Up was likely playing in the background. Since she wasn’t present when Blurred Lines was written, the judge sustained King’s objection and that remark was stricken from the record.

Finally, Finell also testified that there were additional strong melodic similarities. In her expert report and testimony, she identified a short, recurring melodic line she labeled “theme X,” heard over Gaye’s lyrical phrase “dancing lady” under the main vocal.  Finell identified this as the same melody Thicke sings under lyrics “OK, now he was close” and “But you’re an animal.”  Significantly, she identified one very recognizable note in “theme X’ that happened to be sung out of key.  This is reminiscent of the rest note that ultimately decided the George Harrison case regarding subconscious infringement, Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).  On that note, Finell drove home the substantial similarities between the songs, concluding that they are “… the same musical material. It’s the same notes, the same rhythm, just … the same.”

Miller responded to this damaging testimony by asserting that Thicke’s vocals don’t match the Gaye sheet music, but rather that any similarity between the songs is found in the recordings, thus repeating King’s theme of the case to the end.  But Finell pointed out that this discrepancy is a result of the fact that Thicke’s theme X matches a harmony that is implied in Gaye’s lead sheet, even though it is not written.  “It’s represented as one melodic line when really there’s three that occur,” she noted.

In the end, it is critically important to see this case through the eyes of the jury when evaluating the outcome.  Those eight people – five women and three men – saw the mountain of evidence, heard the dueling opinions, listened to the testimony of Williams and Thicke, and carefully evaluated and weighed the credibility of all that testimony and evidence to determine if Busch had met his obligation to prove ownership, access and misappropriation.  After careful deliberation, they believed the evidence indicated substantially similarities not only in the keyboard, drum and bass interplay, but also in the themes, melodies and lyrical construction.  The very unique musical elements used by Gaye, and no other Motown artists, were the same as those found in Blurred Lines.  Since access was admitted by Thicke and, to some degree, by Williams, the jury didn’t buy the shallow defense that this was a homage to 70’s R&B music.  Rather, it was a misappropriation of Gaye’s original song.   They believed Thicke’s early admission against interest in the GQ article that he had instructed Williams to write a song similar to Got to Give it Up, rather than he self-serving testimony that that admission was, in fact, a little white lie.  In the end, a jury of their peers determined that Thicke and Williams should pay $4 million in copyright damages plus profits attributable to infringement, which for Thicke was determined to be $1.8 million and for Williams was determined to be $1.6 million. While that total amounted to almost $7.4 million, one of the highest awards in history, it should be noted that the song has generated more than double that amount, so it is not unreasonable.  Busch immediately asked that the court suspend sales of the song.

After the trial, the Plaintiffs issued the following statement:

While we respect the judicial process, we are extremely disappointed in the ruling made today, which sets a horrible precedent for music and creativity going forward. “Blurred Lines” was created from the heart and minds of Pharrell, Robin and T.I. and not taken from anyone or anywhere else. We are reviewing the decision, considering our options and you will hear more from us soon about this matter.

Of course, they decided to appeal the verdict, so we will have to hear what the 9th Circuit has to say about it.  In typical fashion, King announced the appeal on the Fox networks, repeating the now familiar themes:

We owe it to songwriters around the world to make sure this verdict doesn’t stand.  We are going to exercise every post-trial remedy we have to make sure this verdict does not stand. … Just because eight people think two songs are similar doesn’t mean they are. I think this is a horrible decision that is going to affect whether or not record labels provide the necessary funds for new music to be created.

In the end, King and his clients are still ignoring the evidence and leaning on the theme of his case, seeming even soliciting the support of friend like John Legend to denounce the verdict.   Of course, Legend was not present for the evidence.  Rather than “respect[ing] the judicial process,” they have mounted another social media campaign deriding the decision as a “horrible precedent” and a “horrible decision” for creativity.  You might admire them for that, but I would remind them that appeals courts tend to heavily favor the jury, who had the opportunity to impartially weight the credibility of the evidence and made their determination on that basis. If I had been sitting on that jury, this evidence likely would of swayed me in the same direction. Infringement, even unintended, is still infringement.

More importantly, I would remind everyone that this is the type of decision that actually encourages creativity.  If an artist know that his creation cannot be misappropriated, that artist will continue to create.  The day that we allow the unfettered use of creative expression without appropriate penalty is, in the words of Don McClean, the day the music died.[/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]

Is it time for Congress to draft a replacement for the 1976 Copyright Law? In point of fact, the law was drafted almost half a decade ago now and its last major amendment came in 1998 with the addition of the DMCA. Many argue that the advent of digital technology, driven of course by the ubiquitous Internet, makes the current iteration of the Progress Clause obsolete.
Recently, in March 2014, the current Register of Copyrights, Maria Pallante, made just such a proposal to Congress, urging them to create “the next great copyright act.” You can read those remarks here. But contrary to that proposal, other advocates of the status quo point out that Congress has amended the current law to keep it up to date. In fact, Pallante acknowledged as much in her remarks when she said “[fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][a]s a general matter, Congress introduces bills, directs studies, conducts hearings and discusses copyright policy on a fairly regular basis and has done so for two centuries.” Her push is a part of a coordinated movement with the House Judiciary Chairman Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va) to leave a mark on copyright law.
While I do not necessarily disagree with the Register of Copyrights that perhaps a consideration of a new consolidated law may be necessary to combine these various amendments, I am bothered by the fact that much of the urgency for a new law is driven by the various interested parties on the Internet who believe that just because a copyright finds its way into digital form, it is no longer protected and should be free for all to use, “mash up” or do whatever the hell they want to with it. These radical thinking individuals, such as The Pirate Bay, Lawrence Lessig, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and others use heated rhetoric and emotional appeals to call for a lessening of the copyright protection that has made America the most idea-rich country in the world. While these illogical and emotional appeals are a good way to drum up support dollars and defeat well-meaning and good legislation such as SOPA, they do very little to advance the philosophical and legal debate and should not be the driving force behind our legislation, good or bad. Good emotional causes make for very bad law.
These dramatic appeals for changing the copyright act are most often done with a lack of understanding as to its philosophical underpinnings, and often demonstrate ignorance of the business realities faced by those who create the arts and sciences, as well as the benefactors who support them.
One of the things that bothered me most about Pallante’s remarks was the total absence of any discussion of these philosophical underpinning of the copyright construct. There was no discussion of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of our Constitution (the Progress Clause) or any reference to some of the chief architects of its current form, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and Charles Pickney, just to name a few. It also worries me when Pallante suggests that the current term – Life + 75 – “is long and the length has consequences,” thereby questioning the validity of the Supreme Court’s proclamation to the contrary in Eldred v. Ashcroft. The latter, of course, is one of about a half a dozen cases the aforementioned anti-copyright advocates has levied against the law over the years.
Sandra Aistars, executive director of the Copyright Alliance, summed it up well in an opinion piece for The Hill entitled “Protect rights of artist in new copyright law.” She said “Should Congress take on the challenge of updating the Copyright Act, it must do so guided by sound principles, and its deliberations must be based in reality rather than rhetoric.” At least Aistars points out that the principle of copyright law is driven by the fact that “protecting authors in in the public interest” and based on “stable property rights.”
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 gives Congress the right “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Madison and Jefferson debated the various components of this clause with some degree of fervor in their massive collection of actual correspondence, with Madison defending the idea that if our society gives up a monopoly (copyright) to creators, the value of that monopoly will generate the creation of widespread ideas that would ultimately reward society. There is no doubt that the equitable component that was bestowed upon authors and inventors the day the Congressional Congress approved the Progress Clause has created the America we know and love today through the wealth of new ideas and expressions that have been created in the form of books, music, films, visual arts, scholarly research and inventions. Without that value in the patent or copyright, there would be no Apple, no Microsoft, no IBM, no Ford, no Chevrolet . . . you get the point. This is the reward that Madison envisioned our society would gain by giving individuals control over their creations, a theory that Locke and others disseminated long before the new nation of America was conceived.
As Aistars summarized in her article, “Ensuring that all creators retain the freedom of choice in determining how their creative work is used, disseminated and monetized is vital to protecting freedom of expression. Consent is at the heart of freedom, thus we must judge any proposed update by whether it prioritizes artists’ rights to have meaningful control over their creative work and livelihood.”
The most important thing for Congress to consider if it picks up the gauntlet laid down by Ms. Pallante is this idea that society benefits by giving a monopoly to creators. Given an individual who has created a work of authorship stable property ownership in that work is the foundation of our great Country and is the primary goal of copyright. To take that away takes away one of our inherent and valuable Constitutional rights, even greater perhaps than our Freedom of Speech and Assembly. Any new proposal much cherish the rights of the creators that the current Copyright Act has created and retain the same privileges and advantages. The future of our Nation in the Internet Age depends on it.
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Written by Amber Shultz*

Edited by Barry Neil Shrum, Esq.

A recent headline on the BBC News was “Jersey Gorilla Turns Photographer at Durrell Park.” The story was about a silverback gorilla at Durrell Wildlife Park in New Jersey named Ya Kwanza, who was given a high-definition camera in an indestructible box. While examining the bazaar looking box, the gorilla inadvertently took a seriesgorilla of self portraits. Can these photographs, indisputably taken by Ya Kwanza, be described as original and creative? If so, are they entitled to protection pursuant to U.S. copyright law, thus giving certain rights to the gorilla?

This begs the question, “What makes a photograph original and protectable under copyright?” This query has perplexed copyright lawyers and courts since photography became protectable under copyright law. Traditionally, the courts have used the concept of an idea/expression dichotomy in order to set the perimeters of an expressed idea within the art of photography.

clip_image002.jpgOne of the first cases analyzing the protection of photography under copyright law is the 1884 case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. In this case, a well-known photographer, Napoleon Sarony, filed a lawsuit against Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company for marketing his photographs of the writer Oscar Wilde without his permission. The court ruled in favor of Sarony, upholding the section of the Copyright Act of 1870 that extended copyright to photographic works. In its defense, Burrow-Giles argued that photography was not “art” but rather, mere mechanics. The court disagreed and found that Sarony’s photo of Wilde was an original expression of an idea. In doing so, the court found that the scene set by Sarony in his photo, including the way he posed Wilde, the background he chose, and similar factors, moved the photograph closer to an original expression than a mere idea. This decision was an early precursor to using expression in a photographic work as a means of identifying which works are protected under copyright law.

Photography is a medium of art that can stretch our concept of “originality” and the idea/expression dichotomy. While it may be true that the act of making a photo is mostly mechanics, it is also true that the act of photography can, in some cases, be considered an art. Courts have consistently applied these principles, not only stopping others from directly copying a photograph but also from creating an imitation of a photograph by copying the style, angle, lighting, and any other artistic or expressive notions the photographer might have used in his photograph. Courts also apply this to derivative works based on photographs, such as statutes or paintings imitating the photograph.
According to copyright lawyer Steven Ayr, “courts have set up a system to describe the various ways a photograph can be original and therefore the various ways in which it’s protected by copyright.” Ayr states that there are three ways in which a photograph is original and therefore protected under copyright law: timing, rendition, and creation of the subject. Timing, he says, is the most basic and least original aspect of a photograph, and provides the least amount of protection for a photograph. Timing basically means that the photographer was in the right place at the right time; the photographer took the photo at the exact perfect time for his photo to be a beautiful piece of art. But what Ayr seems to miss in this analysis of “timing” is its relationship to the element of exposure selected by the photographer. While a lot has to do with being at the right place at the right time, an equal emphasis might be placed on the photographer’s ability and knowledge in selecting the exact right exposure to capture the moment he or she is attempting to capture. By grouping the element of exposure into the second factor, addressed below, Ayrs overlooks the undefinable element of synchronicity that makes this element more critical.

The second element, according to Ayrs, is “rendition,” which has to do with the aesthetic elements the photographer chooses to use in the photograph, such as special effects, the angle, lighting, and the type of camera or lens used to shoot the photo. In many court cases, infringement is determined by the amount of these types of choices made by the plaintiff, which are compared to the accused work to determine how closely related, or similar the copy is to the original photograph.

The third element Ayrs identifies is something he calls “creation of the subject,” by which he essentially means that the photo is original in the way that the creator sets the scene for the photograph. According to Ayrs, the subject selected in creation may achieve sufficient originality to allow the photographer to obtain protection over the subject itself, whereas timing only allows the protection of the reproduction of the subject, and rendition only protects the view of the subject.

These three concepts of originality in a photograph proposed by Ayr interact to form the basis of protection. For example, he identifies two instances in which the originality of a work can be determined quite easily and result in infringement of another photographers work: the first is when someone duplicates the original photograph and the second is when the photographer’s creative choices, such as angle, lighting, positioning, are imitated. In terms of copyright law, in other words, when the copy incorporates protected elements of the original. The first can be illustrated by the court case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. The second instance can be found in numerous court cases, but one that is particularly applicable is the case of Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.

clip_image004.jpgIn Mannion, a freelance photographer sued Coors for copying his photograph of Kevin Garnett in SLAM magazine. Coors created, “a manipulated version of the Garnett photograph and superimposed on it the words ‘Iced Out’ (“ice” is slang for diamonds) and a picture of a can of Coors Light beer…” The Mannion court used the three concepts identified by Ayrs in finding the Garnett photograph to be original. The Court used the concept of rendition when it declared that “originality . . . does not depend on creation of the scene or object to be photographed… [fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][but] resides [instead] in such specialties as angles of shot, light and shade, exposure, effects achieved by means of filters, developing techniques etc.” Using what has traditionally been described as the “total look and feel” methodology for determining if something has been misappropriated, the Court found that the Garnett photograph was protected based on how Garnett was portrayed, not merely the fact that he had been portrayed. In applying this concept of rendition, the court found the Garnett photo was very original in its application of angle and lighting.
Though the Mannion court also gave a nod to Ayr’s timing concept when it stated that “the memorability of [the photograph]… is attributed in significant part to timing of its creation.” In the end, however, the Court did not directly apply the concept of timing to the case.

clip_image006_thumb.jpgLastly the Mannion court found that originality occurs when a photograph creates of the subject, the final and most important of Ayr’s concepts. When the Mannion court applied this concept to the plaintiff’s photograph, it found that Mannion’s photo was a “composition – posing man against sky – [that] evidences originality in the creation of the subject.” Accordingly, this protected not only the portrayal of what was being photographed, but the scene or subject that was created by the photographer when he took the photograph, allowing Mannion to “prevent others from duplicating that scene in a photograph or other medium.” In the end, the court ruled in favor of Mannion and declared Coors photo an infringement of Mannion’s original photo.

The originality elements of a photograph are further illustrated in the court case of Eastern America Trio Products, Inc. v. Tang Electronic Corp. In this case, Eastern America sued Tang Electronic for copyright infringement of some of the product photographs in their catalogs and flyers. Although the defendant acknowledged copying some of the photographs in the catalogs, they stated the similarities of their pictures to the plaintiff’s photographs did not constitute copyright infringement, because the subjects were not original, nor were the photographs.

The Eastern America court disagreed, ruling that the elements of the photographs met the requirements for “originality,” and could therefore be protected by copyright. The photographer “supervised the layout-out of the items that were photographed, positioned them in what she thought [was] an attractive manner, selected particular angles and lighting, and in some cases even had the images enhanced by a computer to achieve the desired outcome.” The court found that the defendant infringed the originals, in as much as it had access to the original flyers and catalogs and that many of the defendant’s photographs were, in fact, copies of the plaintiff’s originals.

clip_image007_thumb.jpgWhile these courts clearly uphold the principal that originality can be achieved in photography, there are other courts that hold a contrary view and do not consider the photograph a protectable means of expression. These contrarian courts use a more abstract approach, finding that the elements of the expression are not original enough to be protected by copyright law. One such example is the case of Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc. which has a very similar fact pattern to Mannion. In Kaplan, Peter Kaplan, the plaintiff, took a photograph named “Wing Tips Over the Edge,” depicting “a businessperson standing perilously on the ledge or roof of a tall building, looking down onto a car-lined street. It is taken from the viewpoint of the businessperson.”

Kaplan copyrighted his photograph and published in a compilation with other photos called “The Creative Black Book.” Kaplan submitted his photograph to a contest held by an ad agency to find artwork for a client who manufactured camera lenses. Kaplan sent in his photograph to the ad agency, but they choose another photographer’s work that depicted a very similar scene to Kaplan’s photograph. The winning photograph used the same perspective. Kaplan sued the winning photographer stating that the similar concept infringed his copyright. The court acknowledged plaintiff’s copyright, but found that the only similar elements between the two photos were not entitled to copyright protection and therefore, the defendant had not misappropriated. In other words, the similarities between the original and the alleged copy was an “idea,” and not a protectable expression, so the defendant did not infringe Kaplan’s copyright. The court summarized that “…after a careful examination of the two photographs at issue here, [we] conclude that the differences between [the two photographs] far outweigh the similarities, quantitatively and qualitatively, such that no reasonable jury could find that the two works are substantially similar.” Therefore, the court ruled for the defendant. This case illustrates that one may have an expression of idea that is not original.clip_image008.jpg

So how do we determine the originality of a photograph? While it may be easy to see similarities between a few photos, coincidence does not particularly mean that there is actual copying, much less actual infringement. Elements of a photograph that are closer to ideas or concepts are not protectable by copyright, and as such are not considered original expressions. A photograph is, at its essences, merely a mechanical and/or chemical reaction to reflected light. In fact, it is the very nature of photography that makes it hard to determine the originality of a photograph. It is the photographer’s creative expression of those mechanics that make the difference, just as a painter’s creative application of pigments can create an original expression.

If the photographer is creative in the selection of subject matter, lighting, rendition, and how he or she arranges the scene of their photograph, the photographer may create an original expression, one that he or she might be able to protect. But still too many courts have difficulty determining whether an element of a photograph is an idea or an expression. In these instances, some judges seem unqualified to make substantive artistic choices, or are simply not creative. While there are some guidelines for defining “originality” of a photograph, such as those of timing, rendition, and the creation of the subject as proposed by Ayrs, there is no guarantee as to the outcome. Courts still struggle to determine the originality of a photograph, especially when determining where the elements of the original photograph fall along the idea/expression dichotomy continuum. In considering photography and its relation to the idea/expression continuum, the closer a particular element in a photograph moves along the continuum from a mere idea to an expression, the more likely it is to be original and protected in court and by copyright. The more artistically attuned a court can be, the more accurate its decision.

 

*Amber was a top student in my Copyright Law class at Belmont University’s Mike Curb School of Music Business in Spring 2013.[/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]

 

By Erin Thiele and Barry Neil Shrum, Esq.

In the mid-1980s, Donald Trump approached Tony Schwartz to ghost write his autobiography.  At this point in time, Trump was in his early 30s and did not have a great deal of life experiences about which to write a personal biography.  So, according to Schwartz, he suggested instead that writing a book discussing Trump’s deal-making acumen was a better idea, and offered up the title, “The Art of the Deal.”  So that’s what they agreed to do.  The collaboration ended up on the New York Times best-seller list in 1987 and remained there for almost a year.

That Trump and Schwartz collaborated on the book is no secret, since Schwartz received prominent credit on the front cover.  Legally, that takes this project out of the realm of pure “ghostwriting” and places it firmly in the area of joint authorship as defined at 17 U.S.C. 201.

I often explain to my “co-write obsessed” songwriter clients in Nashville that when you enter into a collaboration of this nature with another author, it’s a lot like being in a long-term relationship in that 50% of them end in divorce!   That’s why it always good to have some form of written understanding in place whether you are co-writing or ghost writing.

Fast-forward to present day America where there is a decidedly unpopular duo of presidential candidates which includes Trump’s name on the Republican ticket, amidst a constant whirlwind of controversy and media circuses.  Trump has many times referenced The Art of the Deal on the campaign trail and ranks it among one of his greatest accomplishments.

Schwartz, for his part, obviously feels distraught and remorseful for putting the “T” in Trump.  So, he jumped into the fray suddenly, appearing on Good Morning America with nothing but unfavorable things to say about Art of the Deal and, perhaps more to the point, about his co-writer, Donald Trump.

Schwartz claims he “wrote every word” of the manuscript, further alleging that Art of the Deal is filled with fictional accounts of the deals created in his own mind. Trump’s lawyers strongly deny these charges, insisting in their cease and desist letter to Schwartz that the deals are real, and that it was Trump, not Schwartz, that actually made the deals described in the book and that Trump is solely responsible for its success.  The cease and desist requests, among other things, a return of all the royalties Schwartz has made on the book. 

This reaction was no shock to Schwartz who, in reply, says:

“I . . . almost immediately received this cease and desist letter delivered to me by FedEx and it’s nuts, . . . completely indicative of who he is. . . .  I fully expected him to attack me because that is what he does, so I can’t say I’m surprised.  But I’m much worried about his becoming president than I am about anything he might try to do to me.”

From what can be gleaned from news stories related to the controversy, the original agreement between Schwartz and Trump provided that each author would receive half of the book’s $500,000 advance from Random House, as well as half of the royalties from Trump’s agreement with the publisher. This substantiates what the Trump camp has been saying, i.e., that Schwartz has made a great deal of money off the best-selling work:  so much so, in fact, that Schwartz and Trump inked a deal for the audio version less than 3 years ago.

       So, the question becomes was there anything that Trump could have done to prevent these kinds of actions by Schwartz.  More broadly, is there anything one joint author can do to prevent the other joint author from denigrating their work?  The answer, you might suspect, lies in the language of the written agreement between the authors.

       Let’s start there.  Anytime you collaborate with another author, you should insist on a written collaboration agreement.  Anytime you want to hire a ghost writer to draft your memoirs, insist on a ghost writing agreement.  There, I got that out of my system.

       But this is apparently a trickier question when it comes to the Schwartz/Trump agreement, since this agreement between the two of them appears more like a collaboration agreement than a ghost writing agreement.  A glance at the copyright database indicates that Donald Trump is the owner of the copyright, while Schwartz is listed as an author alongside, or “with” Donald Trump.  So, perhaps the agreement is some sort of hybrid between to two.  

When it comes to ghost writing arrangements, there are several grey areas that one should address in the written agreement with the person writing it. But first and foremost, the issue of who owns the work should be specified.  Usually, in the ghost writing situation, the person hiring the writer is considered the “employer for hire” and the work is then considered a “work made for hire.” 

In contrast, in a joint authorship or collaboration agreement, the authors usually own the work together, each holding an “undivided” interest in the copyright (meaning they can exploit 100% of it) and share an equal percentage of the royalties as well as an obligation to account to the other for receipt of any royalties.

Needless to say, in either situation, if one party wishes to be the sole owner of the copyright, there must be a written contract that is specifically states that the author does not own an interest in that copyright, has assigned that copyright, or has performed the work as an employee for hire. The justification for allowing this kind of transaction are too varied to go into here, but primarily if the originator of the idea funds the completion of the work, that person, NOT the ghostwriter, should own the copyright.

              Another preventative negotiating point in either situation would be a provision in the contract that neither author will do anything either during the term of the agreement or afterward that would be “harmful” to the work.  For example, the person hiring the ghostwriter might insist on a “non-disparagement” provision providing that neither party will intentionally be involved in any conduct or activity that may reasonably be anticipated to harm the other party or the work itself.  This type of clause may also have provisions that include liquidated damages and even allow for injunctive relief.  Any of these could have been available to Trump in this situation.

              In addition, especially in ghostwriting situations, the non-disparagement clause combines with confidentiality and non-disclosure clauses which prevent an author from disclosing information about his/her work on the book.  This contract provision has been effective for years, as many great works of authorship have been written in the shadows whilst their authors remain quiet.  John Kennedy’s famous work, Profiles in Courage, for example, was ostensibly written by his chief speechwriter Ted Sorensen, according to the latter’s autobiography released many years after Kennedy’s death when he was no longer subject to the provision.  The key purpose of these types of clauses is that the authors can control what the other author, particularly a ghost writer, can, and more importantly, cannot say about the work.

Needless to say, Trump could have prevented much of the negative publicity that Schwartz is generated if he had more cautiously drafted agreement that addressed these issues and kept The Art of the Deal and Trump’s reputation protected from allegations, true or not.

              Regardless if you are co-writing or ghostwriting, you should explain your situation to a well-informed entertainment attorney and obtain a well-drafted contract to protect your specific situation, as well as your intellectual property. 

 

A special thanks to my intern Erin Thiele for her helpful contributions to this piece.  Erin attends Belmont University’s Mike Curb School of Music and Entertainment Business.

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By Bennett L. McMordie, ed. by Barry Neil Shrum

“Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. . . . [fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][F]or the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. Give everyone what you owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor.”

Romans 13:1-7 (ESV)

It is perhaps an irony that my use of Paul’s words concerning the respect owed to the authority of government may, in fact, be an infringement of a particular government’s copyright!

bibleMore to the point, is the fact I quoted these verses from the English Standard Version of the Bible copyright infringement? One would think not, as the original disparate writers of the assembled Hebrew and Greek texts that make up our modern Scripture have been deceased for centuries now, and their individual works were created long before any type of copyright protection was ever imagined, must less applicable. In fact, the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, would not be passed by Parliament until 1709, while the earliest extant fragments of any type of scripture are fragments containing Hebrew texts which date back to the 2nd century BCE.

The myriad translations of the Bible that are around today — over 400 English translations have been created over time, including popular versions such as the New International Version, the Good News Translation, the New American Standard Version, The Message — are registered by their respective publishers as copyrights in the United States.

So, if a preacher quotes scripture aloud in church, or reprints a couple of inspirational verses in his weekly newsletter, is the minister committing willful copyright infringement? Fortunately, he is not, but only by virtue of licensing. While most all translations of the Bible are copyrighted, their publishers allow people to copy them freely, howbeit with certain limitations. For example, the publishers of the New American Standard version allow a person to copy as much as 500 verses without prior written, so long as the total amount copied is less than 25% of the total new work created. Other publishers take a similar approach, allowing a person to publish 1,000 verses totaling less than 50% of the work. The rationale behind this policy is that it allows the public to use the Bible freely while preventing blatant reproduction of the entire text.

Perhaps one of the more intriguing examples of a protected version of the Scriptures the most popular version of the Bible, the King James Version, which is still protected by copyright l1769-King-James-Bible-Introductionaw despite the fact that it was published over 400 years ago.

The rights to the KJV, initially published in 1611, are still owned by the English monarchy, under their so-called “Crown Copyright” laws. The Copyright Act 1911 provided specific protection for government works prepared or published by or under the direction or control of the Monarch or of any Government department, specifically including the KJV.

Now, lest there be a revolution, there’s no need to get your “knickers in a wad” if you’re a non-Brit: the King James Version is in the public domain everywhere else in the world. Still, the concept of a government holding copyrights indefinitely can feel a little strange, especially if you’re from the U.S., where Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 limits the grant of a copyright for “a limited time.” Unlike England where copyright concepts are based on natural rights, U.S. laws are based upon the utilitarian principle that incentivizing creative endeavors for a limited time and then passing them into the public domain sustains society’s interest in a fluid marketplace of ideas.

But in England, only two publishers possess the rights to print the King James Bible: the Queen’s Printer (now the Oxford University Press) and the Scottish Bible Board; all others must receive a letter patent from the Crown to legally print the KJV .

Should governments be allowed to hold copyrights?

Ownership of copyright by a government entity begs a larger question: shouldn’t works that were created for the public, using the people’s tax dollars, be available for public copying and use? This is certainly the case in the U.S., where §105 of the 1976 Act prohibits ownership of “any work of the United States Government,” which is defined in §101 as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties.” The effect of section 105 is intended to place all works of the United States Government, published or unpublished, in the public domain.

This prohibition only applies to works created by the U.S. on its own soil, and does not apply to works created in foreign countries, as most governments are entitled to copyright protections in their works. Thus, it would be unfair not to allow protection for U.S. works in that situation. Currently in Great Britain, works that are commissioned by the government are protected for 125 years from creation, or 50 years after publishing. image

The KJV states: “and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” (John 8:32). Now that the truth is known, shouldn’t the King James Bible be free to the descendants of King James?

Bennett McMordie is currently a student in Mr. Shrum’s Copyright Law class at Belmont University in Nashville, TN, where he is earning a degree in Music Business. He loves all things music, most things business, and also enjoys playing bass for the CJ Solar Band.

 

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By Rachel Galloway

IMPORTANT NOTICE:  The views expressed in this article are solely those of Ms. Galloway and may not necessarily reflect the views of Law on the Row or Barry Neil Shrum, Esquire.

The last time I watched a Happy Tree Friends video was when I was around 13 years old in the company of my 10-year-old cousins. The videos typically consisted of the characters getting into situations where they lost limbs or impaled themselves with blood squirting everywhere. Needless to say, when I watched YouTube’s Copyright School, I was shocked to see those same characters teaching me about copyright infringement and piracy.

[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=InzDjH1-9Ns?rel=0&hd=1]

YouTube’s Copyright School video has been on the site for roughly a month now with 248,734 views, 1,142 likes, and 5,914 dislikes (as of April 25, 2011 when I viewed it). I have heard and read many mixed feelings on this video and personally find it to be unsuccessful. Judging from the dislikes, I am not the only one.

I understand where YouTube is coming from in trying to educate children and teenagers on copyright issues using characters that they would normally watch such as Happy Tree Friends. However, I am not sure that they will get the effect they are hoping for. In my opinion (and experience with today’s generation), teenagers and children will continue to copy and use copyrighted work regardless of whether they understand that it is illegal.

In my two years at Belmont University as a Music Business major (where students are required to take a Copyright Law course), I have come to find out that teenagers do not care whether downloading music illegally is wrong or not. They simply do not care as long as they do not get caught. I find it ironic and hypocritical to go to a school where artists are encouraged to create original works and where copyrighted works are taught to be protected to find out that mosBioPic1t of the students (including the artists) still continue to download illegally. This infringement mainly takes the form of pirating music just like with the majority of American teenagers. In my opinion, if we can’t get college students who have a substantial knowledge on copyright infringement and it’s consequences to stop pirating music, then how can we get teenagers across America to do so with a 4 minute and 39 second YouTube video?

Pirating music is an issue that will always be a problem for the music industry. There have been many suggestions made that attempt to fix or at least ease this issue. Personally, I believe that the best way to go about this is to cut the cost of digital downloads (from $9.99 an album to around $1-$2 an album), so that consumers will not feel like they are forking out a ton of money towards entertainment that they believe should be free.  Personally, I would rather pay a low price for an album of superior quality than go through the trouble to find the pirated version for free that has a bad quality.

YouTube’s Copyright School had the right idea and motivation. Will it make a difference in the music industry? I personally doubt it. I applaud them for making an attempt to educate kids across America on the issue, but I believe that this is probably a losing battle.

Rachel Galloway is a Sophomore Marketing major with a minor in music business at Belmont University in Nashville, Tennessee.  Born and raised in Atlanta, Rachel graduated from Providence Christian Academy in Lawrenceville, Georgia in May 2009.  She came to Belmont University the following year with an interest in marketing and event planning in the music world.  There, Ms. Galloway studied copyright under the tutelage of Professor Shrum.  Upon graduation, she hopes to open her own event planning company.

Under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a settlement of a class action requires approval of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The court may approve a settlement that is binding on the class only if it determines that the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable, and not a product of collusion.” This week, with regard to the much ballyhooed amended settlement arrangement (the “ASA”) in The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. the honorable Denny Chin of the U.S. District Court in Manhattan said flatly “I conclude that it is not.”  See full decision.

google-book-search-3The ASA would have allowed Google to digitize millions of copyrighted works in an effort to create the largest digital library, a process Google began in 2004 when the company entered into agreements with certain academic libraries to digitize their holdings. Since that inaugural agreement, over 12 million books have been scanned and made available online through Google Books. The ASA would have allowed Google to “(1) continue to digitize books and inserts, (2) sell subscriptions to an electronic books database, (3) sell online access to individual books, (4) sell advertising on pages from books, and (5) make certain other prescribed uses. (ASA §§ 3.1, 4.1-4.8; see also ASA § 1.149).” Google’s rights to the copyrighted work would be on a non-exclusive basis, permitting the copyright holder to exploit the work to other companies, including competitors, while simultaneously allowing Google to display the work, for which Google would have been required to compensate the class plaintiffs 63% of the revenue from all uses of the work to the copyright holder.

Judge Chin recognized the many benefits of an online library with virtually every work ever created are great in number. First, the sheer number of books that students, schools and researchers could access would greatly benefit the public. Those in disadvantaged economies and cultures could access knowledge otherwise not available, and persons with disabilities could learn through the implementation of Braille and audio books. Moreover, publishers and authors would benefit due to the number of books made accessible to the public, especially those works that have been forgotten in the dark and hidden corners of libraries. But as Judge Chin further pointed out,

While the digitization of books and the creation of a universal digital library would benefit many, the ASA would simply go too far.

At least 500 additional parties filed amicus briefs on the subject commenting, mostly from a negative point of view, on the amended settlement, including such notables and Microsoft and Amazon. In addition, 6800 members of the plaintiff class “opted out” of the settlement. The bulk of the briefs focused on the inadequacies in the settlement relating to class notice and class representation, and on concerns regarding copyright, antitrust, privacy and international issues. Some also argued that the settlement would go beyond the authority of the court under Rule 23 of the Civil Rules of Procedure.

This procedural issue turned out to be one of the more compelling arguments presented to the court. In as much as the settlement would have released certain claims not before court such as, for example, so-called “orphaned works,” the court felt that the ASA was “an attempt to use the class action mechanism to implement forward-looking business arrangements that go far beyond the dispute before the Court in this litigation.”

Orphan works are books that have copyright protection, but the copyright owner identified in the registration certificate cannot be located or reached. Under the ASA, Google was required to “strive” to locate the copyright holder, but if unsuccessful could digitize the book without consent. In this case, and in the case of “absent class member who failed to opt out,” pursuant to terms of the settlement agreement, the copyright owner would lose the right to object to future infringing conduct by Google. The court was “troubled” by this aspect of the agreement. The judge stated:

The questions of who should be entrusted with guardianship over orphan books, under what terms, and with what safeguards are matters more appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement among private, self-interested parties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.

The court illustrated the concern with a quote from a Texas woman who grandfather self-published his memoirs, Dust and Snow, she says,

From Google’s point of view, Dust and Snow is an “orphaned” book. If and when Google scans it, the company is likely to be unsuccessful in trying to locate the publisher, since the book was self-published and my grandfather is now deceased. In essence, the way the settlement is written, such “orphaned” titles are automatically handed to Google free of charge to do with, as it will. From my family’s point of view, Dust and Snow is not orphaned at all. It is very clear who owns the copyright. So why is Google being granted the automatic right to take over the copyright of books like my grandfather’s?

As noted earlier, Chin stated that such matters as “orphaned works” are best left to Congress rather than private entities to delineate and enforce through such an agreement.

As the literary agents Stuart Bernstein and Susan Bergholz expressed to the court so eloquently:

By accepting this settlement, the court will be setting a highly questionable precedent, usurping the role of the legislature by creating a legal loophole for one corporation and reversing the very foundation of copyright protection. We who have devoted our lives to assisting the work of creative individuals are left with a sense of moral indignation. We have pledged, in our contracts with clients, to sell or license their rights to ethically and financially sound purchasers and licensees. And for many years we have toiled over agreements and contracts to accomplish this, aided by the protections of the law. The situation we find ourselves in now is one of dismay and powerlessness, with only the weak ability to “object” or opt out. We beseech you to give authors back their rights. Force Google to negotiate like any other.

With regard to the fact that the ASA would give Google permission to digitize any work unless the copyright owner “opted-out,” the court also found this to be unpalatable, as it places an unnecessary and unwarranted strain on the copyright owner to initiate an action to prevent copyright infringement, when in fact; the responsibility should be placed on the entity wanting to use the copyright work.

As the Copyright Act explains,

When an individual author’s ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under the copyright, shall be given effect under this title, except as provided under title 11.” (17 U.S.C. § 201(e).)

As David Nimmer, author of Nimmer on Copyright explains, “By its terms, Section 201(e) is not limited to acts by governmental bodies and officials. It includes acts

of seizure, etc., by any ‘organization’ as well.” However, under the ASA, any copyright owner who fails to notify Google and “opt-out” will lose their right to the copyright and deem Google competent to do with their copyright as they please.

In light of the previous lawsuits brought against Google by publishers and the current settlement recently rejected, Judge Chin says,

It is incongruous with the purpose of the copyright laws to place the onus on copyright owners to come forward to protect their rights when Google copied their works without first seeking their permission.

The Court was also sympathetic to concerns raised by Microsoft and Amazon that approval of this settlement would, in effect, give Google de facto monopolies over the digital book industry as well as the online search industry. This, of course, raises a number of antitrust concerns by effectively foreclosing competition.

In Google’s pursuit to provide the first digital library encompassing the estimated “174 million unique books,” the information giant has displayed the unequivocal lengths it is willing to take in order to bring more information to more people. As one individual put it, “Google pursued its copyright project in calculated disregard of authors’ rights. Its business plan was: ‘So, sue me.'” Google’s thirst for providing perpetual information to the consumer caused the company to overlook, whether intentionally or accidently, major copyright issues.

In rejecting the settlement, Judge Chin made one very keen observation in his conclusion: ” many of the concerns raised in the objections would be ameliorated if the ASA were converted from an “opt-out” settlement to an “opt-in” settlement.” He strongly urged the parties to consider such an option.

http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=special&id=115

By Barry Neil Shrum, Esquire and Nathan Drake

The classical libertarian, Frédéric Bastiat, is quoted as saying:

In the full sense of the word, man is born a proprietor. . . . Faculties are only an extension of the person; and property is nothing but an extension of the faculties. To separate a man from his faculties is to cause him to die; to separate a man from the product of his faculties is likewise to cause him to die.

According to a recent article, entitled The Copyright Monopoly is a Limitation of Property Rights, the author, Rick Falkvinge, writing for TorrentFreak.com, argues that copyright is merely “a limitation of property rights” and is “not a property right.” This conclusion is incorrect and totally without any basis in U.S. history, not to mention world philosophy. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution directly refutes that by granting Congress the power

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

Our Forefathers, in this case James Madison and Charles Pinckney, based the idea of intellectual property rights on John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian philosophy. In other words, they were quite willing to violate the property of tcode-of-hammurabi-3he few – i.e., the "rights" of individuals to use someone else’s intellectual property however they choose – if doing so would serve to advance the greater good of society as a whole. So, the original drafters of the Constitution did. They did not intend to grant partial ownership to the creator, but rather “exclusive rights” for a work derived from their intellect and creativity. That is to say, the idea that copyright is a monopoly is not the "carefully chosen" "rhetoric from the copyright lobby" of recent vintage as put forth by Falkvinge is completely false: rather, it is an idea that our Forefathers debated and discussed, and carefully chose to bestow upon Authors and Inventors.

Many fail to grasp the idea that the ownership of an intellectual property such as copyright is no different than ownership of real property, such a person owning their own house or piece of land. Both forms of ownership are based on societal laws and give the owner inherent rights to do with the property as they please. Just as the government prohibits individuals from reproducing and distributing copyrighted works, so does the government prohibits individuals from trespassing onto another person’s personal property or stealing their possessions. Are the latter "government-sanctioned private monopolies" that impose "limitations of property rights" on individuals other than the owner? You bettcha! That is, in fact, what a monopoly is: allowing an individual to control something to the exclusion of other competitors.

The significant different between real property (i.e. the chair in Mr. Falkvinge’s analysis), and a copyright (i.e. the DVD in aforesaid analysis), is that the chair is a tangible object, and its essence is easily grasped by our senses. A DVD, on the other hand, is a physical object which embodies, for example,  a movie, or intellectual property, that is intangible and more difficult to conceptualize. When purchasing a copyrighted work such as a movie, one has to realize the two forms of property contained within that physical object that is the DVD. Falkvinge draws his analogy between the chair and the DVD as follows:

When I buy a movie, I hand over money and I get the DVD and a receipt…after the money has changed hands, this particular movie in mine.

This statement is factually and legally incorrect. Although the purchaser owns the physical embodiment of the DVD – and in fact may dispose of it any way he or she chooses – the purchaser does not own the intellectual property embodied within the DVD, and may not exercise dominion, or monopoly, over that property. The creator of the work, in fact, owns the intangible property encoded in the DVD, and the creator is within his/her rights, according to section 106 of the United Sates Copyright Code, to reproduce and distribute the work as they please due to the time, creativity and money that produced the work. The owner of the physical object containing the movie has no such rights. Our Constitution is what controls this fact, not just the copyright laws Congress has passed under its authority.

The umbrella of intellectual property, and more specifically Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, also include the concept of patents. In the article, when Falkvinge compares the limitations copyright places on the purchaser of a DVD to the endless opportunities an ostensibly-expired patent gives the purchaser, he erroneously concludes that " patents are not relevant for this discussion." Oh, but they are. First, one cannot legitimately compare a patent with limitations that have expired to a copyright that currently retains its exclusive rights and limitations. In fact, one author has asserted that it is patents¸not copyrights, that place a greater restriction, or monopoly, on property rights. In Man, Economy, and State, Murray Rothbard concluded:

The patent is incompatible with the free market precisely to the extent that it goes beyond the copyright.… The crucial distinction between patents and copyrights, then, is not that one is mechanical and the other literary. The act that they have been applied that way is an historical accident and does not reveal the critical difference between them. The crucial difference is that copyright is a logical attribute of property right on the free market, while patent is a monopoly invasion of that right. Rothbard’s point is that businesses should not be restricted from independently designing and creating a product using natural laws and principles, even if it turns out to be similar to a patented product, even though our legal structure often operates in that manner.

But the greater point to made here is this: accepting the validity of a patent monopoly requires the acceptance of a copyright monopoly. Both rights are granted by the same Constitutional clause and, a priori, both are relevant to any discussion of government-granted monopolies. Second, simply because an individual purchases the physical embodiment of a chair design does not imply that they acquire full rights to disassemble, analyze, reengineer and distribute the chair commercially. To play with Falkvinge’s analogy, imagine that instead of chair, we are discussion the purchase of a new automobile, let’s say a Ford Mustang. Does one who purchases an automobile by virtue of that sales transaction, gain the right to deconstruct and reverse engineer the product, and start his or her own manufacturing facility to churn out duplicate cars in order to compete with Ford? Why, because there is intellectual property that is embodied in the automobile, just as there exists intellectual property embodied in a DVD, a CD and, yes, even an MP3 or an MP4. Based on the utilitarian teachings of John Stuart Mill, our society believes in rewarding an individual for the “fruits of their labor.” When labor is applied to raw goods by an individual in order to create an original expression of an idea, our society has agreed that this product is the property of the individual that created it. Our Constitution grants the creator of such product a limited monopoly in the exploitation of that creation. This brings me to my final point:

The copyright is, in fact, a “government-sanctioned private monopoly.” The ideology behind the monopolization of intellectual property is to “promote” and incentivize people to create works with the understanding and confidence that the time, energy and financial hardship involved will be fairly compensated. Without any supreme authority protecting the interests and livelihood of creators, the motivation to develop such a work arguably decreases dramatically. The implementation of the monopoly grants the property rights in the creator. As with all property rights, that grant places limitations on the persons who do not own the property.

So, the idea that "monopoly" is an evil concept which the lobbyist have attempted to associate with a "positive word such as ‘property,’" as Falkvinge argues, is historically, philosophically, and logically false. It is rather a concept that has been with us since the Code of Hammurabi first described laws regarding property; it was passed down to us by our Merry Old Ancestors from England; it is a right the participants of the Oklahoma Land Rush had to fight to exercise; and it is these rights – the right to exercise control over one’s intellectual creations – that assure a society in which ownership of property is exercised by the appropriate party by wielding their monopoly against those that would steal it away.

So yes, Mr. Falkvinge, a copyright monopoly is a limitation of property rights. But it is also a means by which the owner can exercise his or her property rights. The limitation is, in fact, on those who would steal their rights. So if this is a limitation on your rights to freely distributed copyrighted product, I’m ok with that and I think the majority of our society is as well.

As the French economist François Quesnay succinctly said: “Without that sense of security which property gives, the land would still be uncultivated.” In other words, if we don’t grant a monopoly to our "cultivators" of ideas, the landscape will be baron.

See also, Cleveland, Paul A., Controversy: Would the Absence of Copyright Laws Significantly Affect the Quality and Quantity of Literary Output? A Response to Julio H. Cole, Journal of Markets & Morality 4, no. 1 (Spring 2001), 120-126

Technorati Tags: ,,,,,,,,,,

The search engine giant Google, known for its colorful name and creative endeavors, has been convicted in French Court of infringing the copyrights of four artistic works and now faces fines upwards of $600,000, not including legal costs and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs in the case was made up of four entities who owned the allegedly infringed copyrights: a photographer, the producers of the movie Mondovino, and two other documentary filmmakers responsible for the films Armenian Genocide and the Clearstream GoogleControversy.

According to the plaintiff, "take-down" notices were sent to Google demanding that the copyrighted works be taken off their search engine and its "Google Video" component citing the alleged infringement. Although Google agreed to remove the content from their website, the works remained available, initiating further legal action by the plaintiff and involving the Court of Appeals in Paris. Google argued that monitoring individual internet posts to verify whether specific material appearing in a search result infringing copyright is a tedious, if not impossible, task. More importantly, it argued that such activity is ultimately not their responsibility. Google defended its position by citing Article 6 of the 2004 French act entitled Law of Confidence in the Digital Economy, which

“[fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][e]xclude[s] civil and criminal liability on the part of hosts in two cases ­ no knowledge of the disputed content or of its unlawful nature, and withdrawal of such ccourcassationontent…these provisions could not impose liability on the host merely because it had not withdrawn information reported by a third party as being unlawful…”

The French protections are very similar to the safe harbor provisions of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. But the Court of Appeals in Paris refused to give Google safe harbor under the law. Instead, in four separate decisions (three rendered on January 14, 2011 and one on February 4), the Court assessed approximately $600,000 in damages for what it called “préjudice moral” and infringement.

Google has appealed the decision with the highest court in France, Cour de Cassation, which acts strictly as an appellate court, and the prospects for Google on appeal look more promising as they begin process. In 2009, the Cour de Cassation ruled that the video hosting website, Dailymotion, was not liable for providing the film “Joyeux Noël” because the provider did not have "explicit knowledge" of the infringed material being on their website, basing its decision on Article 6 of the Law of Confidence in the Digital Economy. According to Article 6, three criteria must be met to invoke knowledge of infringed material, including specifically that “notifications should indicate precisely which content is alleged to be unlawful, its precise location on the website and the reasons why it is unlawful.” Google intends to use this ruling to their favor as they embark on a case that will likely become the first of many.

http://www.ipbrief.net/2011/03/13/the-unimaginable-happened-google-sued-for-copyright-infringement/

http://www.twobirds.com/English/News/Articles/Pages/Paris_CourtofAppeal_Dailymotion_host.Aspx

http://www.juriscom.net/actu/visu.php?ID=949

http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2004/7/article18.en.html

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By Barry Neil Shrum & Nathan Drake

In November 2010, the Federal Immigration and Counterfeit Enforcement agency (“ICE”) recently seized 82 websites and shut them down on the grounds that they were committing criminal copyright infringement. One of these websites has recently become the spotlight of attention:. Brain McCarthy, the owner and operator of channelsurfing.net, has been arrested by ICE and charged with providing free streaming content to NFL, NHL and NBA sporting events. According to the ICE, McCarthy accumulated approximately $90,000 from advertisers on his website, and has received over 1.3 million hits since being obtained last month, depicting the significance of the website.

IICECE acts as the principle investigative arm of the United States Department of Homeland Security and is currently the second largest investigative arm of the federal government. What makes ICE’s action unusual is that McCarthy is charged with criminal copyright infringement, since most other cases involving copyright infringements are brought against defendants in civil court in search of damages. If charged as a criminal, McCarthy could serve up to five years in prison and pay substantial monetary fines.

These actions by ICE create a certain level of perplexity in the eyes of the public. In the eyes of many, including the editors of TechDirt, ICE’s actions are not justificed since, at the time of the channelsurfing.net seizure, the website ostensibly did not “possess” any copyrighted material, but rather only provided links to other website/servers where the infringing material resides. Is the criminal charge levied against McCarthy warranted if he was merely acting as a conduit of infringing information?

Perhaps the answer lies in the criteria constituting criminal copyright infringement in United States Code Title 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319. The code states that the prosecutor must show the following elements to prove criminal infringement:

(1) that a valid copyright; (2) was infringed by the defendant; (3) willfully; and (4) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.

To apply the analysis, it’s necessary to understand, on a technical level, what is happening on the McCarthy’s website. He is providing a “link,” i.e., a form of hypertext markup language, or HTML, that, when clicks, directly a stream of video to the user within the structure of McCarthy’s website. So the question become whether the criteria has been met. Let’s examine it:

Is there a valid copyright? Yes. This is easy. The NFL, NHL, NBA, etc. all possess valid copyrights in their broadcasts.

For purposes of financial gain. No doubt. Here, McCarthy obviously profits from the availability of the infringing material on his website, regardless of where the material is stored.

Wilfully infringed by the Defendant. Here is perhaps where some debate might occur as to McCarthy. Was his intention in placing the links on the site to infringe the copyright owner’s rights? If so, was it wilful?

One case that has examined the issue of whether embedded HTML code can serve as the basis for copyright infringement is Perfect 10 v. Google decided by the 9th Circuit. In that case,, Google was accused of civil copyright infringement for using a database of “borrowed” photographic images and making them available on their website when a user performs a search. The Citizen Media Law Project at Harvard University explained the ruling on this case as follows:

“The court went on to conclude that HTML instructions do not themselves cause infringing images to appear on a user’s computer screen because the HTML instructions merely convey an address to the user’s browser, which itself must then interact with the server that stores the infringing image. Accordingly, the mere provision of HTML instructions, in the view of the 9th Circuit, does not create a basis for direct copyright infringement liability.”

Several things should be noted about the 9th Circuit’s opinion. First, this case involved civil liability for copyright infringement, not criminal. The elements for civil copyright infringement are very different than those for criminal infringement. Secondly, the 9th circuit court is known as a radical circuit and many of its decisions are on the fringe. It’s rulings certainly do not hold the clout of the U.S. Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the decision, though it will likely be challenged, provides a new and thought provoking perspective.

So, bottom line, what do we think about McCarthy? In my opinion, the 9th Circuit is off base in regard to providing HTML code that “merely convey[fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][s] an address to the user’s browser” which it must then “interact” with to obtain the infringing image, which is stored on a different story. What the court complete overlooks is that this is the very essence of vicarious joint & several liability! It’s a well-established principle of copyright law that everyone in the chain of distribution is jointly and severally liable for the actions of the primary infringer. Taking this theory out of the physical realm and putting it into the digital realm should not change its application. In my humble opinion, Mr. McCarthy likely knew what he was doing. He is providing users with access to multiple portals that provide them with streams of illegally obtained intellectual property, much as a vendor on the streets of New York city provides pedestrians access to counterfeited Rolexes! The fact that he does not “warehouse” the goods, in either case, does not change the fact that he is facilitating the infringement.

Arguably no other circumstances in the history of law has caused so many problems of application as the invention and development of the Internet. This virtual world as wonderful a resource as it is, allows for greater efficiency and anonymity for infringers than ever thought possible, serving as a double-edged sword for this generation. While some may view the efforts of those pursuing copyright infringement via the Internet futile – in fact many consider copyright itself unnecessary as a result of the Internet – these enforcement efforts are nonetheless important and essential in maintaining the rights set forth by our forefathers over a century ago: rights of monopoly balanced with limitations and public access. If we as a society do not honor these goals, it is probable that we will be faced with a less creative society.

http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110104/12324012513/did-homeland-security-make-up-non-existent-criminal-contributory-infringement-rule-seizing-domain-names.shtml

http://paidcontent.org/article/419-feds-campaign-against-pirate-websites-leads-to-an-arrest/

http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110303/16584013356/ice-arrests-operator-seized-domain-charges-him-with-criminal-copyright-infringement.shtml

http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01847.htm[/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]