Mark Twain had a lot to say about statistics, ranking them as the highest of all lies:  “There are three kinds of lies:  lies, damned lies, and statistics.  Twain is also attributed with the more insinuated saying that “statistics are like ladies of the evening, once you get them down, you do anything with them!”   It’s been quite awhile since I’ve seen a manipulation of statistics that illustrates Twain’s philosophy about them more than what is found in the article posted by self-styled “political evangelist” and anti-copyright activist, Rick Falkvinge, this week entitled Kill Copyright, Create Jobs. Absent three very slick and attractive graphics, the only “facts” that Falkvimark_twain_pic_440_1_nge offers in support of this conclusion is statistics which, as far as I can tell, are made up!
 

In an effort to defeat the claims of the United Kingdom’s “copyright industry” that 1.2 million jobs will be lost by 2015 if stricter enforcement of copyright laws is not enacted, Falkvinge begins with the exaggerated conclusion that “for every job lost (or killed) in the copyright industry due to nonenforcement of copyright, 11.8 jobs are created in electronics wholesale, electronics manufacturing, IT, or telecom industries — or even the copyright-inhibited part of the creative industries.”
Falkvinge reaches this absurd conclusion through a somersault of logic involving segregating the “creative industries” into various categories of groups subdivided into “copyright-dependent” and “copyright-inhibited” sectors.  Of course, these phrases are never precisely defined but, reading between the lines, the reader can gather that the latter sector includes industries “fueled by a lack of copyright monopoly enforcement,” while the former we must assume includes some form of enforcement.  Once he groups the various creative industries according to this loosely defined structure, he asserts that “the contribution of the copyright-inhibited industries outweigh the copyright-dependent industries by a factor of 11.8,” and then draws the leap of faith that when a copyright-dependent job is lost, a copyright-inhibited job is created.  He then forms this general conclusion: “Prevent copyright enforcement, or weaken or kill copyright, and create jobs. Lots more of them.”  Wow!  Please, Obama, take note of this staggering feat of intellectual prowess!
There are so many errors in this article, it’s hard to begin, and I don’t intend to address each one.  But as you start to examine the sectors of industry that Falkvinge places into these divisions, you can easily see where his analysis falls apart.  Seriously, I don’t think it’s intended so much as analysis as it is rhetoric.  Nonetheless, let’s look at some examples.
In the first instance, Falkvinge erroneously relies on the conclusions of Peter Higgs in Beyond the Creative Industries for his foundational argument that the “creative industries” of the U.K. only account for 7% of its GDP, which he divides into three categories:  copyright-dependent, copyright-inhibited and copyright-agnostic.  I say he relies on this statistic “erroneously” because the 7% figure contained in Higgs’ report is based on what Higgs calls the “creative core” of the industry, not the entire industry.  Higgs’ defines the creative core as the “pre-creative and creative stages of the value chain” (p. 27).   This approach, Higgs establishes, only focuses on those involved in the initial stages of creation, i.e., the musicians, the dancers, the producers, etc (p. 28).  Thus, by default, the analysis does not factor in the post-creation employment of the creative industry and, thus, cannot be used in support of Falkvinge’s overall asssertion that on 7% of the GDP of the United Kingdom is based on the creative industries.
Second, in one sweeping yet unexplained fell swoop, Falkvinge places the entire advertising and marketing industry in the “copyright-inhibited” category.  Last time I checked, the advertising and marketing industry relied in large part on the creation of intellectual property, much of which is copyrighted work which relies on enforcement.   In another breathe, again without laying any factual foundation, he states that only 25% of the software, electronic publishing, games, film, television, radio and photography industries are “copyright-dependent.”  Twenty five percent?  Seriously?  Then he “estimates” than only 50% of the music and performing arts sectors of the creative industry are dependent on copyright protection.  Again, really?
With regard to his category of “architecture, visual arts and design,” Falkvinge’s “analysis” is totally off the mark.  First, again, he simply asserts that 100% of the architecture industry is copyright-inhibited, meaning it does not rely on copyright protection for enforcement.  He doesn’t define whether he is referring to architecture as a visual art or whether he is referring to the more intellectual and abstract protection of the actual structure which the U.S. Congress protected in 1996 with the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act.   One can only assume that Falkvinge is unaware that the U.S. and most other Berne Convention signatory countries protect such works, since he groups architecture with the visual arts.
Secondly, Falkvinge lumps all of the “visual arts and design” industry into “fashion design” and then asserts that it is “copyright agnostic,” since fashion design is not entitled to copyright protection.  Ignoring the fact that there are many other arts to be considered in the visual arts and design sector of a country’s industries, let me just address the last assertion about fashion design.  There are several nations that actual do offer copyright protection for fashion design, namely the European Union, and France individually, and Japan, just to point out a few.  The U.S. currently has legislation pending that would follow in the footsteps of these country and protect U.S. fashion designers whose designs are pirated as soon as they are released.  (See this post on Law on the Row regarding the pending legislation).
As Falkvinge draws to a long and painful conclusion, he states that U.K’s “monopolized entertainment [fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][industries’]” claim that they will lose 1.2 million in jobs by the year 2015 is “deceptive, dishonest and bordering on fraudulent,” which he uses to link to another self-aggrandizing article in which he claims that we as a culture are creating now more than ever, that copyright monopolies are an obstacle, and the copyright abolishment would only intensify this effect.  All I can say to Falkvinge’s claim is bull$^!+.  Isn’t that something akin to the pot calling the kettle black?  Is it really deceptive to say that most of my songwriting clients, the people who write the music, are struggling to feed themselves and have to take full time retail employment to make ends meet?  Is is dishonest to say that those same songwriters do not create as much music as they did before they were forced to work 10-12 hours a day to support their families?  And how can you deny the decline in sales of recorded music?  How can you deny the falling profits of the world’s entertainment conglomerates?  I certainly don’t pretend to know about the music industry of the U.K., but I do know that the local economy in Music City U.S.A., Nashville, Tennessee has suffered dramatically as a direct result of illegal downloading of copyrighted works.  I certainly know that this has a trickle down effect on all sectors of the music industry here, including my own practice!  If any of these claims are fradulent, then call me a fraud.
Long before Falkvinge began spinning his  illogical analyses, a company of men including Jefferson, Madison and Pinkney and other great thinkers of their day dealt with the issue we are dealing with – should creative ideas be entitled to protection as individual property?   These men debate natural law versus utilitarianism, and ultimately derived what is arguably a very workable system of protecting intellectual properties.  The U.S. system is based on theories like those of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who believed that we should “give to every man his own,” and that man acquired the ownership of property by exerting labor and converting nature – in this case ideas – into something that benefits society.  In fact, Locke believed that because a work created by an individual enriched society in general, and would theoretically continue to do so in the future, the author should have the right to be compensated as long as that benefit to society continued.  But, our Forefathers also wisely saw that in order to create, it is helpful to have a thriving public domain, so they placed certain limitations on these rights, namely granting the monopoly for “limited time.”  The “monopoly” of copyright protection – Falkvinge derisively refers to it as the “copyright monopoly” as if it’s a bad thing – is merely a reflection of these ideas.  If we believe that one should benefit from his or her own creation, his or her own expression of an original idea, then laws and rules are the only way to enforce that in a developed society.  Because of the wisdom of our Forefathers, we have that in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution.  For my money, the logic of Locke, Hobbes, Jefferson and Madison surpasses the diatribe of Falkvinge at least by a factor of 11.8 to 1!
So, in summary, I am quite certain that Falkvinge, if he even takes note of my existence, would categorize me as just another one of the “lawyer who advocate maximization of the copyright monopoly.”  He would likely also allege that my claims are misleading if not bordering on fraudulent.  Regardless, I think that it is evident that Falkvinge’s assertion that for every 1 job lost to copyright infringement, 12 more will pop up to replace them is unfounded and, frankly, completely manufactured.

 


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NBC Universal recently hired a company called Envisional to study counterfeiting activity over the Internet. The results of this study – despite the fact that it is industry funded – are literally astonishing: 24% of all global Internet traffic involves digital theft!  Stated another way, one in every four people surfing the Internet are stealing intellectual property, i.e., illegally downloading either copyrighted or trademarked materials.  According to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, 95% of the music downloaded from the Internet is downloaded illegally!  Imagine how our society would react if one out of every four people in retail malls were carrying out stolen merchandise on a daily basis, or if 95% of the product leaving the mall was stolen.  It would be chaos.

Ring of FrodoNow consider whether these people who so quickly download a song or a movie on the Internet without paying for it would also walk up to an artist selling their painting in the park and steal one of their painting.  I firmly believe the answer to that question is a resounding no!  But why? What is different about the world wide web, i.e. cyberspace, that gives these consumers the feeling that they are entitled to download music and movies through mechanisms like BitTorrent without compensating those who created such product?  What are these people thinking?

I think the answer can be found in the writings of Plato.  In the second book of his Republic, Plato’s student, Glaucon, poses the illustration of the “Ring of Gyges.”  In the story, Gyges is a shepherd who finds a magical ring in a chasm created by a lightning storm.  The ring gives him a cloak of invisibility.  Using his newfound power, Gyges seduces the Queen of Lydia, murders the King, and takes the throne, gaining power, wealth and fame.  In the Republic, Glaucon argues that given a similar opportunity, any person, whether or not they were previously just or unjust, would use the power to commit as many crimes as necessary to get what they want [fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][Book II, 359d].    Glaucon was responding to Socrates’ refutation of arguments put forth by Thrasymachus in Book I of the Repbulic, i.e., that “justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger”  [Book I, 338c].

I believe Glaucon’s experiment in thought informs us as to why someone who would not normally steal a tangible object in the physical world is nonetheless more than willing to download music or movies, intangible objects, on the Internet for free: because the fear of being punished or getting caught is eliminated in the evanescent world of Cyberspace.  The Internet, like Gyge’s ring, confers upon its users a seeming cloak of indivisibility as it were.  As one astute commentator surmised in response to an interview with Alice in Chain’s lead singer, Sean Kinney, “The real reason people steal music is that they CAN and very easily.”  That this is a truth is evident from the plethora of “how to” guides on the Internet, teaching people “How not to get caught.” There you have it in a nutshell.   All of the commentary about how the record industry has been thieves and how the RIAA unjustly goes after the defenseless people, these are mere justifications for actions people otherwise know in their hearts are wrong.

It’s important to read Plato’s response to his student to understand fully, as Plato did not agree with Glaucon.  Plato’s argument in the remaining portion of the Republic is that the just man would not be tempted by this cloak of invisibility to commit crimes.  Rather, the just man understands that crime itself makes a person unhappy and that he is better off to remain just.   I frequently discuss this issue with my college students at Belmont University when teaching a course on Copyright Law.  One of my students made the following observation, which confirms Plato’s conclusion.  She said:

I do not follow the rules because I am scared of the RIAA busting me for illegal downloading. I follow the rules because I have respect for the people who wrote and recorded the songs, and even more, because I want to work in the music industry.

Another relevant opinion is offered in the excellent blog article found on arbiteronline entitled Illegal downloading: The real cost of ‘free’ music.” In that article, a student at Boise state, Ammon Roberts, is quoted as saying:

“I don’t do it because I don’t feel it’s right.  If I were making the music, I’d be upset if people were downloading it for free.”

For these two students, following the rules is not about whether or not they’ll be caught, it’s about doing the right thing.  It’s about honoring, i.e. compensating, the people who created the music. 03-20-invisible_full_600 This illustrates Plato’s point precisely:  a just person understands that even with a cloak of invisibility, doing the right thing makes a person happy or, in the words of Roberts, makes the person “feel right.”

The Internet is also very much the Land of Oz.  In addition to this cloak of invisibility endowed on us by the Internet, it also deceives us with illusions of anonymity – not so much that the user is anonymous, as that’s merely another form of invisibility – but in the sense that it’s difficult to know who’s behind the curtain.   As Trent Reznor said in an interview, “there is a perception that you don’t pay for music when your hear it . . . on MySpace.”  Because of its sheer vastness and its mysteriousness, Cyberspace gives people false perceptions that their actions on the Internet do not affect real people.   This, in turn, creates an illusion that “resistance is futile.”  Everyone is doing it, so I can too.  In other words, Cyberspace alters our reality in that it makes the real people behind the music an amorphous, anonymous entity.  The result is that it’s much easier to steal from an amorphous, anonymous entity – the man behind the curtain – than it is from a struggling songwriter, particularly when all your friends are doing it.

I truly believe that most of the people who are illegally downloading music from the Internet have no idea who they are affecting or how widespread the effect is.  Most of these people would not even think about walking up on stage after a singer/songwriter in a nightclub takes a break and stealing his guitar, but that very same person doesn’t think twice of taking that same singer/songwriter’s song from the Internet.  They wouldn’t steal the filmmaker’s camera, but downloading the movie doesn’t phase their consciousness.  In fact, many who contribute to the  dialog would argue that these two thefts are not analogous.  But one analysis conducted by the Institute for Policy Innovation states otherwise.  The report indicated that music piracy causes $12.5 billion of economic losses every year.  It further concluded that 71,060 U.S. jobs are lost, with a total loss of $2.7 billion in workers’ earnings.  Such reports abound throughout the industry, yet many of the people guilty of illegal download continue to view these reports as industry-driven and, therefore, skewed.  Take this comment by blogger Michael Arrington as an example:

Eventually the reality of the Internet will force the laws to change, too. One way or another the music labels will eventually surrender, and recorded music will be free.  Until it is, I refuse to feel guilty for downloading and sharing music. Every time I listen to a song, or share it with a friend, I’m doing the labels a favor. One that eventually I should be paid for. Until that day comes, don’t even think about trying to tell me that I’m doing something ethically wrong when it’s considered quite legal, with the labels’ blessing, in China.

resistanceBut what this illusion of anonymity, and such misguided opinions, miss is the fact that very real people – not amorphous masses – are being affected.  And the effect is devastating.  I have clients who are songwriters who are no longer creating art because they are forced to take odd jobs to support their families.  The performance royalties they used to receive from ASCAP, BMI or SESAC are down by half or more from a few years ago.  Their mechanical royalty checks are virtually non-existent.  They simply cannot afford to create simply for the sake of creation.  And now, working sometimes two jobs, they don’t have the time to create.  What will become of the art of songwriting if Mr. Arrington has his way and all recorded music is free?  I believe we will not have the quality of music in this country that we have enjoyed throughout the last millennium.  In this instance, I do not believe that resistance is futile.

Now, getting back to Plato and the Ring of Gyges, in answer to Glaucon, Plato would say that the root of all trouble is unlimited desire.   How true is that in this world of Cyberspace, in this world of rampant illegal downloading.  The wheels really fell off the wagon when the RIAA sued Diamond Multimedia, bringing the MP3 into society’s field of view.  Then, Napster exploded and almost everyone found that almost every song they ever loved was available for free.  It’s as if they were Harrison Ford and discovered the treasure room in an unknown, ancient tomb: everything your heart desires is within your grasp.  It’s yours for the taking.  With its cloak of invisibility and its illusion of anonymity, what the Internet has done, in short, is to return the power – i.e., the control – back to the people.  Everyone is now a creater, a publisher, and distributor.  No one needs the conglomerates anymore – the people have the power.  But, as Lord Acton said, beware:  “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”  With power, therefore, comes responsibility.   Unfortunately for the music industry, the power is currently being abused and will, ultimately, mean the end of the recording industry as it existed through the 20th century unless the creators regain that power.

So what does this mean for those of us who have chosen to make our living in the world of creation?  Does it mean the end of our industry?  Does it mean an end to copyright law as it exists?  If we examine the origins of copyright – i.e., the protection of an original idea expressed in a tangible format – as passed down to us from our forefathers, we find a concept on which we can continue to build.  In the now famous Radiohead experiment in which Reznor and crew allowed consumers to pay what and only if they wanted to, 18% of the consumers chose to do so!  That to me, is an encouraging statistic, and one that confirms a believe in the viability of creating art.  At least one in five people, even with the cloak of anonymity provided by the Ring of Gyges of this era, i.e., Cyberspace, chose to pay the creators for their creation.  Take that Glaucon!  Take that Arrington!  What does that say for our society?  It says that there are people who still chose to do the right thing, even when the tide of conformity rises above their heads.

The bottom line is that it really doesn’t matter what laws are passed by society, there will always be a certain percentage of people who will chose to steal, take and plunder, whether it be because they are more powerful or because they are cloaked with invisibility or shielded by anonymity.  But – and here is the important thing – there will also always be a segment of society that recognizes the idea that Thomas Hobbes first advanced hundreds of years ago, i.e., the idea of “giving to every man his own.”    If a man bakes a loaf of bread, is it not his right to trade that to the artist for whose painting he wishes to barter?  This idea was later incorporated by our Forefathers into Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the authority “[to] promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  Without this Constitutional right, a creator has no hope of protecting his or her property against plunder.  And as long as a segment of society believes this proposition to be beneficial to society as a whole, it will hopefully continue to motivate creators to create, and so profit from their creations, despite the efforts of those who choose to destroy it under a cloak of invisibility and unjustly take for themselves the kingdom of Lydia.

Quotations from Republic are taken from the W.H.D. Rouse translation, Great Dialogues of Plato, Mentor Books, 1956, a quoted in this fine article on the topic.

 


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By Nathan Drake

RunwayThe wildly popular and quickly emerging fashion giant, Forever 21, has endured numerous obstacles since its inception into the fashion industry 27 years ago. Recently however, Forever 21 has encountered a new type of hurdle; copyright infringement. In the January 24th edition of Bloomberg Businessweek, Susan Berfield explains, “Starting in about 2004…labels ranging from Diane von Furstenberg to Anna Sui to Anthropologie, about 50 in all, separately sued Forever 21 for copying their clothes.” According to Susan Scafidi, a copyright professor at Fordham University Law School and director of the Fashion Law Institute, “Of the various fast fashion chains, Forever 21 is the one who treats liability as a cost of doing business…Illegal copying has been incorporated into their business model.” In response to this increasing litigation and skewed mentality in the fashion industry, numerous senators, including Senator Schumer and Senator Clinton, introduced a bill in 2006 amending Title 17 of the Copyright Act of 1976 of the United States Code to include copyright protection for “fashion design.” If it passes, this would represent the first addition of a new protected class of copyrighted works since Congress passed the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act in 1989.

Consequently, the question that looms in the minds of those opposing copyright protection for fashion design is simple: How does one successfully and fairly protect something as functional and practical as clothing? While certain designers and fashion lines will have their own character and price tag, allowing certain individuals to own sleeve designs or collar configurations would prove absurd and oppressive. Just as architecture laws do not provide copyright protection for “functional elements,” such as doors, windows, walls or ceilings, fashion design is limited in what it can deem copyrightable, i.e., original, due to the utilitarian use of clothing.

Support for copyright protection in the fashion industry has gained a backing from several prominent designers and New York’s Council of Fashion Designers of America, according to Louis S. Ederer and Maxwell Preston of Arnold and Porter LLP. The main opponent of the bill has been the American Apparel and Footwear Association. As Preston and Ederer explain, the AAFA has opposed the bill for several reasons, including, but not limited to ambiguous language in prosecuting copyright infringement and the perceived lack of resources to accommodate the influx of applications the Copyright Office would likely encounter. In response to these complaints, Senator Schumer and his colleagues have revised and submitted a new bill to the Senate as of August 5, 2010 (S. 3728).

In the eyes of the law, clothing serves a “utilitarian” purpose in covering a person’s body, so attempting to separate the fashion design from the clothing becomes a very difficult task. Essentially, the copyright law wants to prevent functional styles, such as the collared shirt or the “v-neck,” to remain unprotected due to the utilitarian and practical purpose it provides. To assure this, the current requirements of the Copyright Act would still apply, i.e.¸ that the fashion design would need possess a “modicum” of originality in order to be eligible for copyright protection. The current draft of the S. 3728 specifically states that the fashion design must “provide a unique, distinguishable non-trivial and non-utilitarian variation over prior designs for similar types of articles” (Section 2(a)(2)(B)(ii)).

Furthermore, while there is no perfect answer for an issue as complex as copyright protection for fashion design, working to promote a healthy industry by awarding creativity is an important principle. The revised bill, currently cNathanalled the “Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act” was introduced on August 5, 2010 and remains in the Senate to be discussed and voted on.

The author, Nathan Drake is a senior at Belmont University from Northville, Michigan who graduates in May with a degree in Music Business from the Mike Curb School of Music Business. Nathan currently clerks for Mr. Barry Neil Shrum at Shrum & Associates in Nashville, Tennessee.  He plans on pursuing a law degree after graduation.

References

Berfield, Susan. “Forever 21’s Fast (and Loose) Fashion Empire.” Bloomberg BusinessWeek. 20 Jan. 2011. Web. 14 Feb. 2011. <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_05/b4213090559511_page_2.htm>.

“Copyright Law of the United States.” U.S. Copyright Office. Oct. 2009. Web. 7 Feb. 2011. <Copyright.gov>.

Ederer, Louis S., and Maxwell Preston. “The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act – Fashion Industry Friend or Faux?” Business Solutions & Software for Legal, Education and Government | LexisNexis. 25 Aug. 2010. Web. 07 Feb. 2011. <http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/copyright-trademarklaw/blogs/fashionindustrylaw/archive/2010/08/25/the-innovative-design-protection-and-piracy-prevention-act-fashion-industry-friend-or-faux.aspx>.

Schumer, Charles. “Bill Text – 111th Congress (2009-2010).” THOMAS (Library of Congress). 5 Aug. 2010. Web. 07 Feb. 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c111:1:./temp/~c11198mPaA::.

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Kris Kristofferson and Fred Foster once penned one of my favorite lyrics in the song Me and Bobby McGee, i.e., “freedom’s just another word for nothing left to lose.”  The sentiment is perhaps appropriate for the ongoing war that is being waged against copyright laws as we know them.  The latest battle in this war was fired by the esteemed Lawrence Lessig, famous lawyer and copyright scholar, in his new book Remix: Making Art & Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy.  If Lessig has his way, the songwriter and music publisher will, indeed, have nothing left to lose.

Remix Lawrence Lessig The main goal of the book is the demolishment of existing copyright laws, which Lessig has described as Byzantine.  He believes our current copyright laws are futile, costly and culturally stifling. The “hybrid economy” is described by Lessig as one in which a “sharing economy” coexists with a “commercial economy.”  See this very humorous interview by Stephen Colbert.  He gives examples such as YouTube, Flikr and Wikipedia, which rely on user-generated “remixes” of information, images and sound to illustrate his point.  This “hybrid economy,” in Lessig-speak, is identical to what he calls a “Read/Write (RW)” culture — as opposed to “Read/Only (RO)” — i.e., a culture in which consumers are allowed to “create art as readily as they consume it.”  Thus, the “remix” to which he refers is the concept of taking another persons copyrighted work and “making something new” or “building on top of it.”  This is what us less-published copyright lawyers like to refer to as a derivative work!  And that is the crux of Lessig’s problem:  the copyright law DOES in fact make provision for this type of creative endeavor, provided that the creator of the derivative work gains the permission of the copyright owner.  This is that with which Lessig seeks to do away.

In the Colbert interview, Lessig drolly points out that 70% of our kids are sharing files illegally and that the “outdated” copyright laws are “turning them in to criminals.”  This reminds me just a bit of what my Daddy used to tell me: just because everybody’s doing it doesn’t make it right!   Or, as Colbert blithely responded, “isn’t that like saying arson laws are turning our kids into arsonists?”  The obvious conclusion is that perhaps the law is simply not the problem.

Colbert then comically crosses out Lessig’s name on the cover of his his advance copy of Lessig’s book, draws a picture of Snoopy inside, and then questions Lessig as to whether the book was now his (Colber’t’s) work of art, to which Lessig says “that’s great,” we “jointly” own the copyright.  That’s a point to which Lessig’s publisher, Penguin Press, would surely not acquiesce.  In the final retort to Lessig, Colbert makes the point that he likes the current system, and I quote, “the system works for me.”  I might add that the system seems to be working extremely well for Lawrence Lessig as well.  Lessig is making a fortune exploiting the very system he criticizes as antiquated – the very essence of free speech, I suppose, but in the final analysis, a bit disingenuous.

While I do admire Professor Lessig for working toward a solution to a perceived problem, it’s very difficult to believe that tearing down the entire system of copyright laws in order to accommodate a large percentage of prepubescent teenagers who are too cheap to pay for their music is the appropriately measured response we need in this instance.   Call me crazy.

Here are several good critiques of Lessig’s work and ideas here for further exploration of this issue:

The Future of Copyright, by Lawrence B. Solum (download PDF from this page)

Lessig’s call for a “simple blanket license” in Remix, by Adam Thierer

Copyright in the Digital Age, by Mark A. Fischer

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The trial in Capital v. Thomas was one of the first stories I began tracking over a year ago.  See Jury Awards RIAA $222,000 against Thomas:  My Thoughts on the Verdict and Jammie Thomas to appeal verdict in RIAA Litigation.  

Now, in a decision issued on September 24, 2008 – only eight days shy of the one-year anniversary of the verdict – Judge Michael J. Davis of the United States District Court in Minnesota, who heard the case originally, vacated the $222,000 verdict against Jamie Thomas in Capital v. Thomas and ordered a new trial.  Read the 44-page verdict.

Judge Davis found that he provided the jury with an erroneous instruction, Jury Instruction No. 15, which read:

The act of making copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the copyright owners, violates the copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution has been shown.

A fter reviewing case law in other circuits, Judge Davis reached the opposite conclusion in this memorandum and order, i.e. that “Liability for violation of the exclusive distribution right found in § 106(3) requires actual dissemination” and, therefore, the contrary assertion in the instruction substantially prejudiced the jury against Thomas.

In his opinion generally, the Judge Davis examined the reproduction right, the effect of MediaSentry’s involvement in the distribution,  the plain meaning of the term “distribution,” whether the term “distribution” is synonymous with the term “publication” under the Copyright Act, and whether a plaintiff has the exclusive right to authorize a distribution.

The Judge refutes the RIAA’s theory that making a copyright available for distribution violates Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act, which gives the owner the exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”   Judge Davis examines the dictionary definition of the term “distribute,” other sections of the Copyright Act, and provisions of the analogous Patent Act, to arrive at the conclusion that “the term ‘distribution’ does not including making available and, instead, requires actual dissemination.”  The Court noted that if it had intended to include “making available” as one of the means of distributing a copyright, Congress would have specifically added the language as it had done in the Patent Act when Congress amended it to forbade “offers to sell.”

Judge Davis also refuted the Plaintiff’s argument that the definitions of “publication” and “distribution” under the Copyright Act are synonymous as incorrect.  His conclusion regarding this issue is worth quoting in its entirety:

The Court concludes that simply because all distributions within the meaning of §106(3) are publications does not mean that all publications within the meaning of § 101 are distributions. The statutory definition of publication is broader than the term distribution as used in § 106(3). A publication can occur by means of the “distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending.” § 101. This portion of the definition of publication defines a distribution as set forth in § 106(3). However, a publication may also occur by “offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display.” § 101. While a publication effected by distributing copies or phonorecords of the work is a distribution, a publication effected by merely offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public is merely an offer of distribution, not an actual distribution. 

Congress’s choice to use both terms within the Copyright Act demonstrates an intent that the terms have different meanings. “It is untenable that the definition of a different word in a different section of the statute was meant to expand the meaning of ‘distribution’ and liability under § 106(3) to include offers to distribute.” Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976,
985 (D. Ariz. 2008). The language of the Copyright Act definition of  publication clearly includes distribution as part of its definition – so all distributions to the public are publications, but not all publications are distributions to the public.

Finally, in reaching its opinion that the jury verdict should be vacated because of the erroneous instruction, Judge Davis clearly states that it is not necessary to reach Thomas’ issue of whether the award was excessive (See page 40 of his opinion).  Nonetheless, he did indicate his leanings on this issue in dicta as follows:

The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to implore Congress to amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer-to‐peer network cases such as the one currently before this Court. The Court
begins its analysis by recognizing the unique nature of this case. The defendant is an individual, a consumer. She is not a business. She sought no profit from her acts. The myriad of copyright cases cited by Plaintiffs and the Government, in which courts upheld large statutory damages awards far above the minimum, have limited relevance in this case. All of the cited cases involve corporate or business defendants and seek to deter future illegal commercial conduct. The parties point to no case in which large statutory damages were applied to a party who did not infringe in search of commercial gain.

The statutory damages awarded against Thomas are not a deterrent against those who pirate music in order to profit. Thomas’s conduct was motivated by her desire to obtain the copyrighted music for her own use. The Court does not condone Thomas’s actions, but it would be a farce to say that a single mother’s acts of using Kazaa are the equivalent, for example, to the acts of global financial firms illegally infringing on copyrights in order to profit in the securities market. Cf. Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 42 737, 741‐42 (D. Md. 2003) (describing defendants as a “global  financial‐services firm” and a corporation that brokers securities). While the Court does not discount Plaintiffs’ claim that, cumulatively, illegal  downloading has far‐reaching effects on their businesses, the damages awarded in this case are wholly disproportionate to the damages suffered by Plaintiffs. Thomas allegedly infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs ‐ the equivalent of approximately three CDs, costing less than $54, and yet the total damages awarded is $222,000 – more than five hundred times the cost of buying 24 separate CDs and more than four thousand times the cost of three CDs.  While the Copyright Act was intended to permit statutory damages that are larger than the simple cost of the infringed works in order to make infringing a far less attractive alternative than legitimately purchasing the songs, surely damages that are more than one hundred times the cost of the works would serve as a suffic
ient deterrent.

Thomas not only gained no profits from her alleged illegal activities, she sought no profits. Part of the justification for large statutory damages awards in copyright cases is to deter actors by ensuring that the possible penalty for infringing substantially outweighs the potential gain from infringing. In the case of commercial actors, the potential gain in revenues is enormous and enticing to potential infringers. In the case of individuals who infringe by using peer‐to‐peer networks, the potential gain from infringement is access to free music, not the possibility of hundreds of thousands – or even millions – of dollars in profits. This fact means that statutory damages awards of hundreds of thousands of dollars is certainly far greater than necessary to accomplish Congress’s goal of deterrence.

Unfortunately, by using Kazaa, Thomas acted like countless other Internet users. Her alleged acts were illegal, but common. Her status as a consumer who was not seeking to harm her competitors or make a profit does not excuse her behavior. But it does make the award of hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages unprecedented and oppressive.

One issue I note in this dicta by Judge Davis is that statutory damages, as provided in the Copyright Act, were not necessarily intended only as a deterrent, but also were established because it is sometimes difficult to determine the value of an intellectual property.   This does not, however, negate his primary point that a factor of 100x the actual damages might have been a more reasonable award than 500x the actual damages. 

Expect to hear more about this case as the new trial unfolds.

On August 4, 2008, the Second Circuit court of appeals overturned a lower courts opinion that Cablevision’s Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder (“RS-DVR”) system violated the Copyright Act by infringing plaintiffs’ exclusive rights of reproduction and public performance.  The full 44-page opinion is available at Cartoon Network, LLP, et al. v. Cablevision.  In my humble yet fully animated opinion, the Second Circuit’s opinion was not at all well reasoned nor, for that matter, even common sense — I believe it misinterprets at three very important areas of the Copyright Act and interpretation thereof:

When is a work “Fixed” According to Section 101

Through a system of buffers, Cablevision’s RS-DVR will allow customers who do not own stand alone DVR’s to record programming, which resides on Cablevision’s servers, and “time-shift” it to view it at a later date.  Certainly a great concept, but one which, in my opinion, should require authorization from the owners of the copyrights.

In arriving at its conclusion, the court determined that the buffer used to process the steam of data only “copies” the data for a duration of 1.2 seconds, before transferring it to another buffer used to reconstruct a copy of the program for any customer who has asked to view it at a later time.  The court concluded that this “embodiment,” i.e. the copy, was transitory in duration and therefore not “fixed” pursuant to Section 101 of the Copyright Act.  Therefore, the copyright owners’ right of reproduction was not violated.  This is clearly erroneous reasoning:

The definition of “fixed” in Section 101 of the Copyright Act states, in its entirety:

A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.

In arriving at its determination, the Second Circuit focused on its condensed version of the definition, i.e. a work is “fixed” when its embodiment “. . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of more than transitory duration.”  The court concluded, based on this shortened version of the definition, that the “language plainly imposes two distinct but related requirements, i.e. an “embodiment requirement” and a “duration requirement.”

The Second Circuit’s error is grammatical in nature:  it misinterprets the language of the definition of “fixed” by assuming that the phrase “for a period of more than transitory duration” modifies the words “permanent or stable” when in fact it actually modifies the antecedent phrase “permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated.”  This is certainly the case with regard to the RS-DVR – it fixes the copies for in sufficiently permanent state in one buffer (i.e. the 1.2 seconds) to permit them to be reproduced in another buffer for a period of more than transitory duration.  Thus, the court got it wrong.

Without getting into too much detail, the court also incorrectly analyzes a 9th Circuit cases, MAI Systems and its progeny which correctly apply the definition of fixed to a copy of a work created in RAM memory for a period of minutes.  The effect of this misinterpretation is to put legal practitioners in the precarious position of trying to determine at what point between 1.2 seconds and 2 minutes does a reproduction arrive at a “more than transitory” state.

Ironically, the Second Circuit ignores the U.S. Copyright Office’s analysis of this precise issue in its 2001 report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act which elaborated that a work was fixed “unless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or communicated.”  This clarification is in line with my earlier interpretation that the phrase “more than transitory in duration” modifies the communication or perception, not the embodiment itself.  The Second Circuit stated that, in its mind, the U.S. Copyright Office’s interpretation “reads the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the statute.”  To the contrary, however, it is the correct interpretation in that it incorporates the transitory duration requirement into the appropriate section of the definition.

Finally, the Second Circuit completely ignores the last sentence of the definition, to wit:  A work . . . is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.”  In this instance, the court readily admitted that an unauthorized copy of the work was stored, i.e. “fixed” on Cablevision’s servers simultaneously with its transmission.

When is an infringer not an infringer?

In extending recent trends by some circuits to weaken the strict liability component of the Copyright Act, the Second Court refused to find that Cablevision was a direct infringer.  Instead, it rules that the customer is the direct infringer in this instance of digital recording, showing his or her intent to make a copy when he or she presses the record button on the remote.  The court reasons as follows:

In this case . . . the core of the dispute is over the authorship of the infringing conduct.  After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record, and that program airs, a copy of the program–a copyrighted work–resides on
the hard disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is who made  this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.

Emphasis mine.  The first thing to note about the court’s conclusion is that it realizes, right off the bat, that the copy created on the servers of Cablevision is an infringement.  In its mind, however, the only question is who made the copy.  Now, that, of course, flies directly in the face of a host of copyright concepts which I will not address here, but suffice it to say that this is problematic.

But, for the moment, let’s just examine how the court ultimately determines who had the “volition” to infringe in this specific case:

There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems  clear–and we know of no case holding otherwise–that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s command.

The court then continues its analysis by example, offering the examples of a retailer who owns a photocopier and rents it out to the public as reinforcement of its conclusion, finding that because the retailer would not be liable for infringement, neither should Cablevision.   Despite the fact that there is case law holding that such a retailer WOULD, in fact, be liable for infringement, the Second Circuit errs in failing to see the difference between a VCR in the analog world, a single, stand-alone device used express by the customer, and a process devised by a company which makes infringement as simple as pressing my record button on my remote.  The court does not find this a “sufficient” distinction.  The court’s error in logic is apparent in this prose when it examines a 6th Circuit case on the issue:

In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant difference
exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct.

Is this 2001 Space Odyssey?  Did H.A.L. take over when I wasn’t looking?  Who programmed the system?

If this were not enough, the Second Circuit then performs a great deal of legal gymnastics to support its finding:  First, it examines the video on demand process to illustrate that Cablevision does not have control over the transmissions being recorded by thesubscribers in the RS-VCR system.  Are they for real?  Ever heard of apples and oranges.  The VOD system is a fully licensed process which is, dare we say it, nothing like the RS-VCR system.  Secondly, the Second Circuit uses the distinction between “active” and “passive” infringement under the Patent Act to jump to the almost humorous, if it weren’t so wrong, conclusion that:

If Congress had meant to assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a copyright-infringing act and any person who actively induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew how to draft a statute that would have this effect.

Every intellectual property attorney worth his or her salt knows that the Copyright Act and the Patent Act are very limited in their usefulness for purposes of using one to interpret the other.  That’s why it’s said that the Copyright Act is a strict liability statute, whereas, the Patent Act is not so much.

When is work “publicly performed”?

The final error committed by the court is in its analysis of whether the buffered copy delivered to individual customers was “publicly performed.” In this regard, the Second Circuit concluded:

under the transmit clause, we must examine the potential audience of a given transmission by an alleged infringer to determine whether that transmission is “to the public.” And because the RS-DVR system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber, we believe that the universe of people capable of receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that transmission.

Again, the Second Circuit has to do a hatchet job on the definition of “public performance” in order to arrive at this convoluted conclusion.  The definition of “public performance” in the Copyright Act is actually found in the “publication” definition of Section 101.  It states, in its entirety:

To perform or display a work “publicly” means —

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.

Emphasis mine.  Whereas the Second Circuit zeroed in on the phrase “to the public” in making its determination, the definition clearly intends to define public performance as any process that allows the public, in general, the ability to receive the transmission, whether or not it is in the same place or the same time.  Its not very difficult to see the fallacy of the Second Circuit’s reasoning.   The Cablevision RS-DVR clearly does precisely what the definition anticipates, it creates multiple copies stored in the buffers for individual subscribers in multiple places, who then view the (buffered) transmissions at different times.

While this seems simple, the Second Circuit jumps through numerous irrational hoops to arrive at the idea that:

the transmit clause directs us to identify the potential audience of a given transmission, i.e., the persons “capable of receiving” it, to determine whether that transmission is made “to the public.”

Nothing in the statute dictates this conclusion, to the contrary, the legislators probably thought that the word “public” was generic enough to not need interpretation.

The effect of this ruling, at least for now, is that anyone can make digital copies of any copyrighted work on their servers for purposes of transmitting to an individual customer, so long as that individual customer makes a request for it, and there is no implication of the performance rights.

This is a fine example of a court “reasoning” the meaning completely out of a statute.

Conclusion

If it is not obvious by now, I think this is one of the most poorly reasoned and drafted opinions by a Circuit Court that I have read in a long time.  If there is a bright side, it is that the effect of this decision is primarily that it overturns the grant of a summary judgement by the lower court.  From a broader perspective, however, and the more unfortunate result is that, because of the concept of stare decisis, this reasoning can now be cited in other cases in other jurisdictions across the country as good law.  So, unfortunately, we entertainment attorneys will be dealing with the negative impact of this decision for some time to come, until perhaps some higher court, in this case the Supremes, decides to rectify it.

, , ,
All that glitters is not gold – tips on analyzing a songwriting/band contest

When is the last time you heard of someone getting a really “big break” in the music industry through any contest, other than perhaps American Idol?  That’s because most artists and songwriters are not discovered through contests, they are discovered through relationships in the industry.

Yet, there are literally hundreds of such contests out there promising thousands of dollars in prizes or a opening slot for a well-known band, or a recording label or songwriting deal — everything but the kitchen sink!

I don not, by any means, mean to say that all contests are rip-offs.  There are, in fact, many legitimate contestsSongwriters_And_Poets_Critique in which songwriters and entertainers may participate.  I do mean to recommend, however, that you do a bit of research and exercise some good judgment prior to sending your submission off into the digital divide.

First, there are some very simple questions to ask yourself initially as you examine these “one in a lifetime opportunities.  Look at the source or sponsor of the contest.  Often times, their reputation proceeds them.  Have you ever personally heard of the contest sponsor?  What are the credentials of the sponsoring entity?  Have you read about them in any public forum such as a magazine, news article, or online resource?  What successes have they achieved in songwriting and/or the music industry, if any?  Who are the judges?  What are their credentials.  Are there any major advertising sponsorships associated with the contests?   What are the prizes?  Are they substantial?  Answers to most, if not all, of these questions can be derived through a simple online search.

Let’s say you’ve done all of the above research and determined that the contest is sponsored by none other than MTV?  To most songwriters and artists, there could be no greater sponsor than MTV, correct?  But before acting too hastily, let’s move into the second phase of analysis, i.e., taking a look at the RULES.

Now, assume that you determined that since MTV was the sponsor, it must be a great opportunity, so you jump right in with both feet, or in this case, your best demo tape!  A chance to open for a great headline act is waiting for the lucky winner!  Unfortunately, if you did not read the fine print, you just agreed to the following:

release and hold harmless Sponsor Entities against any and all claims, injury or damage arising out of or relating to participation in this Contest and/or the use or misuse or redemption of a Grand Prize and for any claims based on publicity rights, defamation, invasion of privacy, copyright infringement, trademark infringement or any other intellectual property related cause of action. . . . (emphasis added)

This language comes straight from the rules and regulations in a ongoing “Rock the Revolution” contest sponsored by mtv2.com.  See the Rules and Regulation page.  This is typical hold harmless clause, which effectively negates any rights or claims you may have otherwise had to bring a civil action against MTV in the event that you are injured as a result of the contest.

In addition, MTV also states in their terms of agreement that:

The approximate retail value (the “ARV”) of the Grand Prize is $150.00. Any difference between the ARV and the actual value, if any, will not be rewarded. If, for any reason, the Grand Prize related event is delayed, cancelled or postponed, MTV reserves the right, but is not obligated, to cancel or modify the Contest in its discretion and may award a substitute prize of equal or greater value.

This effectively means that you could end up getting only $150 as the “grand prize winner” if the concert is canceled for any reason by the headlining act.  A corollary effect  net effect is that, at most, your damages in a civil lawsuit probably would be limited to $150, the agreed retail value (i.e., by agreeing to their terms, you and MTV agreed to this amount).

Finally, by simply clicking the “I Agree” button on your web browser without first reading the fine print, you also agreed to grant MTV a non-exclusive right, among other things, to record your submission by virtue of the fact that you are a finalist?  See this clause from a real contest:

Finalists and Winner agree that by entering into this Contest they are granting  MTVN. . . the non-exclusive, irrevocable right and license to exhibit, broadcast, copy, reproduce, encode, compress, encrypt, incorporate data into, edit, rebroadcast, transmit, record, publicly perform, create derivative works of, and distribute and synchronize in timed relation to visual elements, the Submission Materials and/or any portions or excerpts thereof, in any manner, an unlimited number of times, in any and all media, now known or hereafter devised, throughout the world, in perpetuity. . . .

While this is non-exclusive license, meaning that you can issue other non-exclusive licenses to third parties, it does give MTV pretty broad rights to use your submission in almost any form they want.  This doesn’t necessarily mean that you shouldn’t participate in this contest, it is just something you should certainly understand and use in weighing your decision.

Believe it or not, this grant is pretty tame compared to the language of other contests I have reviewed for clients.  I’ve seen situations where a contestant ostensibly assigns the copyright in a song submitted for a contest to the sponsor.  So beware.  Make sure there is something in the rules that indicates that you are not transferring any rights or licenses in the submission.

These are just few examples of some of the lawyerly devices that can be utilized in the rules and regulations of a contest, particularly an online contest which a “click agreement” in place.  Before you submit your intellectual property, it is probably worth the money to pay a few hundred dollars to an entertainment attorney to advise you as to what the legal ramification are for you and/or your band.

One question clients often asked me is whether an idea can be protected.  The question frequently arises when a client has an idea for a screenplay, or an outline for a story, or a unique title for a song or book, and wishes to submit or  “pitching” that idea to a major movie house, publisher or record company.  While it is fairly common knowledge that an “idea” cannot be copyrighted, it is important to know that there may be certain types of protection be available for the intellectual properties contained in such a proposal pursuant to current laws, specifically trademark and copyright laws.  This article analyzes and summarizes your rights under each of these two areas of law and offers suggestions for protecting your legal rights when “pitching” ideas.

Protection Under Trademark Law

Titles and names may be entitled to trademark protection at both the state and federal levels by anyone claiming a right to use such a title or name in connection with certain specified trades or services.   These types of marks are commonly designated by use of the “™” and “®” symbols, indicating respectively that registration of the mark has been applied for and registered on the Primary Register.  To be entitled to use these symbols in respect to a mark, a person must apply for and receive a federal or state trademark.

In most states, a state trademark can be applied for in the Secretary of State’s office.  The application is a simple form and payment of a nominal fee is required.  Protection at the state level is, however, somewhat more geographically limited than that of a federal mark.  The application process for a federal mark is much more tedious, complicated and costly than that of the state trademark process.  In addition to legal fees which will, most likely, be incurred, the application fee for each international classification of goods and services is $325.

Protection Under Copyright

As stated earlier, with regard to copyright law, and speaking very generally, an idea, in and of itself, is not entitled to copyright protection.  Rather, it is the expression of an idea that can be copyrighted.[1]

It is not always clear from the case precedents, however, when an idea becomes developed enough to rise to the level of an “expression.”  Some examples of expressions of ideas that have been protected are a screenplay similar to the old television series A-Team,[2] an employee survey regarding employee satisfaction,[3] and a particular section of categories appearing on a form for collecting baseball pitcher statistics.[4] On the other end of the spectrum, courts found that (1) a manual of operation for patented leaching system. [5] and (2) the addition and arrangement of facts to legal opinions [6] were not protectible expressions of ideas.  The only general rule that can seemingly be extracted from this convoluted line of cases is that the more an expression diverges from the mere recitation of raw facts, the closer it gets to expression, as that the courts legally recognize that term.

Is your Idea Literary or Business in Nature

There is another, albeit tangential issue which is relevant and should be briefly discussed here, i.e., whether an idea is literary or business in nature:

Literary ideas are those that, upon development, would become literary property and hence clearly eligible for copyright protection.  Literary ideas include ideas for motion pictures,[7] radio programs,[8] and television programs.,[9]

Business ideas, on the other hand, even when fully developed, may not be copyrightable. ,[10] Business ideas are those that relate to methods of conducting businesses, such as bank night in theaters,[11]contests, [12]and credit rating systems.[13] Here again, however, the more an idea, even a business idea, departs from mere factual recitation, the more it is likely to be considered literary, and therefore entitled to protection under copyright law.

When does an idea rise to the level of expression?

So, let’s now return to the primary issue of when an idea rises to the level of an expression entitled to copyright protection?

In their attempts to deal with the dilemma, courts have created a body of case law which attempts to strike a middle ground between the comprehensive protection of copyright on the one hand, and the complete denial of any legal protection for ideas on the other.  I will attempt to delineate and evaluate some of the legal theories on which a person may be able to rely to render an idea legally protectible, the underlying tort theory of which is known in legal circles as “idea misappropriation.”

In brief, the elements for a claim of idea misappropriation are, first, the idea must be novel and concrete, and, second, there must be a legal relationship between the parties, whether by an express contract, a contract implied-in-fact, a quasi-contract, or a fiduciary relationship.[14]

Novel & Concrete Element

In instances where they have dealt with the protectibility of an idea, the courts hold the plaintiff to a greater burden of proving not merely that the idea is original (as in copyright protection) but that it is actually novel,[15] i.e., “not formerly known; of a new kind.”[16] This standard is, for most courts, a great standard to meet than that required by copyright, i.e., that a work be original – although some courts do confusingly use the terms interchangably.

The second component of the first prong, “concreteness,” in essence requires that an idea be sufficiently developed so as to constitute “property.”  By its very nature, this requirement is intentionally vague, allowing the courts great flexability in applying it.  One court described the concept as follows

while we recognize that an abstract idea as such may not be the subject of a property right, yet when it takes upon itself the concrete form which we find in the instant case, it is our opinion that it then becomes a property right subject to sale.[17]

This is, as pointed out, a rather vague element.  This is sort of like how U.S. Justice Potter Stewart described hard-core pornography in Jacobellis v. Ohio, i.e., it’s difficult to define, but “I know it when I see it.” So, in short, the more developed an idea becomes, the further it goes toward dispelling any doubt as to whether the idea is “concrete.”

Legal Relationship Requirement

The second prong of the test, i.e., the legal relations prong,  can complicate matters when it comes to submitting an idea to a third party.  Whether a legal relationship exists between the parties depends, as does everything in law, on countless fact scenarios to the degree that one small change in a fact pattern can affect the outcome of interpretation.

Most often, clients “pitch” their ideas to a third parties for consideration in hopes that they will take the idea and “run with it.”  But in such instances, it is important to be aware that the method by which an idea is submitted can directly impact whether or not there is a legal relationship.

A non-disclosure and confidentiality agreement with a publisher, for example, would create such a relationship beyond any doubt.  This is one end of the spectrum.  This method can easily be dispensed with since it is difficult enough to get a publisher’s attention, for example, much less without the added complexity of having to get their legal department involved. Most people will likely submit the idea directly to a publisher, either with or without permission, without any such NDA, or they will submit the idea through an agent of some sort.  Each of these variations result in different treatment.

For example, courts have held that if an idea is submitted without solicitation and without advance warning, the idea is not protectible, even if it later turns out to be valuable.[18] There is one variation of this fact pattern, however, where one might successfully argue that an implied contract results because of an implied solicitation by the idea recipient. This occurs where the recipient is engaged in a trade or industry (such as the entertainment or publishing industry) that, by custom, purchases ideas of the type submitted. A book or music publisher, as an idea recipient, makes a continuing offer to pay for any submitted ideas that it elects to use. Thus, an unsolicited submission is not an offer that necessarily requires further conduct by the publisher to establish an acceptance, but rather can be viewed as an acceptance of the publisher’s implied continuing offer. Although no court has expressly recognized this theory, courts have implicitly adopted it by recognizing an implied agreement based upon custom where such a factual pattern can be established.[20] I caution in advance, however, that this is a minority opinion, not expressed by the majority of courts.

Some courts, particularly but not exclusively those in California, imply an affirmative duty on the part of a publisher to reject an unsolicited submission or else the legal relationship is created – hence the practice of most publishers to advertise “no unsolicited submissions.”  Under this so-called “failure to reject” theory, any means of notice that gives the publisher some sort of advance warning of, and an opportunity to prevent, a proposed idea submission is sufficient to establish an implied contract if the recipient then permits the submission to be made.

Thus, the following examples may create such an affirmative obligation on the part of the publisher: (1) enclosing the proposed idea in a sealed envelope accompanying an unsolicited transmittal letter that explains that the contents of the sealed envelope contains such a submission, or (2) a series of two unsolicited letters, the first explaining the intended submission and the second in fact containing the idea to be submitted. [20]

If a publisher specifically requests the submission of an idea, a legal relationship is clearly established creating an obligation to pay the creator if the idea submitted is used. [21] So finding a creative way to solicit a request from a publisher is also a very good means of securing protection for you idea.

Finally, it may come as no surprise that utilizing the services of a agent will help protect your ideas.  It may be inferred that the recipient of an idea submission has knowledge of an expectation of payment for the idea when the submission is arranged by a person whose known occupation is that of representing idea purveyors, such as a book or movie agent. “This fact alone must have indicated to [the recipient of an idea submission] that the persons whom the agent brought together with him were not social callers.” Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc. 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 138 (Cal. App. 1966).

Conclusion

As you can clearly see, the question of whether an idea can be protected is not an easy one to answer in any specific situation because the answer depends so heavily on the individual fact pattern of each case.  Although it may not be apparent from its length, this article in no way exhausts the body of legal information and case law that exists with regard to the protectible nature of an idea.   Therefore, if you have questions concerning this issue, please contact a respected entertainment attorney.

Having stated this, with regard to submission of ideas in general, the following are recommendations that can be followed:

(1)    First, trademark all slogans, titles or name, at the very least your state level, but preferably at the federal level;

(2)    Make sure the idea is as fleshed out as it can be, i.e. as “concrete” as possible.  Rather than a mere outline, insert summaries of each bullet point.  Then, flesh out selected points, e.g., create a summary of each chapter of a particular example book, or maybe even two or more examples of each.  Then, create a few complete chapters of a books, for example;

(3)    Mark everything confidential and, in addition to the copyright notice generally included, add the phrase “All rights reserved” after it.  The copyright notice and your intent to be the owner of the copyright should be clearly indicated in the beginning of the correspondence;

(4)    Attempt to procure an agent, and ask if the agent is willing to enter into a non-compete and confidentiality agreement;

(5)    As an alternative to paragraph (4), solicit the publishers by telephone or in some other general fashion, preferably with written followup, to encourage them to “solicit” the work in advance; and

(6)    As an alternative to paragraphs (4) and (5), place your idea submission in an envelope, draft a summary cover letter explaining that this is the submission of a copyrighted idea and that by opening the envelope, they are agreeing to the confidentiality and non-disclosure of the submission and further, agree to pay for it if they decide to use it.

While these ideas may not be “iron-clad,” they will go a long way toward establishing the necessary elements of an idea misappropriation claim.

[1] 17 U.S.C. §  102(b) . See e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) ; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Gaye v. Gillis, 167 F. Supp. 416 (D.C. Mass. 1958 ). This was also the rule under common law copyright. Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930) ; Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953) ; Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956) ; Ware v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 590, 155 U.S.P.Q. 413 (Cal. App. 1967).[Back]

[2]Ernest Olson, V. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).[Back]

[3]Gallup, Inc. V. Talentpoint, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18560; 61 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1394 (M.D. PA. 2001).[Back]

[4]George L. Kregos v. Associated Press and Sports Features Syndicate, Inc., 937 F.2d 700; 1991 U.S. App. Lexis 12113; 19 USPQ2d (BNA) 1161; Copy. L. Rep. (Cch) P26,744 (Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 1991).[Back]

[5]Presby Construction, Inc., v. Normand Clavet, et al, 2001 DNH 210; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20951; 61 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1184 (Dist. NH 2001).[Back]

[6]Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., et al v. West Publishing Co. et al, 158 F.3d 674; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30790; 48 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1560 (App. Ct. 2nd Cir 1998). [Back]

[7]Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).[Back]

[8]Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).[Back]

[9]Stone v. Goodson, 8 N.Y.2d 8,200 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1960).[Back]

[10]This exclusion also applies to scientific ideas.[Back]

[11]Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936).[Back]

[12]Lewis v. Kroger, 109 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. W.Va. 1952).[Back]

[13]Burnell v. Chown, 69 Fed. 993 (N.D. Ohio 1895).[Back]

[14]See Kienzle v. Capital Cities/American Broadcasting Co., Inc. , 774 F. Supp. 432, 436 n.8, 438 n.13 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (Treatise cited). McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (New York law). [Back]

[15] Noble v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 270 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Santilli v. Philip Morris & Co., 283 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Stevens v. Continental Can Co., Inc., 308 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Pittman v. American Greeting Corp., 619 F. Supp. 939 (W. D. Ky. 1985) ; Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257 (1972) (no promise to pay for an idea will be implied or enforced if the idea is not both novel and original).[Back]

[16]Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary (2d ed.) 1670.[Back]

[17]Williamson v. N.Y. Central R.R., 16 N.Y.S.2d 217, 258 App. Div. 226 (1939) ; Bailey v. Haberle-Congress Brewing Co., 193 Misc. 723, 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1948 ) ; Masline v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R.R., 95 Conn. 702, 112 Atl. 639 (1921) ; contra Brunner v. Stix, 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W.2d 643 (1944).

[18] Giangrasso v. CBS, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ; Curtis v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 213 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 843 (1959) ; see Borden & Barton Enters. v. Warner Bros., 99 Cal. App. 2d 760, 222 P.2d 463 (1950) ; Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. App. 1966) ; Official Airlines Schedule Info. Serv., Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1964) (concurring opinion); Sterner v. Hearst Corp., 144 U.S.P.Q. 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) .[Back]

[19]Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 739, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (1956) ; Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 1987).[Back]

[20] Cole v. Lord, 262 A.D. 116, 28 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1st Dep’t 1941) ; Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953) ; Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Treatise cited), aff’d mem., 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Treatise cited); cf. McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (New York law); Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 193 Misc. 723, 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Mun. Ct. 1948).[Back]

[21] See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.) , where in advance of submission, plaintiff sent a mailgram to defendants advising that a submission was being sent.[Back]

There is a great deal of talk these days about the concept of “freeconomics,” spurned by the fact that most teenagers and college students are still ripping music and sharing it online.  Most recently, the major record labels commissioned a study from two think tanks, The Leading Question and Music Ally, which resulted in a five recommendations for the music industry, including “bundling” of product.  Another of the points was “Free doesn’t mean no money.”  How original.  And oh, by the way, IT DOES ACTUALLY MEAN THAT!  You can read the full article about the study here.

Dollar Bill Let me start out by observing an old adage, which still holds true in life, that you tend to “get what you pay for.”  I’ve always believed in that adage.  There is generally a direct correlation in the amount of sawbucks you shell out to the quality of the product you receive.   When I cook, for example, I use the freshest ingredients.  I spare little expense.  Sure, I try to find bargains, but if you skimp on the quality of your ingredients, you always skimp on taste.  I have always resisted the impulse to buy meat on clearance!

What about “free” goods?  Just think about how many junk e-mails you receive every day offering you a “free” iPhone, or a “free” laptop, or a free whatever. . . the list goes on and on.  Don’t you automatically just delete those?  Of course you do — because everyone knows these types of things are given out for free:  first, someone is actually paying for those goods; secondly, you have to subscribe to a certain number of paying offers in order to actually receive the “free” iPhone or laptop.  There is another adage:  nothing is life is free.   Fact of the matter is, if I wanted an iPhone, I’d go out and buy it.

Now, let’s turn our attention to “freeconomics” and honestly call it what it really is:  freakenomics!  Again, nothing in life is free. 

Nonetheless, we are lead by these researchers to examine Google and its model of giving out free software as an example of how the music industry can give away music and still achieve a profit.  This analogy is wrong on so many levels, but I’ll just point out one basic incongruity:  the software developers that are writing software for Google work for the conglomerate under a work for hire agreement – Google does not have to compensate multiple rights owners.  It owns the entire product. 

This is not so with a musical composition/sound recording combination.  That is bundle that is not so readily united.  The record label generally owns the sound recording of a musical composition, but does not always own the underlying music compositions.  There may be multiple owners of the underlying compositions which have to be compensated – multiple songwriters and multiple publishers.  The producer also must be compensated.  The musicians who play on the record have to be compensated, not to mention their union fees and retirement fund.  The engineers who work on the project are compensated. The artist has to be compensated for their performance.  The people who master the product must be compensated. 

What the simplistic – dare I say naive – five point plan laid out by the record “think tank” overlooks is that in order to accomplish the equivalent of something like a Google in the music industry, one has to completely rewrite the industry.  While this is not a new idea, it is also not an idea that can be accomplished in today’s copyright structure nor within the current orientation of the music industry.  Hundreds of years of practice have to be completed abolished for the Google model to work in the music industry.

Let’s look an entity that has actually tried to make such a paradigm shift:  MySpace.  It is most definitely the place where independent artists go to get their music heard.  The music is generally free.  How many artists have you listened to on MySpace in the last month?  I’m in the industry, and I have listened to maybe two, but only because I received a specific request to do so. 

How many artists on MySpace actually make a lucrative living doing what they are doing there?  Again, the music is free isn’t it?  Freecomonics will get us something akin to the quality of music that you find on MySpace in general.  There is no realistic way to sift the wheat from the chaff. 

The instant you stop rewarding the songwriters and artists that create the music — removing a real incentive for creating their art full time — the sooner you’ll find a void in the really high quality music.  Yes, there are some who say that artists will produce art regardless of whether they receive compensation, because that is what they do.  However, this is not historically accurate in music or any of the arts.  If you find an artist who is thriving, you will generally find a source of money, whether it be selling the artwork to a famous benefactor or having financial muscle behind him or her. 

In music, the major labels have historically been the finders and funders of the talent.  They spend a lot of money discovering, developing and marketing the talent.  For the most part, it is the major label product that gets traded on the P2P networks.  That is one factor that is often overlooked.  What the general public wants to hear, and shares on P2P, is generally the music that is marketed heavily – generally by the major labels.  That will not change until someone constructs a better way to get music heard by the public in general. 

So, I believe if you remove the economic component of music, you will ultimately eliminate the talent altogether.  Otherwise, the talented will have to get day jobs to support their art and the art will most certainly diminish and/or suffer.

Let’s turn to some of the other suggestions made by The Leading Question and Music Ally:

(1)  Music needs to be bundled with other products and entertainment packages.  They conclude that “music needs to move away from per unit sales and become more of a service than a product.”  Can we say YAWN class?  The record labels cannot break themselves of the idea that people want a package deal.  We don’t.  We want ala carte!  The sooner that the industry comes to this realization, the better off they will be.  Isn’t this what the labels have been feeding us for years?  This is but the “record album” in another iteration.  Buy this collection of 10 songs, 2 of which are what you actually want and 8 of which bite!  Come on guys, hasn’t the digital revolution taught you anything?  Wake up and smell the single downloads.  That IS what the consumer wants.  Build a model that incorporates the single download.  Don’t build a model that ignores it.

(2)  Labels needs to experiment with new release schedules and formats.  Seriously?  Again, the think tanks suggest that “single . . . releases have run [their] course.”  Ditto what I said above.  Check out
the success of iTunes, emusic, Amazon, etc. etc.  Check out what happens on P2P networks when a new digital single is released.  The single is NOT a thing of the past.  Now, granted, I agree that digital only releases and new pricing models are going to be part of the new model — couldn’t any fourth graders could tell you that?  But again, people want their music ala carte.  They want good music.  They don’t want the bundles, the fillers, the parasitical crap that the industry wants to latch onto what they really want.

(3)  Change the charts.  Yes, people actually get paid to say this stuff!  The conclusion is that the charts don’t make sense anymore because fewer people are buying music.  In fairness, I understand this one to some degree. But, has anyone noticed that Billboard already tracks digital downloads?  Has anyone noticed any of the other p2p tracking devices, such as Big Champagne, just to name one.  Sure they have and so have the major labels.  In fact, that is in part where many of the researchers get their data.  No doubt, the tracking of general overall consumption should be an important factor in consideration.  While we are at it, why not pay more attention to the portion of the market called baby boomers.  The older generation that buys music, but rarely gets consulted when discussing these issues.

(4)  Trust the DJ.  Next to the CD format, the other big thing the record industry has a hard time letting go of is the radio format.  The record industry likes to control the advise given about music so that they control what the listener “wants” to hear.  The think tanks concludes that “the instant and massive availability of music on demand means you need a trusted guide like John Peel more than ever.”  I disagree with this conclusion because I believe that this “advisor model” is antiquated.   These days, most people rely more on social networking – either virtual or real — and trending algorythms to determine what music they enjoy.  I don’t know of any teenager that listens to terrestrial radio any more.  For them, a DJ is someone at a wedding reception and they are not likely to take advise from that person. 

Yet, the file sharing continues and, more importantly, so does the need for change.  Now that I have ranted a little about the suggestions made by these industry think tanks, let me say that I do, in fact, appreciate their efforts to come up with solutions to the declining music industry.  I wholly agree with what the managing director of Music Ally, Paul Brindley says in the article, that the

“business models need to change radically if the music business is to stand any chance of halting the current decline in sales.”  Without a doubt, something truly has to be done or the industry will fail.

As I heard one venture capitalist put it, for him to consider an investment in the music industry, it must be a paradigm shifting, industry changing business model.  These suggestions by The Leading Question and Music Ally just don’t quite rise to that level, in my humble opinion.  In my opinion, the ultimate solution will be a fair priced – but not free – digital download model.  The most important component that is missing thus far, and that is critical, is a means of getting the music heard by the general population.  We have many services which may be close, but as of yet, we are not quite there.

 

 

 

You say you want a revolution

Well, you know

We all want to change the world . . .

 

You say you’ve got a real solution

Well, you know

We’d all love to see the plan

You ask me for a contribution

Well, you know

We are doing what we can

 

But if you want money

for people with minds that hate

All I can tell is, brother, you’ll have to wait

Don’t you know it’s gonna be alright?

 

 

-John Lennon

 

Perhaps John Lennon said it best:  if you push people hard enough and long enough, they will revolt.  The question is, has the RIAA gone too far for too long? A recent motion filed in their case against students at the University of Maine may very well answer that question.

The RIAA named numerous “John Doe” students in their complaint in Arista Records v. Does 1-27, as is their practice in all of their lawsuits.   The RIAA’s purpose of naming the John Doe defendants is so that they may obtain an ex parte (i.e., without the other party being notified) order from the Judge requiring the targeted university to provide the various students’ name, address, and, particularly, their IP address.

Student lawyers at the University school of law Cumberland Legal Clinic have filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against the RIAA claiming that this practice improperly seeks to circumvent the student’s rights under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, §1232g(b)(2)(B) (“FERPA”), gain publicity for its cause, and coerce students into settling for “nominal” amounts in the $3-5000 range.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows sanctions against an attorney who signs a pleading without properly investigating the facts and the law and does so with an improper purpose.

The motion also questions whether the joinder of plaintiffs and defendants under the RIAA-type lawsuits is proper because the actions do not, in fact, arise out of the same transaction.  Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Procedure provides that multiple plaintiffs can join in one action if “they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences…and any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).  Similarly, multiple defendants can be joined in one action if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transaction or occurrences . . . and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Id.  The student motion alleges that the RIAA does not, in fact, believe that all of these copyright infringements arise out of the same facts, but join together against multiple defendants for the sole purpose of trimming litigation and discovery costs.

In this case, the student lawyers are seeking more than just monetary damages under this Rule 11 motion:  they also seek dismissal of the complaint and a permanent injunction preventing the RIAA from filing “fishing expedition” type complaints against “unconnected” defendants in the future.  These types of injunctions may be applied in jurisdictions other than the one in which it was issued, so in theory such an order may be applied to thwart lawsuits in other Federal courts across the country.

This in one ruling that should be very interesting.