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Back in 1999, my law clerk, J. Eric Crupi and I considered the topic of personal jurisdiction as applied to the Internet. In the resulting Law on the Row article, entitled “Lines in the Virtual Sand.” In the original article, Eric concluded that “the boundaries of personal jurisdiction in cyberspace have not been concretely defined, but rather represent unsettled lines drawn in the ‘virtual’ sand. . . .” In the intervening years, I would have to say that the lines in the virtual sand have been blown away by the winds of U.S. Court decisions, particularl after considering the three-year long case against Hew Griffiths from Australia.

The original article describe the process of personal jurisdiction as follows:

The traditional determination of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant involves a two-pronged analysis. The first prong of the analysis inquires into whether the state in which the lawsuit was filed (i.e. the “forum state”) has a “long-arm statute” permitting the assertion of personal jurisdiction. A long-arm statute is simply a legislative act that allows the courts of a state to assert jurisdiction over persons and corporations that, although not residents of that state, have voluntarily conducted some type of activity in that state. The second prong of the analysis, however, is more involved and inquires into whether the forum state’s assertion of personal jurisdiction complies with Constitutional due process standards. Due process requires that a non-resident defendant must have certain “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that maintaining the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Essentially, this prong is satisfied if the defendant performs some act in the forum state through which it purposefully takes advantage of the benefits of doing business in that state and can thus reasonably anticipate being haled into that state’s courts.

It is the “minimum contacts” section of the long arm analysis that has received the most attention in the U.S. Department of Justice’s extradition of Australian Hew Raymond Griffiths. In one of the first ever extraditions for an intellectual property offense, Griffiths, 44, a British national living in Bateau Bay, Australia – a man who arguably had absolutely no physical contact with the United States – was extradited to the United States in February 2007 to face criminal charges in U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Va. On April 20, 2007, he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit criminal copyright infringement and one count of criminal copyright infringement before U.S. District Court Judge Claude M. Hilton. He was sentenced to 51 months in prison and given credit for the three years he spent in Australian facilities awaiting extradition. He will serve out the remaining 15 months imprisonment in U.S. facilities.

Griffiths’ conviction was the latest action arising from the joint U.S. Customs/Department of Justice investigation known as Operation Buccaneer, the largest international online copyright piracy investigation ever conducted by federal law enforcement. To date, Operation Buccaneer has resulted in more than 30 felony convictions in the United States and 11 convictions of foreign nationals overseas.

In an article for the Australian Law Journal, NSW, Chief Judge in Equity, Peter Young summarized that “[Our] people are being extradited to the U.S. to face criminal charges when they have never been to the U.S. and the alleged act occurred wholly outside the US.” He concluded that while International copyright violations are a great and valid problem that must be remedied, “there is also the consideration that a country must protect its nationals from being removed from their homeland to a foreign country merely because the commercial interests of that foreign country are claimed to have been affected by the person’s behaviour in Australia and the foreign country can exercise influence over Australia.”

The DOJ Assistant Attorney General Alice S. Fisher of the Criminal Division stated the Department’s counter position, that “the Justice Department is committed to protecting intellectual property rights, and will pursue those who commit such crimes beyond the borders of the United States where necessary.” U.S. Attorney Chuck Rosenberg for the Eastern District of Virginia echoed her sentiment when he stated that “Whether committed with a gun or a keyboard — theft is theft. And, for those inclined to steal intellectual property [in the United States], or from halfway around the world, they are on notice that we can and will reach them.”

So what did Griffiths do to raise the ire of the DOJ? Griffiths, known by the screen nickname “Bandido,” was a longtime leader of an organized criminal group known as DrinkOrDie, which had a reputation as one of the oldest and most security-conscious piracy groups on the Internet. DrinkOrDie, an international organization founded in Russia in 1993 and known as the warez scene, was an underground Internet piracy community that specialized in cracking software codes and distributing the cracked versions over the Internet. Griffiths had boasted in interviews that even though he ran all of DrinkOrDie’s day-to-day operations and controlled access to more than 20 of the top warez servers worldwide, he would never be caught. Some of DOD’s most prominent victims were Microsoft, Adobe, Autodesk, Symantec and Novell, but they also affect smaller companies whose livelihood depended on the sales revenue generated by one or two products. Once cracked, these software versions could be copied, used and distributed without limitation. Members stockpiled the illegal software on huge Internet computer storage sites that were filled with tens of thousands of individual software, game, movie and music titles alleged to be worth over 50 millions dollars. The group used encryption and an array of other sophisticated technological security measures to hide their activities from law enforcement. Griffiths was certainly no farm boy and was well aware that his activities were criminal, even though many articles on the Internet about his activities point out that he allegedly made no profit from the pirated software.

Griffiths’ extradition was very controversial in Australia. The matter of U.S.A. v Griffiths has been cited as an example of how bilateral arrangements can lead to undesirable effects such as a loss of sovereignty and the introduction of draconian measures. On the other hand, increased enforcement internationally through heavy criminal sanctions is seen as an effective way of protecting legitimate distribution networks.

A common mistake made in many of the Internet discussions about the Griffiths case is that the extradition occurred pursuant to the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (“AUSFTA”). Griffiths’ indictment, however, occurred before amendments were enacted to harmonise the Australian Copyright Act with U.S. copyright laws, so AUSFTA had nothing to do with the extradition. There were multiple factors that motivated extradition, not the least of which was that the DOJ alleged conspiracy, claiming that most of the overt acts were based in the United States and that many DrinkorDie members were located in the U.S. This gives credence to the argument that, as the leader of DOD, Griffiths was subject to its jurisdiction. This analysis is no different than exercising jurisdiction over a criminal enterprise whose activities result in murder rather than theft – the analysis has nothing to do with the severity of the crime. That said, it is not wise to underestimate the impact that the lobbyist for the powerful technology industry may have had on the government’s interest in this case, nor the effect of the close relationship between Australia and the United States, both of which made extradition more likely.

The bottom line in all of this is that the traditional geographical boundaries which once severely restricted the reach of the long arm of the law are no longer an impediment. If a person’s criminal activities rise to a significant enough level as to garner the attention of a organization such as the DOJ, that person is going to find him or herself in unfamiliar territory being charged with violation of crimes in that territory. The lines in the virtual sand have disappeared.

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vuLogo2Fueled in part by its success in Virgin v. Thomas, the RIAA (on behalf of EMI Music, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group and Warner Music Group) issued a new round of pre-litigation letters to college students across the country Thursday of last week. This is its ninth such round of letters since beginning the campaign against downloaders nearly two years ago. This round included letters to 32 students at Nashville’s prestigious Vanderbilt University. Vanderbilt received the third greatest quantity of letters in this round, behind University of Southern Florida, with 43 and Southern California with 37.

In addition to those three institutions, the RIAA also sent letters to these 16 schools (quantity in parentheses): Drexel University (17 pre-litigation settlement letters), Indiana University (23), Northern Illinois University (25), Occidental College (19), State University of New York at Morrisville (18), Texas Christian University (20), Tufts University (15), University of Alabama (14), University of California, Berkeley (19), University of Delaware (18), University of Georgia (13), University of Iowa (18), University of Michigan – Ann Arbor (20), University of Nebraska-Lincoln (13), University of New Hampshire (30), University of New Mexico (17).

As with the more than 3,500 letters previously sent to college students at other schools, the letters gives students the opportunity to resolve copyright infringement claims against them at a discounted settlement rate before the threatened lawsuit is filed against them. The letters are accompanied by instructions to the university administrators to forward the letter to the appropriate individuals the give them the opportunity to promptly resolve the matter and avoid a lawsuit.  So far, the RIAA has filed over 26,000 lawsuits, with more than 8,000 students settling out of court at for average penalty of $3,000 each.

While most unversities simply forward the letters as requested by the RIAA, some, like the University of Kansas, have taken the stance that they are not a legal agent of the RIAA and that forwarding the letter would be a violation of the students’ privacy and the Digital Millnnium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”).  They refuse to relase information with a court order or subpoena legally requiring them to do so.  The safe harbor provision of the DMCA protects Internet service providers, in this case the University, from liability for users’ online activity if they immediately remove or disable a access to identified material in a copyright infringement complaint.

It is uncertain what position Vanderbilt University will take with regard to this issue.

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Section 101 of the United States Copyright Act defines work for hire at as follows:

(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. 17 U.S.C. sec 101

Whether a particular work is a work made for hire is determined by the relationshiCopyright_symbolp between the parties.  According to the Supreme Court of the U.S., one must first ascertain whether the work was prepared by (1) an employee or (2) an independent contractor.

Subsection 1 above only applies when the work is created by an employee, not independent contractors.  A work created within the scope of a regular salaried or hourly employee’s job is a work made for hire. Whether an individual is an employee for the purposes of the work made for hire doctrine is determined using common law principles of “agency.”  A person is an agent of an employer if he or she, for example, the employer controls how the work is done, if the work is done at the employer’s location, the employer provide equpment and supplies for the work, the employer controls the worker’s schedule and has the right to make assignments, and if the employer provides benefits to the employer.  Some examples of works made for hire include a software program created by an employee programmer, newspaper articles written by a staff journalist for a newspaper, musical compositions created by a staff writer for a music publisher, or advertising copy created by a marketing department employee.

If a work is created by an independent contractor or freelancer (that is, someone who is not an employee), the work may or may not be created as a work made for hire, depending on two variables.  In this case, the work is considered a specially ordered or commissioned work.  In order for such a work to be made work for hire, both of the following conditions are required: i) the work must come within one of the nine categories of works listed in the definition above; and ii) there must be a written agreement in advance between the parties specifying that the work is a work made for hire.  As an example, an independent reporter who writes a specially commissioned article for a newspaper or magazine will probably not be an producing a work made for hire, unless there is a written agreement between the two parties to the contrary.

The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor can be difficult to analyze in some situations.  The closer an employment relationship comes to a regular salaried position, the more likely a work is to be considered made for hire. 

When a work is considered a work made for hire, the author and owner of the work is the employer and it is identified as such on the copyright registration form.   For more information on this subject, contact me or another competent entertainment attorney.

The “Star Power” theory of damage reduction in copyright infringement actions

Most consumers instantly recognize brand names such as Coca-Cola®, Nabisco®, Frito-Lay®, and Sony®. As a result of their prior purchasing experience with these brands, a consumer is much more likely to purchase a new brand of cookies bearing the Nabisco®® label than they are a bag of “Fred’s” cookies. This phenomenon is generally Magicknown as brand name impact, or brand name recognition, and is the essence of trademark law.

When applied to the entertainment industry, an artist’s brand name impact is often referred to as “star power.” More specifically, star power refers to that portion of an artist’s earnings generated by a particular entertainment product which can be attributed to the entertainer’s success, fame, and the expectations of the artist’s fan base, as opposed to the specific content of the particular entertainment product, e.g., a musical composition. The theory is that a large percentage of consumers who purchase a popular artist’s entertainment product do so on the basis of the artist’s reputation, and on their past experience with that artist, rather than on a preference for any one particular song on that artist’s latest release.

The more astute reader may now be wondering how this principle applies in a copyright infringement action. The answer lies in the text of §504 of the Copyright Act, which deals with the calculation of actual damages in a copyright infringement action. The plaintiff, if he or she proves liability, is “required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue.” Once the gross revenue is established, the burden shifts to the defendant infringer, who is required — and this is where it gets tricky — “to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. 504(b) (emphasis added).

Star power is one of the more important “elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work” used by defendant-artists who have significant “brand name impact” to reduce the amount of damages to be awarded in a successful copyright infringement action against them. If the jury finds, for example, that the actual damages in a copyright infringement action involving an internationally known artist total $1 million, and further finds that fifty percent of the profits generated by the infringing song are attributable to the artist’s “star power,” then the copyright owner would only be entitled to $500,000.

One of the first applications of this sort of reduction for star power of an entertainer was in the case involving George Harrison’s subconscious infringement of the Chaffon’s 1963 classic hit He’s So Fine with his equally successful composition, My Sweet Lord. For more information, see, ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd. (1981, SD NY) 508 F Supp 798 (apparently 1909 Act), mod on other grounds, and remanded (CA2 NY) 722 F2d 988, 221 USPQ 490, later proceeding on other grounds (CA2 NY) 841 F2d 494. In that case, the court held that 75 percent of the success of the infringing song was attributable to the plagiarized music, while 25 percent was attributable to other factors including, among other things, the popularity and stature of Harrison in the pop music industry.

In order to calculate the percentage of sales attributable to star power, a defendant usually will hire a damages expert to apply elaborate formulas to the sales data of the infringing artist in order to derive an applicable percentage. The expert may, for example, perform nonlinear regression analysis to compare the sales of the more recent album containing the infringing musical composition to the sales from one of the artist’s earlier album, usually the first release, over an extended period of time (as many as 4-5 years). We’ll call this percentage the “Star Power Percentage.”

So, you might think to yourself, the calculation is simple. If a court determines that the gross profits from sales of the infringing album are 2 million dollars, and that the Star Power Percentage is 50%, then the copyright owner would be entitled to 1 million dollars, right? Wrong!. Just when you think you’ve got the trick figured out, the infringing artist has one more trick up the sleeve!

Instead of applying that Star Power Percentage to the gross profits from the sale of albums containing the infringing composition, the defendant will apportion out only those portions of profits that are directly attributable to the infringed musical composition and then apply the Star Power Percentage only to that apportionment. Again, you might think this calculation is straight forward. If there are 10 songs on the album, one manner of calculation would be to apply the Star Power Percentage to 1/10th of the earnings from the album. In the example given, 1/10th of 2 million is $200,000, and the plaintiff would be awarded 50% of that, or $100,000. Wrong again!

A typical damages expert will base the apportionment of earnings from an album on the performance royalties generated by each musical composition. The expert will apply the respective performance royalty total for each musical composition to the total earnings to derive the allocated percentage of profits attributable to each individual musical composition. If the infringing song happens to be a very popular song, that might be beneficial to the plaintiff. If, however, the infringing song is less popular, it probably means that the Star Power Percentage will be applied to less than 1/10th of the total earnings from an album containing 10 songs.

The good news is that the infringer bears the burden of proving these types of deductions. One factor that weighs heavily in favor of a lesser deduction is the degree of popularity of the infringing musical composition. If the infringing musical composition is extremely popular, a good argument could be made, through the use of plaintiff’s expert testimony, that the musical composition itself contributed a great deal to the success of the album.

Another important factor is the popularity of the musical composition that has been infringed. In the Harrison case, for example, He’s So Fine was an extremely successful musical composition in 1963. The inference is that even though George Harrison’s star power may have attributed some percentage to the sales of the infringing composition, the familiarity of the melody could arguably be said to have contributed as much or more to the sales and, therefore, the effects of star power are diminished.

When calculating damages, the defendant will most certainly make use of every means available to reduce the amount of damages to which the songwriter/plaintiff is entitled. The songwriter, therefore, should make use of a good copyright infringement attorney and a reputable musicologist to make certain that his or her rights are protected and to make certain that he or she gets the full extent of the damages to which he or she is entitled.

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Magic HatThis article originally appear in the print edition of Law on the Row, Volume 2, Issue 1 on September 9, 2002. 

Imagine two musical works written in a minor key using a standard jazz progression such as I-IV-II-V. Further imagine that Work B is alleged to be an infringement of Work A. The author of Work B hires an expert who testifies that the 16-note melodic line in Work B that is identical to the 16-note melodic line in Work A is not entitled to copyright protection because that melody is “dictated” by the jazz chord progression, and, therefore, there is no infringement. This analogy describes a new and novel use of the legal concept known by the French moniker, scenes á faire.

The phrase scenes á faire refers to certain distinct elements — characters, settings, or incidents, for example — in a copyrighted work that are absolutely necessary or indispensable in describing a particular “scene.” See, Atari Games v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir 1989). For example, in creating a story about the music business in Nashville, one would expect references in the story to such elements as Music City, Music Row, songwriters, producers and the Bluebird Café. If a copyrighted novel contained those elements, those specific portions of the work relating to the scenes faire would not be entitled to copyright protection, and a second novel containing the very same elements would not be an infringement.

Thus, the concept of scenes á faire is applied in circumstances such as those described to limit the scope of copyright protection.

It is also important to note that the concept of scenes faire has traditionally been applied specifically to infringement actions involving novels, literary works and computer programming code. More recent attempts have met with success, however, in applying the doctrine to the comparison of lyrics alleged to be infringing. Even more recently, novel attempts have been made to apply the concept of scenes faire to the musical phrases and melodic lines of musical compositions

If a position such as the one described in our analogy could be argued successfully, then the amount of damages to which the author of Work A would be entitled is severely reduced, if not eliminated entirely. The copyright owner would end up with, at best, a musical work where certain sections of the melody and certain sections of the lyrics are entitled to protection — indeed, he have a copyright full of holes!

Of course, a simple mathematical calculation yields literally hundreds of thousands of permutations consisting of acceptable melodies which may be superimposed over the jazz chord progression common to the two works, yet this simple fact does not prevent the use of this argument in copyright infringement actions. Although the issue has arisen in the context of summary judgment, as of yet no court has issued a direct ruling on the application of scenes faire to melodic phrases or chord progressions.

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What songwriters can do to improve their negotiating strength in an entertainment deal

A very common theme among my songwriter and artist clients is the subject of how they were “ripped off” by their record label and/or music publisher (for purposes of this general publication, I’ll refrain from using the actual, more vivid terms often used to describe the process!). They often feel as if they have not received the benefit of the bargain.

As an attorney who negotiates deals for these types of clients on a routine basis, however, I am frequently placed in the precarious position of walking a tightrope between trying to obtain as many concessions as possible from the opposing party while not pushing so hard as to, in my clients’ words, “blow the deal.” My clients want the best deal possible, but are very rarely willing to walk away from a deal if the terms and concessions are not good. As any good negotiator can tell you, your deal is only as good as your best alternative to the negotiated deal.

In some ways, this willingness to settle for less in order to salvage the deal feeds the very beasts songwriters and artists need to tame, i.e., the record companies and music publishers. Artist think that record companies have the ability to give them instant stardom – in fact, that is the dream of almost every struggling songwriter and entertainer. On the opposite end of the spectrum, however, record companies most certainly know that many artists are willing to “sell their soul” in order to obtain a deal.

The infamous controlled composition clause is the perfect example of how far an artist is willing to go for “the deal.” The United States government requires that a copyright owner be paid a minimum statutory rate for the mechanical reproduction of their creative work. The record label, however, turns to the artist and says, “Despite the government minimum, will you consent to accept only seventy-five percent of that to which we’re required to pay in order to get a deal?” “Furthermore,” the record label says, “we’ll only pay you seventy-five percent of statutory rate on ten compositions, no more, o.k.?” As incredulous as those questions might sound, the majority of artists throughout the history of the controlled composition clause have answered “yes” to those questions. From the record companies’ perspective, this negotiation process is just good business.

This disregard for the government’s requirements does not often occur in other industries outside of the music industry. If a company interviewing a potential employee suggested that the employee agree to an hourly rate that is less that the minimum wage, the employee would balk, and most likely the company would be reported and fined. The difference, of course, is that the employee in this scenario has a multitude of alternatives, as there are numerous companies to which he or she can apply that will pay minimum wage. That is not the case, of course, with entertainers. It has been said one’s odds of getting struck by lightning are greater than the odds of getting a record deal! Most entertainers are desperate for “the deal.”

So, the question then becomes “What is the deal worth to the songwriter or the artist?” Is it worth giving up possession of your songs without the possibility of reversion in order to receive a monthly draw in order to get that publishing deal? Is it worth giving up twenty-five cents on every mechanical dollar earned in order to receive a cash advance and the remote possibility of future royalties from a major label in order to get that record deal? If the songwriter or artist has no alternatives, then the answer to those questions may very well be yes. Or, it may be that no deal is worth giving up such concessions. The answers to these questions are as diverse and individual as the artists and their particular situations.

In order to better understand their own position, then, songwriters and artists should carefully consider their “sacred cows”– i.e., the points on which there is no negotiation – prior to entering negotiations. The difference I have witnessed between fresh young songwriters and experienced writers who have been around the Row for a while is the wisdom to know what is important to them and what is not. If a songwriter has a young child, she is likely to be more willing to walk away from a deal without a reversion clause than is a single songwriter with no family obligations. The recording artist who has a track record of selling more records the first time out than any other artist is in a better position to walk away from a deal that includes a controlled composition clause. The potential recording artist who has offers from three major labels is in a better position to obtain a higher royalty rate than the artist who has been offered a development deal.

The point is, the songwriter and the artist should think about what is important to them in terms of a deal and carefully consider their “bottom line,” the point at which they are willing to say “”no deal.” These issues should be discussed with an experienced entertainment attorney. Develop two lists with your attorney: (1) a wish list of provisions for improving the deal and (2) a “drop dead” list of items which must be included in the agreement or the deal is off, which hopefully includes a good alternative to the negotiated deal. Remember, the more alternatives a person has to the deal in hand, the better his or her negotiating strength.

This article originally appeared in the print edition of Law on the Row, Volume 2, Issue 1, on March 21, 2001.

This article first appeared in the print edition of Law on the Row, Volume 2, Issue 1, on March 21, 2001 

Hillary Rosen, president of the Recording Industry Association of America (“”RIAA”), called RIAA’s legal victory over Napster, the mega-MP3 file trading site, a “clear victory for all creators.” While the efforts of the record industry watchdog organization should certainly be applauded, it should be noted that the victory against Napster is a slow ball compared to the spit balls being thrown at the creative industry by the likes of Gnutella and FreeNet. This article compares these two file swapping services to Napster and examines the Napster opinion for insight into how the courts might deal with these next generation peer-to-peer client software programs.

The Napster Opinion

The RIAA filed suit against Napster in December 1999 claiming vicarious and contributory negligence. In July 1999, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction against Napster. The ruling was immediately appealed to United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.

A recent, unanimous ruling by a three-judgman & computere panel of the 9th Circuit affirmed the lower court decision and found that Napster, which allows users to exchange music free over the Internet, contributes to the infringement of copyrights held by the plaintiffs. The panel specifically found that Napster users (1) infringed plaintiffs’ rights of distribution by uploading file names to the collective index and (2) infringed their rights of reproduction by downloading files containing copyrighted music. Napster was deemed a contributory infringer because its owners had actual knowledge of pirated music in Napster’s index.

The appellate panel rejected Napster’s fair use defenses, including (1) that the users were merely “sampling,” i.e., making temporary copies of the work to determine their desire to purchase it; and (2) that the users were merely “space-shifting” the product they already owned by transferring it from audio CD to another format. The court affirmed Patel’s holdings regarding these issues as well.


With regard to sampling, the District Court had concluded that the more music a user downloads, the less likely that user is to purchase the desired artists’ albums. Secondly, the court observed that even if the audio CD market it not harmed by Napster’s infringement, the infringement has adverse effects on the developing digital market from which the copyright owners are entitled to benefit. The 9th Circuit agreed.

As to “space-shifting,” Napster appealed to Sony v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) and RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) for analogy. These cases involved the alleged infringing uses of VCR’s and MP3 players. Napster claimed that its file sharing technology merely allowed for the “space-shifting” of musical compositions and sound recordings much in the same way as a VCR or MP3 player allows a user to “time-shift” programming or “space shift” music. Napster argued its usage of the copyrighted music was a similar fair use.

The appellate panel noted, however, that the Sony and Diamond cases are not applicable because the legal theory of “shifting” as applied to VCR’s and MP3 players did not “simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the general public … [but rather] exposed the material only to the original user.” The 9th Circuit pointed out that Napster made the material available not just to the original purchaser, but to “millions of other individuals,” and therefore upheld Judge Patel’s refusal to apply the fair use rulings in the Sony and Diamond cases to Napster’s situation.

The appellate ruling affirmed most of the pertinent rulings by Judge Patel and sent the case back to her with instructions to narrow the preliminary injunction to prevent Napster from being used to exchange unauthorized songs, but not songs from new artists used with their permission. The appellate court further said that such an injunction must, at the same time, be fashioned to respect the technological limitations that Napster faces in policing its service.

Napster, Gnutella & FreeNet

Before applying some of the court’s holdings to Gnutella and FreeNet, it is first important to understand the similarities and differences between these peer-to-peer software clients and the services offered by Napster.

Gnutella is a software package that is downloaded and installed on individual computers, much in the same way as Napster. In its own words, Gnutella is “basically a mini search engine and file serving system in one.” It functions in much the same way as Napster. Once you install the software, you can type in a search for information, and the Gnutella client will seek out that information on the “GnutellaNet,” i.e., from among the community of users in closest proximity to the user making the request, which usually numbers approximately 10,000 users. The request for information is then transmitted from user to user until it finds the information, at which point it routes its way back through the network of users to the original requester.

FreeNet functions in much the same way as Gnutella. Its developer describes FreeNet as “an information publication system similar to the World Wide Web.”” To use FreeNet, users simply install a piece of server software on their computers and separate client programs that allow insertion and removal of information from the “network.” The programs are based on an open protocol developed by Ian Clarke, which means that specialized applications can be written to perform unique tasks by anyone with a minimum amount of programming knowledge.

The differences between Napster and these second generation file-sharing programs are more significant, however, than the similarities, particularly with regard to the legal precedent established in Napster.

For starters, Gnutella and FreeNet are not centralized, as was Napster. Napster maintained a centralized server containing an index of all user files. This fact was significant in the 9th Circuit’s opinion. It opined that Napster “has the ability to locate infringing material listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to the system. The file name indices, therefore, are within the ‘premises’ that Napster had the ability to police.”

Gnutella and FreeNet, in contrast, are based on protocols, or software technology, rather than a model of providing services. Every user who installs the kernel software becomes, in essence, a “file server” on the ad hoc network and, thus, has the ability to control the content of his or her proximate network of users. It is difficult, if not impossible, with the Gnutella software, to determine who sent a request for information. It is passed from user to user, and not even the original recipient of the request is certain that the requester with whom he or she communicates is the original person making the request.

Furthermore, FreeNet claims that information on its system is distributed from server to server in such a way that it is difficult to determine where a particular piece of information is at any given time. This feature makes it nearly impossible, according to its developers, to forcibly remove a piece of information from the “network.”

The best framework to facilitate understanding of Gnutella and FreeNet is to think of them as a “super chat rooms.” Running the Gnutella or FreeNet software program, a user has the ability to send out a request for files or information to thousands of other users on the Internet instantaneously and simultaneously. Those people, in turn, resubmit the request to the users connected to their “network,” i.e., their buddies, and so on until the requested information is located and a “message” is returned to the original requester that the information requested is available.

How will the Napster opinion apply to Gnutella & FreeNet?

As indicated earlier, the Napster decision is as important for how it applies to Gnutella, FreeNet and other later generation file-swapping technologies as it is in how it applies to Napster. While the RIAA may have won the battle, it could very well end up losing the war against these more nimble and elusive second generation peer-to-peer software clients!

In its examination of whether Napster was a contributory infringer, the 9th Circuit made several interesting observations worthy of note in this regard. The court recognized that a computer system operator can be held vicariously liable for copyright infringement if he or she is specifically aware, or is made aware, that infringing material is on the system and fails to purge it. But the court clarified that “absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.

Most significantly, the court made it clear that it imposed contributory infringement on Napster because of its owners’ actual knowledge of infringing material on the server and his failure to purge it. To make the point absolutely clear, the 9th Circuit stated that “[t]he mere existence of the Napster system, absent actual notice and Napster’s demonstrated failure to remove the offending material, is insufficient to impose contributory infringement.”

NetworkIn the case of Gnutella and FreeNet, the “computer system operator” is an amalgam of literally thousands of users of the software package – not one centralized server. Each computer in the amalgam serves an equal function in the structure of the network. To further complicate matters, the conglomeration of users is in a constant state of random flux as users sign on and off the system. There is no centralized source of information, no centralized server, and no centralized administration. In short, there is no one to sue! (It should be noted, however, that whenever a file is transferred on these systems from one user to another, it necessarily passes through an Internet Service Provider, or ISP, which keeps logs of such transactions and can track the recipient’s identity — thus providing, at least, a minimal target).

The Gnutella and FreeNet protocols are much more similar to the relevant facts concerning the products in the Sony VCR and the Diamond MP3 cases.

In the Sony case, for example, the court refused to impute the requisite level of knowledge to Sony simply because it made a product that was capable of both infringing and “substantially noninfringing uses.” The VCR is used to play pre-recorded tapes, as well as to record copyrighted programming for viewing at a later time, i.e., time-shifting. This same rationale was used in the Diamond case where an MP3 player can be used by the rightful owner of musical compositions to “space-shift” the songs from one format to another. These types of usages, the Supreme Court ruled, are fair uses and not infringements.

Like the VCR and the MP3 player, Gnutella and FreeNet are types of technology capable of both infringing and “substantially non-infringing uses.” Both protocols were established for the express purpose of freely sharing information. The existence of a non-infringing purpose is an issue the 9th Circuit was extremely concerned about in the Napster case, and the argument is even stronger in favor of Gnutella and FreeNet than it was for Napster. As an example, the 9th Circuit expressly stated that it refused to “impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe . . . copyrights.” The court went so far as to disagree with the lower court’s ruling that Napster had failed to demonstrate that its system is capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses, holding that this ignored the system’s capabilities.

The issue of non-infringing uses is the crux of why Gnutella and FreeNet will have greater success defending any infringement action brought against them by the big guns. Napster was designed, from the beginning, for the exchange of music. While it may be argued that it has other useful functions, its founders acknowledged purpose was the illicit exchange of copyrighted material. Gnutella and FreeNet, on the other hand, are frequently used for much more than merely transferring MP3 files — they are also used to exchange various types of non-infringing information such as recipes, clip art, photographs, word processing files, etc. The basic design of Gnutella and FreeNet lends itself to the sharing of information. Neither provide a “service,” per se, but rather offer a method for exchanging information freely with other computer users. The developers’ own comments about their products on their websites make that abundantly clear. Will this be enough to shield them from liability against a copyright infringement action? If the Napster opinion is any guide, and it is, then it appears that these second generation software packages will fair better than their more well-known first cousin.

Considerations for the Future of Online Delivery of Music

While the industry may have hit a home run against the slow ball thrown by Napster, the game is only in the 1st inning, and it appears that Gnutella and FreeNet are capable of throwing no-hitters! As long as there are international computer networks, skilled hackers and determined computer nerds in this world, there will be ample avenues for stealing intellectual property through exchanges over peer-to-peer networks. Even in the absence of Napster, if a person wants to download music without paying for it, he can do so, and there is not much the RIAA or anyone else can do about it.

The fact is, there have always been and will always be people out there who will make choices that are in direct conflict with current social morals and dictates — and there will always be people with the capability and the desire to “”steal” copyrighted music and, for that matter, other materials. In order to track down and prosecute such renegades who use protocols like Gnutella and FreeNet to distribute pirated music, the RIAA will have to become something akin to an “Internet Police Squad,” scouting ISP records for the names and identities of people using their system to receive file transfers of unauthorized music, and then suing them individually, one by one. This daunting task would not only consume much of the organization’s time and resources, but would present significant legal issues and barriers, as discussed earlier.

Ms. Rosen perhaps summarized it best in her remarks to the press following the Napster decision, “the business model built on infringement is not only morally and legally wrong, but it is also a threat to the development of the legitimate online music market.” Given the choice, however, studies indicate that most people generally would prefer to make the right and moral decision. In this case, specifically, that assumes that most people would prefer to reward entertainers and songwriters by paying for the music they love.

Assuming that conclusion to be correct, the industry’s efforts would perhaps be better spent in educating people about the value of creative efforts required to produce a musical composition, how much it costs to make a sound recording, and how being paid motivates creative people to produce creative product. Their efforts might be better spent developing a business model that demonstrates a lack of greed and thereby encourages those who really want to buy their music by pricing it more in line with the perceived value. At the same time, such a pricing structure would be a disincentive to the hackers by making the programming efforts involved in pirating the music more trouble than they’re worth. To revise an old adage, a byte of prevention is worth a gigabyte of cure!

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