Tag Archive for: Google Books

The recent decision presented by the honorable Judge Chin on the matter of copyright infringement in the case The Authors Guild v. Google Inc. raised numerous issues in the arena of Intellectual Property. In addition to opposing the “opt-out” stipulation written into the settlement, Judge Chin also contested the way Google Inc. approached and viewed “orphan works” in relation to digitizing books where no copyright owner or recipient could be located or reached. In Judge Chin’s opinion, the matter of orphan works should not to be decided by private enterprise, but is rather a matter for Congress to decide. In so deciding, Judge Chin refers to certain opinions issued by the Copyright Office, as well as legislation that was originally proposed back in 2008.

"Orphaned works" are defined as copyrighted works for wSAVEORPHANShich the owner cannot be identified, but which someone wants to use. In other words, works for which the potential user cannot locate or identify the actual owner of the work in order to seek proper permission. Under the current legal structure, even if a potential user makes a diligent effort to find the owner in order to seek permission, the user’s risk of copyright liability for such use is not eliminated because there is always a possibility, however remote, that a copyright owner could bring an infringement action after that use has begun. Although it is difficult to know precisely how many orphaned works are around, one 2009 study conducted by the JISC (Strategic Content Alliance) in the United Kingdom calculated that as many as 25 million such works existed in the libraries, museums and archives of that country. In such situations, productive and beneficial use of the work – something the concept of copyright is designed to encourage – is impeded.  It is such a real problem that many organizations, like the Society of American Archivists, have issued statements of best practices to assist their members in dealing with orphaned works.  But many potential creators are not members of such an organization and don’t know how to approach clearing an orphaned work for use.

Based on a report on orphaned works prepared by the Copyright Office in 2006 at the requests of Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, the “Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008” (S. 2913) was ultimately introduced by Senator Leahy on April 24, 2008. It quickly passed by a unanimous vote on September 26, 2008. The act was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, where it unfortunately lies dormant or, more likely, has stalled or died in committee chambers, suffering the fate of many good laws. Several earlier actions which served the same purpose, such as Copyright Modernization Act of 2006 (H.R. 6052) suffered similar fates.  The proposed 2008 act outlined specific guidelines for individuals pursuing and currently using orphan works. The following is a brief overview of the proposed bill and its major provisions.

Under the proposed legislation, in order to use an orphan work, a person would be required to follow very specific steps in order to avoid financial and legal liability for infringement. These rules fall under the section entitled “Conditions for Eligibility,” which outlines the following as steps the person utilizing the orphaned works would need to takes in order to limit liability:

  1. provide extensive evidence that the infringer performed a detailed search in “good faith” to locate and identify the copyright holder and was unable to locate the copyright holder;
  2. acknowledge the copyright holder in an appropriate manner, assuming the copyright holder was known with a reasonable amount of confidence (a form of "moral rights");
  3. provide a mark or symbol in some regard indicating the work is used under this section;
  4. assert in an initial pleading the eligibility for such limitations; and
  5. provides documentation for the search undertaken to locate and identify the copyright holder.

The exceptions to the above guidelines for limited remedy collection do not apply to an "infringer" if: 1) the infringer receives notice of infringement and fails to negotiate in good faith with the claimant or 2) fails to provide payment for the use of the infringed material in a reasonable time period after reaching an agreement with the copyright holder.

Additionally, the individual must search with what the legislation described as "diligent effort” to locate the copyright holder. The phrase "diligent effort" requires, at a minimum: 1) a search of the records at the Copyright Office through the medium of the Internet 2) a search of “reasonably available sources of copyright authorship and ownership information” 3) use of intangible and tangible tools and publications, and where necessary, assistance of others and 4) use of databases available to the public, including those accessible by the Internet.

If someone utilizing an orphaned work follows these guidelines, any award for monetary relief “may not be made other than an order requiring the infringer to pay reasonable compensation to the owner of the exclusive right under the infringed copyright for the use of the infringed work.” Injunctive relief remains an additional remedy offered to the owner in order to prevent or restrain any further infringement action.

The act apparently died its quiet death because of opposition from many copyright groups and, in particular, notable expert Lawrence Lessig, who opposed the bill because of its vague definition of the "diligent efforts" required to avoid liability. Some of these opposition groups even referred to the proposed legislation as a “license to steal.”  The Register of Copyrights at the time, Marybeth Peters, believes to the contrary that the orphans works situation is a problem that is "overdue" and that the "pending legislation is both fair and responsible (See Marybeth Peter’s open letter).

This issue is particularly of concern for musicians and artists, since a large number of old recordings are no longer commercially available because of an uncertainty as to who owns them. In addition, creators of new recordings must often abandon projects if a work is "orphaned," for fear of liability. This is a loss not only for the artists, but for the public and our collective culture, i.e., the continuum.

Officially, legislator still deem the legislation to be "pending."  In his speech in 2009 in from of the World Copyright Summit, Senator Orrin Hatch state he “continue’s to be very active on passing orphan works legislation.”  He continued to say:

For years, I have been working with industry stakeholders and copyright experts, including Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to pass orphan works legislation. The bill seeks to unite users and copyright owners, and to ensure that copyright owners are compensated for the use of their works. I couldn’t agree more with Register Peters when she said, “A solution to the orphan works problem is overdue and the pending legislation is both fair and responsible.

Judge Chin felt that the Google settlement would have given Google an effective monopoly over orphan works, and that was one of his primary rationales in deciding the way he did.  His rejection of the Google settlement highlights this important issue and brings it to the light of public awareness again.  Anyone with an interest in intellectual property should contact their senators and representatives and ask why a more diligent effort, no pun intended, has not been made to address a problem that still exists, despite the fact that there has been no movement on the bill in three years.  With President Obama’s pro-intellectual property agenda, the time may right to solve this incredible hole in U.S. Copyright law.

Under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a settlement of a class action requires approval of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The court may approve a settlement that is binding on the class only if it determines that the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable, and not a product of collusion.” This week, with regard to the much ballyhooed amended settlement arrangement (the “ASA”) in The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. the honorable Denny Chin of the U.S. District Court in Manhattan said flatly “I conclude that it is not.”  See full decision.

google-book-search-3The ASA would have allowed Google to digitize millions of copyrighted works in an effort to create the largest digital library, a process Google began in 2004 when the company entered into agreements with certain academic libraries to digitize their holdings. Since that inaugural agreement, over 12 million books have been scanned and made available online through Google Books. The ASA would have allowed Google to “(1) continue to digitize books and inserts, (2) sell subscriptions to an electronic books database, (3) sell online access to individual books, (4) sell advertising on pages from books, and (5) make certain other prescribed uses. (ASA §§ 3.1, 4.1-4.8; see also ASA § 1.149).” Google’s rights to the copyrighted work would be on a non-exclusive basis, permitting the copyright holder to exploit the work to other companies, including competitors, while simultaneously allowing Google to display the work, for which Google would have been required to compensate the class plaintiffs 63% of the revenue from all uses of the work to the copyright holder.

Judge Chin recognized the many benefits of an online library with virtually every work ever created are great in number. First, the sheer number of books that students, schools and researchers could access would greatly benefit the public. Those in disadvantaged economies and cultures could access knowledge otherwise not available, and persons with disabilities could learn through the implementation of Braille and audio books. Moreover, publishers and authors would benefit due to the number of books made accessible to the public, especially those works that have been forgotten in the dark and hidden corners of libraries. But as Judge Chin further pointed out,

While the digitization of books and the creation of a universal digital library would benefit many, the ASA would simply go too far.

At least 500 additional parties filed amicus briefs on the subject commenting, mostly from a negative point of view, on the amended settlement, including such notables and Microsoft and Amazon. In addition, 6800 members of the plaintiff class “opted out” of the settlement. The bulk of the briefs focused on the inadequacies in the settlement relating to class notice and class representation, and on concerns regarding copyright, antitrust, privacy and international issues. Some also argued that the settlement would go beyond the authority of the court under Rule 23 of the Civil Rules of Procedure.

This procedural issue turned out to be one of the more compelling arguments presented to the court. In as much as the settlement would have released certain claims not before court such as, for example, so-called “orphaned works,” the court felt that the ASA was “an attempt to use the class action mechanism to implement forward-looking business arrangements that go far beyond the dispute before the Court in this litigation.”

Orphan works are books that have copyright protection, but the copyright owner identified in the registration certificate cannot be located or reached. Under the ASA, Google was required to “strive” to locate the copyright holder, but if unsuccessful could digitize the book without consent. In this case, and in the case of “absent class member who failed to opt out,” pursuant to terms of the settlement agreement, the copyright owner would lose the right to object to future infringing conduct by Google. The court was “troubled” by this aspect of the agreement. The judge stated:

The questions of who should be entrusted with guardianship over orphan books, under what terms, and with what safeguards are matters more appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement among private, self-interested parties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.

The court illustrated the concern with a quote from a Texas woman who grandfather self-published his memoirs, Dust and Snow, she says,

From Google’s point of view, Dust and Snow is an “orphaned” book. If and when Google scans it, the company is likely to be unsuccessful in trying to locate the publisher, since the book was self-published and my grandfather is now deceased. In essence, the way the settlement is written, such “orphaned” titles are automatically handed to Google free of charge to do with, as it will. From my family’s point of view, Dust and Snow is not orphaned at all. It is very clear who owns the copyright. So why is Google being granted the automatic right to take over the copyright of books like my grandfather’s?

As noted earlier, Chin stated that such matters as “orphaned works” are best left to Congress rather than private entities to delineate and enforce through such an agreement.

As the literary agents Stuart Bernstein and Susan Bergholz expressed to the court so eloquently:

By accepting this settlement, the court will be setting a highly questionable precedent, usurping the role of the legislature by creating a legal loophole for one corporation and reversing the very foundation of copyright protection. We who have devoted our lives to assisting the work of creative individuals are left with a sense of moral indignation. We have pledged, in our contracts with clients, to sell or license their rights to ethically and financially sound purchasers and licensees. And for many years we have toiled over agreements and contracts to accomplish this, aided by the protections of the law. The situation we find ourselves in now is one of dismay and powerlessness, with only the weak ability to “object” or opt out. We beseech you to give authors back their rights. Force Google to negotiate like any other.

With regard to the fact that the ASA would give Google permission to digitize any work unless the copyright owner “opted-out,” the court also found this to be unpalatable, as it places an unnecessary and unwarranted strain on the copyright owner to initiate an action to prevent copyright infringement, when in fact; the responsibility should be placed on the entity wanting to use the copyright work.

As the Copyright Act explains,

When an individual author’s ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under the copyright, shall be given effect under this title, except as provided under title 11.” (17 U.S.C. § 201(e).)

As David Nimmer, author of Nimmer on Copyright explains, “By its terms, Section 201(e) is not limited to acts by governmental bodies and officials. It includes acts

of seizure, etc., by any ‘organization’ as well.” However, under the ASA, any copyright owner who fails to notify Google and “opt-out” will lose their right to the copyright and deem Google competent to do with their copyright as they please.

In light of the previous lawsuits brought against Google by publishers and the current settlement recently rejected, Judge Chin says,

It is incongruous with the purpose of the copyright laws to place the onus on copyright owners to come forward to protect their rights when Google copied their works without first seeking their permission.

The Court was also sympathetic to concerns raised by Microsoft and Amazon that approval of this settlement would, in effect, give Google de facto monopolies over the digital book industry as well as the online search industry. This, of course, raises a number of antitrust concerns by effectively foreclosing competition.

In Google’s pursuit to provide the first digital library encompassing the estimated “174 million unique books,” the information giant has displayed the unequivocal lengths it is willing to take in order to bring more information to more people. As one individual put it, “Google pursued its copyright project in calculated disregard of authors’ rights. Its business plan was: ‘So, sue me.'” Google’s thirst for providing perpetual information to the consumer caused the company to overlook, whether intentionally or accidently, major copyright issues.

In rejecting the settlement, Judge Chin made one very keen observation in his conclusion: ” many of the concerns raised in the objections would be ameliorated if the ASA were converted from an “opt-out” settlement to an “opt-in” settlement.” He strongly urged the parties to consider such an option.

http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=special&id=115