On August 7th, a lawsuit was filed by Kristen Alison Hall, former member of the country band, Sugarland, against the remaining original members of the band, Jennifer Nettles and Kristian Bush.   A copy of the complaint can be viewed here.Sugarland

Essentially, the lawsuit alleges that Nettles and Bush breached a partnership agreement between the three members, breached their fiduciary duty to Hall, and failed to account to her for partnership profits.  Among other facts alleged, Hall claims that she contributed the trademark, “Sugarland” to the partnership.  A search of the trademark database at www.uspto.gov shows that the partnership owns two marks:  a service mark for live performances, Reg. No. 2747326, and a trademark for merchandise, Reg. No. 3250679.  All three original members, Hall, Nettles and Bush, are identified as the registrants on these marks.

More about the lawsuit can be gleened from this article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, written by entertainment journalist Shane Harrison, with contributions by Rodney Ho.  Yours truly is cited as a resource in the article.

This lawsuit provides a dramatic visual aid as to why it is so important for musical groups to plan in advance with regard to issues such as who owns the band name in the event of a dispute.  Either a band partnership agreement, or a  properly established limited liability company or corporation, can effectively provide for what happens to the name in the event a member leaves.  One method I commonly use is to establish a limited liability company and assign the trademark and trade name to the company.  Provisions for what happens to a member that leaves the LLC are then incorporated into the Operating Agreement which set forth the procedure for valuing the company’s assets in that instance.  Such a structure could have eliminated the need for a lawsuit such as the one that Hall filed against the other two members of Sugarland.

If your band does not have a written document dealing with this issue, you should consider retaining an entertainment attorney for such purposes, particular if your band is starting to generate significant income.

On August 4, 2008, the Second Circuit court of appeals overturned a lower courts opinion that Cablevision’s Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder (“RS-DVR”) system violated the Copyright Act by infringing plaintiffs’ exclusive rights of reproduction and public performance.  The full 44-page opinion is available at Cartoon Network, LLP, et al. v. Cablevision.  In my humble yet fully animated opinion, the Second Circuit’s opinion was not at all well reasoned nor, for that matter, even common sense — I believe it misinterprets at three very important areas of the Copyright Act and interpretation thereof:

When is a work “Fixed” According to Section 101

Through a system of buffers, Cablevision’s RS-DVR will allow customers who do not own stand alone DVR’s to record programming, which resides on Cablevision’s servers, and “time-shift” it to view it at a later date.  Certainly a great concept, but one which, in my opinion, should require authorization from the owners of the copyrights.

In arriving at its conclusion, the court determined that the buffer used to process the steam of data only “copies” the data for a duration of 1.2 seconds, before transferring it to another buffer used to reconstruct a copy of the program for any customer who has asked to view it at a later time.  The court concluded that this “embodiment,” i.e. the copy, was transitory in duration and therefore not “fixed” pursuant to Section 101 of the Copyright Act.  Therefore, the copyright owners’ right of reproduction was not violated.  This is clearly erroneous reasoning:

The definition of “fixed” in Section 101 of the Copyright Act states, in its entirety:

A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.

In arriving at its determination, the Second Circuit focused on its condensed version of the definition, i.e. a work is “fixed” when its embodiment “. . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of more than transitory duration.”  The court concluded, based on this shortened version of the definition, that the “language plainly imposes two distinct but related requirements, i.e. an “embodiment requirement” and a “duration requirement.”

The Second Circuit’s error is grammatical in nature:  it misinterprets the language of the definition of “fixed” by assuming that the phrase “for a period of more than transitory duration” modifies the words “permanent or stable” when in fact it actually modifies the antecedent phrase “permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated.”  This is certainly the case with regard to the RS-DVR – it fixes the copies for in sufficiently permanent state in one buffer (i.e. the 1.2 seconds) to permit them to be reproduced in another buffer for a period of more than transitory duration.  Thus, the court got it wrong.

Without getting into too much detail, the court also incorrectly analyzes a 9th Circuit cases, MAI Systems and its progeny which correctly apply the definition of fixed to a copy of a work created in RAM memory for a period of minutes.  The effect of this misinterpretation is to put legal practitioners in the precarious position of trying to determine at what point between 1.2 seconds and 2 minutes does a reproduction arrive at a “more than transitory” state.

Ironically, the Second Circuit ignores the U.S. Copyright Office’s analysis of this precise issue in its 2001 report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act which elaborated that a work was fixed “unless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or communicated.”  This clarification is in line with my earlier interpretation that the phrase “more than transitory in duration” modifies the communication or perception, not the embodiment itself.  The Second Circuit stated that, in its mind, the U.S. Copyright Office’s interpretation “reads the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the statute.”  To the contrary, however, it is the correct interpretation in that it incorporates the transitory duration requirement into the appropriate section of the definition.

Finally, the Second Circuit completely ignores the last sentence of the definition, to wit:  A work . . . is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.”  In this instance, the court readily admitted that an unauthorized copy of the work was stored, i.e. “fixed” on Cablevision’s servers simultaneously with its transmission.

When is an infringer not an infringer?

In extending recent trends by some circuits to weaken the strict liability component of the Copyright Act, the Second Court refused to find that Cablevision was a direct infringer.  Instead, it rules that the customer is the direct infringer in this instance of digital recording, showing his or her intent to make a copy when he or she presses the record button on the remote.  The court reasons as follows:

In this case . . . the core of the dispute is over the authorship of the infringing conduct.  After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record, and that program airs, a copy of the program–a copyrighted work–resides on
the hard disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is who made  this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.

Emphasis mine.  The first thing to note about the court’s conclusion is that it realizes, right off the bat, that the copy created on the servers of Cablevision is an infringement.  In its mind, however, the only question is who made the copy.  Now, that, of course, flies directly in the face of a host of copyright concepts which I will not address here, but suffice it to say that this is problematic.

But, for the moment, let’s just examine how the court ultimately determines who had the “volition” to infringe in this specific case:

There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems  clear–and we know of no case holding otherwise–that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s command.

The court then continues its analysis by example, offering the examples of a retailer who owns a photocopier and rents it out to the public as reinforcement of its conclusion, finding that because the retailer would not be liable for infringement, neither should Cablevision.   Despite the fact that there is case law holding that such a retailer WOULD, in fact, be liable for infringement, the Second Circuit errs in failing to see the difference between a VCR in the analog world, a single, stand-alone device used express by the customer, and a process devised by a company which makes infringement as simple as pressing my record button on my remote.  The court does not find this a “sufficient” distinction.  The court’s error in logic is apparent in this prose when it examines a 6th Circuit case on the issue:

In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant difference
exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct.

Is this 2001 Space Odyssey?  Did H.A.L. take over when I wasn’t looking?  Who programmed the system?

If this were not enough, the Second Circuit then performs a great deal of legal gymnastics to support its finding:  First, it examines the video on demand process to illustrate that Cablevision does not have control over the transmissions being recorded by thesubscribers in the RS-VCR system.  Are they for real?  Ever heard of apples and oranges.  The VOD system is a fully licensed process which is, dare we say it, nothing like the RS-VCR system.  Secondly, the Second Circuit uses the distinction between “active” and “passive” infringement under the Patent Act to jump to the almost humorous, if it weren’t so wrong, conclusion that:

If Congress had meant to assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a copyright-infringing act and any person who actively induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew how to draft a statute that would have this effect.

Every intellectual property attorney worth his or her salt knows that the Copyright Act and the Patent Act are very limited in their usefulness for purposes of using one to interpret the other.  That’s why it’s said that the Copyright Act is a strict liability statute, whereas, the Patent Act is not so much.

When is work “publicly performed”?

The final error committed by the court is in its analysis of whether the buffered copy delivered to individual customers was “publicly performed.” In this regard, the Second Circuit concluded:

under the transmit clause, we must examine the potential audience of a given transmission by an alleged infringer to determine whether that transmission is “to the public.” And because the RS-DVR system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber, we believe that the universe of people capable of receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that transmission.

Again, the Second Circuit has to do a hatchet job on the definition of “public performance” in order to arrive at this convoluted conclusion.  The definition of “public performance” in the Copyright Act is actually found in the “publication” definition of Section 101.  It states, in its entirety:

To perform or display a work “publicly” means —

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.

Emphasis mine.  Whereas the Second Circuit zeroed in on the phrase “to the public” in making its determination, the definition clearly intends to define public performance as any process that allows the public, in general, the ability to receive the transmission, whether or not it is in the same place or the same time.  Its not very difficult to see the fallacy of the Second Circuit’s reasoning.   The Cablevision RS-DVR clearly does precisely what the definition anticipates, it creates multiple copies stored in the buffers for individual subscribers in multiple places, who then view the (buffered) transmissions at different times.

While this seems simple, the Second Circuit jumps through numerous irrational hoops to arrive at the idea that:

the transmit clause directs us to identify the potential audience of a given transmission, i.e., the persons “capable of receiving” it, to determine whether that transmission is made “to the public.”

Nothing in the statute dictates this conclusion, to the contrary, the legislators probably thought that the word “public” was generic enough to not need interpretation.

The effect of this ruling, at least for now, is that anyone can make digital copies of any copyrighted work on their servers for purposes of transmitting to an individual customer, so long as that individual customer makes a request for it, and there is no implication of the performance rights.

This is a fine example of a court “reasoning” the meaning completely out of a statute.

Conclusion

If it is not obvious by now, I think this is one of the most poorly reasoned and drafted opinions by a Circuit Court that I have read in a long time.  If there is a bright side, it is that the effect of this decision is primarily that it overturns the grant of a summary judgement by the lower court.  From a broader perspective, however, and the more unfortunate result is that, because of the concept of stare decisis, this reasoning can now be cited in other cases in other jurisdictions across the country as good law.  So, unfortunately, we entertainment attorneys will be dealing with the negative impact of this decision for some time to come, until perhaps some higher court, in this case the Supremes, decides to rectify it.

One question clients often asked me is whether an idea can be protected.  The question frequently arises when a client has an idea for a screenplay, or an outline for a story, or a unique title for a song or book, and wishes to submit or  “pitching” that idea to a major movie house, publisher or record company.  While it is fairly common knowledge that an “idea” cannot be copyrighted, it is important to know that there may be certain types of protection be available for the intellectual properties contained in such a proposal pursuant to current laws, specifically trademark and copyright laws.  This article analyzes and summarizes your rights under each of these two areas of law and offers suggestions for protecting your legal rights when “pitching” ideas.

Protection Under Trademark Law

Titles and names may be entitled to trademark protection at both the state and federal levels by anyone claiming a right to use such a title or name in connection with certain specified trades or services.   These types of marks are commonly designated by use of the “™” and “®” symbols, indicating respectively that registration of the mark has been applied for and registered on the Primary Register.  To be entitled to use these symbols in respect to a mark, a person must apply for and receive a federal or state trademark.

In most states, a state trademark can be applied for in the Secretary of State’s office.  The application is a simple form and payment of a nominal fee is required.  Protection at the state level is, however, somewhat more geographically limited than that of a federal mark.  The application process for a federal mark is much more tedious, complicated and costly than that of the state trademark process.  In addition to legal fees which will, most likely, be incurred, the application fee for each international classification of goods and services is $325.

Protection Under Copyright

As stated earlier, with regard to copyright law, and speaking very generally, an idea, in and of itself, is not entitled to copyright protection.  Rather, it is the expression of an idea that can be copyrighted.[1]

It is not always clear from the case precedents, however, when an idea becomes developed enough to rise to the level of an “expression.”  Some examples of expressions of ideas that have been protected are a screenplay similar to the old television series A-Team,[2] an employee survey regarding employee satisfaction,[3] and a particular section of categories appearing on a form for collecting baseball pitcher statistics.[4] On the other end of the spectrum, courts found that (1) a manual of operation for patented leaching system. [5] and (2) the addition and arrangement of facts to legal opinions [6] were not protectible expressions of ideas.  The only general rule that can seemingly be extracted from this convoluted line of cases is that the more an expression diverges from the mere recitation of raw facts, the closer it gets to expression, as that the courts legally recognize that term.

Is your Idea Literary or Business in Nature

There is another, albeit tangential issue which is relevant and should be briefly discussed here, i.e., whether an idea is literary or business in nature:

Literary ideas are those that, upon development, would become literary property and hence clearly eligible for copyright protection.  Literary ideas include ideas for motion pictures,[7] radio programs,[8] and television programs.,[9]

Business ideas, on the other hand, even when fully developed, may not be copyrightable. ,[10] Business ideas are those that relate to methods of conducting businesses, such as bank night in theaters,[11]contests, [12]and credit rating systems.[13] Here again, however, the more an idea, even a business idea, departs from mere factual recitation, the more it is likely to be considered literary, and therefore entitled to protection under copyright law.

When does an idea rise to the level of expression?

So, let’s now return to the primary issue of when an idea rises to the level of an expression entitled to copyright protection?

In their attempts to deal with the dilemma, courts have created a body of case law which attempts to strike a middle ground between the comprehensive protection of copyright on the one hand, and the complete denial of any legal protection for ideas on the other.  I will attempt to delineate and evaluate some of the legal theories on which a person may be able to rely to render an idea legally protectible, the underlying tort theory of which is known in legal circles as “idea misappropriation.”

In brief, the elements for a claim of idea misappropriation are, first, the idea must be novel and concrete, and, second, there must be a legal relationship between the parties, whether by an express contract, a contract implied-in-fact, a quasi-contract, or a fiduciary relationship.[14]

Novel & Concrete Element

In instances where they have dealt with the protectibility of an idea, the courts hold the plaintiff to a greater burden of proving not merely that the idea is original (as in copyright protection) but that it is actually novel,[15] i.e., “not formerly known; of a new kind.”[16] This standard is, for most courts, a great standard to meet than that required by copyright, i.e., that a work be original – although some courts do confusingly use the terms interchangably.

The second component of the first prong, “concreteness,” in essence requires that an idea be sufficiently developed so as to constitute “property.”  By its very nature, this requirement is intentionally vague, allowing the courts great flexability in applying it.  One court described the concept as follows

while we recognize that an abstract idea as such may not be the subject of a property right, yet when it takes upon itself the concrete form which we find in the instant case, it is our opinion that it then becomes a property right subject to sale.[17]

This is, as pointed out, a rather vague element.  This is sort of like how U.S. Justice Potter Stewart described hard-core pornography in Jacobellis v. Ohio, i.e., it’s difficult to define, but “I know it when I see it.” So, in short, the more developed an idea becomes, the further it goes toward dispelling any doubt as to whether the idea is “concrete.”

Legal Relationship Requirement

The second prong of the test, i.e., the legal relations prong,  can complicate matters when it comes to submitting an idea to a third party.  Whether a legal relationship exists between the parties depends, as does everything in law, on countless fact scenarios to the degree that one small change in a fact pattern can affect the outcome of interpretation.

Most often, clients “pitch” their ideas to a third parties for consideration in hopes that they will take the idea and “run with it.”  But in such instances, it is important to be aware that the method by which an idea is submitted can directly impact whether or not there is a legal relationship.

A non-disclosure and confidentiality agreement with a publisher, for example, would create such a relationship beyond any doubt.  This is one end of the spectrum.  This method can easily be dispensed with since it is difficult enough to get a publisher’s attention, for example, much less without the added complexity of having to get their legal department involved. Most people will likely submit the idea directly to a publisher, either with or without permission, without any such NDA, or they will submit the idea through an agent of some sort.  Each of these variations result in different treatment.

For example, courts have held that if an idea is submitted without solicitation and without advance warning, the idea is not protectible, even if it later turns out to be valuable.[18] There is one variation of this fact pattern, however, where one might successfully argue that an implied contract results because of an implied solicitation by the idea recipient. This occurs where the recipient is engaged in a trade or industry (such as the entertainment or publishing industry) that, by custom, purchases ideas of the type submitted. A book or music publisher, as an idea recipient, makes a continuing offer to pay for any submitted ideas that it elects to use. Thus, an unsolicited submission is not an offer that necessarily requires further conduct by the publisher to establish an acceptance, but rather can be viewed as an acceptance of the publisher’s implied continuing offer. Although no court has expressly recognized this theory, courts have implicitly adopted it by recognizing an implied agreement based upon custom where such a factual pattern can be established.[20] I caution in advance, however, that this is a minority opinion, not expressed by the majority of courts.

Some courts, particularly but not exclusively those in California, imply an affirmative duty on the part of a publisher to reject an unsolicited submission or else the legal relationship is created – hence the practice of most publishers to advertise “no unsolicited submissions.”  Under this so-called “failure to reject” theory, any means of notice that gives the publisher some sort of advance warning of, and an opportunity to prevent, a proposed idea submission is sufficient to establish an implied contract if the recipient then permits the submission to be made.

Thus, the following examples may create such an affirmative obligation on the part of the publisher: (1) enclosing the proposed idea in a sealed envelope accompanying an unsolicited transmittal letter that explains that the contents of the sealed envelope contains such a submission, or (2) a series of two unsolicited letters, the first explaining the intended submission and the second in fact containing the idea to be submitted. [20]

If a publisher specifically requests the submission of an idea, a legal relationship is clearly established creating an obligation to pay the creator if the idea submitted is used. [21] So finding a creative way to solicit a request from a publisher is also a very good means of securing protection for you idea.

Finally, it may come as no surprise that utilizing the services of a agent will help protect your ideas.  It may be inferred that the recipient of an idea submission has knowledge of an expectation of payment for the idea when the submission is arranged by a person whose known occupation is that of representing idea purveyors, such as a book or movie agent. “This fact alone must have indicated to [the recipient of an idea submission] that the persons whom the agent brought together with him were not social callers.” Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc. 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 138 (Cal. App. 1966).

Conclusion

As you can clearly see, the question of whether an idea can be protected is not an easy one to answer in any specific situation because the answer depends so heavily on the individual fact pattern of each case.  Although it may not be apparent from its length, this article in no way exhausts the body of legal information and case law that exists with regard to the protectible nature of an idea.   Therefore, if you have questions concerning this issue, please contact a respected entertainment attorney.

Having stated this, with regard to submission of ideas in general, the following are recommendations that can be followed:

(1)    First, trademark all slogans, titles or name, at the very least your state level, but preferably at the federal level;

(2)    Make sure the idea is as fleshed out as it can be, i.e. as “concrete” as possible.  Rather than a mere outline, insert summaries of each bullet point.  Then, flesh out selected points, e.g., create a summary of each chapter of a particular example book, or maybe even two or more examples of each.  Then, create a few complete chapters of a books, for example;

(3)    Mark everything confidential and, in addition to the copyright notice generally included, add the phrase “All rights reserved” after it.  The copyright notice and your intent to be the owner of the copyright should be clearly indicated in the beginning of the correspondence;

(4)    Attempt to procure an agent, and ask if the agent is willing to enter into a non-compete and confidentiality agreement;

(5)    As an alternative to paragraph (4), solicit the publishers by telephone or in some other general fashion, preferably with written followup, to encourage them to “solicit” the work in advance; and

(6)    As an alternative to paragraphs (4) and (5), place your idea submission in an envelope, draft a summary cover letter explaining that this is the submission of a copyrighted idea and that by opening the envelope, they are agreeing to the confidentiality and non-disclosure of the submission and further, agree to pay for it if they decide to use it.

While these ideas may not be “iron-clad,” they will go a long way toward establishing the necessary elements of an idea misappropriation claim.

[1] 17 U.S.C. §  102(b) . See e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) ; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Gaye v. Gillis, 167 F. Supp. 416 (D.C. Mass. 1958 ). This was also the rule under common law copyright. Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930) ; Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953) ; Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956) ; Ware v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 590, 155 U.S.P.Q. 413 (Cal. App. 1967).[Back]

[2]Ernest Olson, V. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).[Back]

[3]Gallup, Inc. V. Talentpoint, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18560; 61 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1394 (M.D. PA. 2001).[Back]

[4]George L. Kregos v. Associated Press and Sports Features Syndicate, Inc., 937 F.2d 700; 1991 U.S. App. Lexis 12113; 19 USPQ2d (BNA) 1161; Copy. L. Rep. (Cch) P26,744 (Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 1991).[Back]

[5]Presby Construction, Inc., v. Normand Clavet, et al, 2001 DNH 210; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20951; 61 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1184 (Dist. NH 2001).[Back]

[6]Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., et al v. West Publishing Co. et al, 158 F.3d 674; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30790; 48 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1560 (App. Ct. 2nd Cir 1998). [Back]

[7]Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).[Back]

[8]Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).[Back]

[9]Stone v. Goodson, 8 N.Y.2d 8,200 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1960).[Back]

[10]This exclusion also applies to scientific ideas.[Back]

[11]Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936).[Back]

[12]Lewis v. Kroger, 109 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. W.Va. 1952).[Back]

[13]Burnell v. Chown, 69 Fed. 993 (N.D. Ohio 1895).[Back]

[14]See Kienzle v. Capital Cities/American Broadcasting Co., Inc. , 774 F. Supp. 432, 436 n.8, 438 n.13 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (Treatise cited). McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (New York law). [Back]

[15] Noble v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 270 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Santilli v. Philip Morris & Co., 283 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Stevens v. Continental Can Co., Inc., 308 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Pittman v. American Greeting Corp., 619 F. Supp. 939 (W. D. Ky. 1985) ; Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257 (1972) (no promise to pay for an idea will be implied or enforced if the idea is not both novel and original).[Back]

[16]Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary (2d ed.) 1670.[Back]

[17]Williamson v. N.Y. Central R.R., 16 N.Y.S.2d 217, 258 App. Div. 226 (1939) ; Bailey v. Haberle-Congress Brewing Co., 193 Misc. 723, 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1948 ) ; Masline v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R.R., 95 Conn. 702, 112 Atl. 639 (1921) ; contra Brunner v. Stix, 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W.2d 643 (1944).

[18] Giangrasso v. CBS, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ; Curtis v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 213 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 843 (1959) ; see Borden & Barton Enters. v. Warner Bros., 99 Cal. App. 2d 760, 222 P.2d 463 (1950) ; Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. App. 1966) ; Official Airlines Schedule Info. Serv., Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1964) (concurring opinion); Sterner v. Hearst Corp., 144 U.S.P.Q. 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) .[Back]

[19]Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 739, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (1956) ; Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 1987).[Back]

[20] Cole v. Lord, 262 A.D. 116, 28 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1st Dep’t 1941) ; Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953) ; Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Treatise cited), aff’d mem., 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Treatise cited); cf. McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (New York law); Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 193 Misc. 723, 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Mun. Ct. 1948).[Back]

[21] See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.) , where in advance of submission, plaintiff sent a mailgram to defendants advising that a submission was being sent.[Back]

 

 

 

You say you want a revolution

Well, you know

We all want to change the world . . .

 

You say you’ve got a real solution

Well, you know

We’d all love to see the plan

You ask me for a contribution

Well, you know

We are doing what we can

 

But if you want money

for people with minds that hate

All I can tell is, brother, you’ll have to wait

Don’t you know it’s gonna be alright?

 

 

-John Lennon

 

Perhaps John Lennon said it best:  if you push people hard enough and long enough, they will revolt.  The question is, has the RIAA gone too far for too long? A recent motion filed in their case against students at the University of Maine may very well answer that question.

The RIAA named numerous “John Doe” students in their complaint in Arista Records v. Does 1-27, as is their practice in all of their lawsuits.   The RIAA’s purpose of naming the John Doe defendants is so that they may obtain an ex parte (i.e., without the other party being notified) order from the Judge requiring the targeted university to provide the various students’ name, address, and, particularly, their IP address.

Student lawyers at the University school of law Cumberland Legal Clinic have filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against the RIAA claiming that this practice improperly seeks to circumvent the student’s rights under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, §1232g(b)(2)(B) (“FERPA”), gain publicity for its cause, and coerce students into settling for “nominal” amounts in the $3-5000 range.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows sanctions against an attorney who signs a pleading without properly investigating the facts and the law and does so with an improper purpose.

The motion also questions whether the joinder of plaintiffs and defendants under the RIAA-type lawsuits is proper because the actions do not, in fact, arise out of the same transaction.  Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Procedure provides that multiple plaintiffs can join in one action if “they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences…and any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).  Similarly, multiple defendants can be joined in one action if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transaction or occurrences . . . and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Id.  The student motion alleges that the RIAA does not, in fact, believe that all of these copyright infringements arise out of the same facts, but join together against multiple defendants for the sole purpose of trimming litigation and discovery costs.

In this case, the student lawyers are seeking more than just monetary damages under this Rule 11 motion:  they also seek dismissal of the complaint and a permanent injunction preventing the RIAA from filing “fishing expedition” type complaints against “unconnected” defendants in the future.  These types of injunctions may be applied in jurisdictions other than the one in which it was issued, so in theory such an order may be applied to thwart lawsuits in other Federal courts across the country.

This in one ruling that should be very interesting.

 

 

The concept of “fair use” is a very misunderstood concept.  The first common misunderstanding that people espouse is that the concept of “fair use” is a right or privilege granted by copyright law.  It is not.  Secondly, many people mistakenly believe that so long as they do not make any money from an infringing use of copyrighted material, then the use is a fair use.  This is also an incorrect assumption.

Fair use is not a right or a privilege to be exercised at one’s whim.  Rather, the doctrine is an “equitable rule of reason” that may be used as an affirmative d

efense in a copyright infringement action.  The purpose of the rule is to balance the equities between the desire to protect and therefore encourage the creation of new ideas and the desire to encourage the free exchange of speech in the marketplace of ideas.  The tension was described by Justice Souter as “simultaneously protect[ing] copyrighted material and allow[ing] others to build upon it.”  Nonetheless, the thing to remember is that application of the fair use defense is declared by judicial fiat in the context of a copyright infringement action.  It is applied on a case-by-case analysis of the factual situation.  Thus, fair use is not a presumptive right or privilege that may be exercised by the infringing party.

There are four factors weighed by the Supreme Court in making a determination of whether a derivative work constitutes a “fair use.”  These factors are (1) the nature of the work itself; (2) whether or not the work is commercial in nature; (3) the amount of the copyright work that is used; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market or value of the copyright at issue. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), codified at §107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.

The nature of the work refers to the “nature” of the unauthorized derivative work, not the original copyright work.  In order for such an unauthorized use of copyrighted material to be entitled to the“fair use” defense, the new creation must transform the original copyrighted material.  A “transformative work” is defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as one that “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”  See, Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).   While all factors must be considered, this is perhaps one of the more critical factors in the analysis.  Merely modulating the pitch of a song or inverting the sequence of a chord progression would probably not be considered transformative.   A very good example of a derivative work that is transformative in nature is Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, the same story as Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind, but told from the perspective of a mulatto slave who is the half-sister of Scarlet O’Hara, the main character in the original work.  See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir 2001) per curiam, opinion at 268 F.3d 1257.  In that case, the Eleventh Circuit extended the protection of a musical parody in Acuff Rose to the novel.

With regard to the second factor as to whether a use is commercial in nature, it should be noted that this does not necessarily mean that the new creation has to generate profits.  If the new work create a significant fan, donor and/or advertiser base, those factors tend to lead to a conclusion that it is commercial in nature.  A person simply does not have the “right” to use copyrighted works in any manner as long as no profit is generated from the use.   It is also evident that this factor does not mean that simply because a derivative use does in fact generate profits, that it is by default not a fair use.  In Acuff Rose, 2 Live Crew’s parody version of Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman had sold over 250,000 copies, yet was still considered a “fair use.”  The thing to be remembered is that this is but one of the factors.

The third factor is fairly easy to evaluate: the more material “borrowed” from the copyrighted source, the less likely the infringer is to have a “fair use” defense.  Again, another misconception is that there is a bright line test for fair use:  that a few measures of a song, a couple of lines from a poem, a few hundred words of a paragraph, or a few paragraphs from a book, are considered fair use.  This misconception has no basis in either the Copyright Act or the case law interpreting it.  It is merely folklore.  The factor, as used by the courts, is more of a sliding scale based, again, on the quantity of the material used from the copyrighted work as compared to the total material.

Finally, the last factor weighs the impact on the infringing use on the potential market and value of the copyright.  This was an integral part of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Acuff Rose that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman did not impact the potential market for the original.   The more a derivative work negatively impacts the potential market for and value of the copyright, the less likely it will a “fair use.”

In summary, as you may have noticed, the fair use doctrine is by no means a bright line test.  Each “fair use” defense is, by its very nature, evaluated on a case by case analysis in the context of a copyright infringement action.  Fair use is not something to be relied on as a presumptive right.

I received a call from one of my readers to address the topic of whether a songwriter has the ability to restrict the use of his or her composition in the instance it is being used in advancing a cause opposite to that espoused by the songwriter.  This was spawned, of course, by the recent allegations of Tom Scholz, lead member of the group Boston, that his 1970’s mega-smash “More than a Feeling” was being used by Mike Huckabee, whose views were oppBostonosite those held by Scholz.  It is an interesting inquiry, and one that has simple solutions, mostly based in contract law.

There are two contract concepts that are usually incorporated into standard music publishing agreements which impact this issue:  one is the concept of droit or moral rights and two is the restrictions on exploitation.  I’ll address them in reverse order.

Grant of Rights

Typically, when a songwriter assigns his copyright in a song to a music publisher, there is grant language contained in the agreement expressly establishing the rights he or she is granting to the music publisher.  In that contract language, there is typically a clause that reads something like this:

The Publisher shall have the right to administer, use and exploit all interests in the Compositions . . . provided, however, that the approval of Writer shall be required for the use of any Composition:

(i)    in any motion picture which Publisher has actual knowledge of an “X” or equivalent rating;

(ii)    in any advertisement or other promotion for  tobacco, firearms or personal hygiene products; or

(iii)    in connection with religious or political purposes.

As you can plainly see, in this instance at least, the music publisher would be contractually required to obtain the approval of the writer prior to authorizing the use of the composition in a political rally, among other things.

If this type of language is not included in the songwriter agreement, or if the grant language included in the songwriter’s agreement is, in general, more broadly worded, then the rights of the songwriter to restrict the use of the song would be greatly impaired.

Droit or Moral Rights

The other legal concept which comes in to play, both from an historic perspective and contractually, is the concept of droit or “moral” rights, although it is important to realize up front that this concept is most often applied, in the U.S. at least, to works of visual art, not musical compositions.

First, in connection to the copyright concept, don’t infuse the the word “moral” with the ethical connotations generally associated with in in the United States.  The use in this concept is much more in the sense of an embodiment of a type of something, i.e., the Monet painting is the moral equivalent of impressionist art.  As used in this sense, it refers to the ability of the creator of a copyright to control the “embodiment” of his work, or its “integrity.”  The French-derived word “Droit” is, perhaps, more to the point when discussing copyright:  it means “a legal right.”

So, in the United States at least, the phrase “droit” or “moral rights” generally refers to the right of the copyright creator to prevent third parties from taking credit for, revising, altering, or distorting his or her creation, regardless of who owns the work, i.e., regardless of whether the copyright has been assigned or transferred.

In contrast, the concept has generally received much broader application in European states.  France, for example, recognizes four moral rights:

  1. the right of disclosure;
  2. the right to correct or withdraw works previously disclosed to the public;
  3. the right of attribution; and
  4. the right of integrity (the right to “respect” the work).

When the U.S. joined the Berne Convention, Congress attempted to bring its copyright laws into line with those of the other signatory companies by passing Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) codified generally at 17 U.S.C. §§106, 106A, and 113.   As implied earlier, however, this statute applies solely to visual arts and not musical compositions.  Nonetheless, the concept of droit or moral rights may be invoked when dealing with the misappropriation of a songwriter’s musical composition.

In addition to copyright law, there a several other legal concepts which may be implicated in this situation.  For example, if a person is somehow giving false attribution to a creative work, e.g., attempting to pass off an creator’s work as his or her own, that person may be liable under the concept of “unfair competition,” which is barred by the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1051).  Or, if the creation is widely recognized as a work of the creator, any distortion or alteration of the creation may constitute trademark “dilution” under trade dress laws and statutes.   More generally, if authorship of a work is somehow falsely attributed, the creator may have a state action for defamation against the person responsible for the false attribution.  If a person uses the identity of an songwriter, or the compositions, for his or her own benefit without permission, a violation the songwriter’s right of publicity may have occurred.  Thus, there may be several remedies available in this type of situation.

In the US, however, it is accepted practice that if a person can waive a right, such a waiver will be in a contract.  This is no exception.  Again, there is language in most songwriting agreements which “waives all droit or moral rights” in the copyright.  Such a waiver would likely nullify any of these general legal remedies available to the songwriter.

As always, I highly recommend that any songwriter contemplating a deal with a music publisher contact a reputable entertainment attorney.

Technorati Tags: ,,,,,,,,,,, “http://technorati.com/tags/Moral%20Rights” rel=”tag”>Moral Rights

U.S. District Judge for the District of Connecticut  Justice Janet Bond Arterton, handed down a very pointed and decisive opinion hammering the R.I.A.A. for its boilerplate style of pleading in the nationwide wide campaign against illegal file sharing.   Justice Arterton was appointed by President Clinton in 1995.  The full decision is here:  Decision.  At several key junctures in the opinion, JusticeRIAA Arterton based her opinion on the fact that the Plaintiff’s complaint was based on “information and belief” rather than direct evidence.

The two areas of concern in the opinion, one is whether to grant a default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and the second is whether the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b).

Default Judgment Analysis under Rule 55(b)(2)

The granting of default judgment is generally almost a “rubber stamp” kind of process.  If the defendant is properly served and fails to respond to the complaint, a default judgment is almost always automatic.  If the complaint demands an exact amount as judgment, the default judgment can even be entered by the court’s clerk under Rule 55(b)(1).  If not, then the court holds a hearing to determine the amount of damages under Rule 55(b)(2).  In this instance, however, the court stepped in and took it upon herself to examine the validity of the claims.

Reasoning from a 2nd Circuit case, Au Bon Pain Corp.v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1981), the court found that the default judgment process is not, in fact, automatic, but that “a district court has discretion . . . to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action.”  Artect, at 65, citing Wright & Miller, a well known legal treatise on procedure. 

Looking a another legal treatise, Moore’s Federal Practice, Justice Arterton reasoned that the analysis should combine elements from Rule 55(c), the rule allowing the setting aside of a default judgment, and Rule 60(b), a more generic rule allowing  a court to set aside judgments.  Finding support for this analysis in 2nd Circuit case law, the court held that three factors arose in determining whether to set aside a judgment under either of the two rules:  (1) “the willfulness of default”; (2) “the existence of a meritorious defense”; and (3) “the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiffs should the default judgment be vacated.”

In weighing these factors, the judge determined that the latter two factors shifted in favor of the defendant, i.e., there were abundant meritorious defenses raised in similar cases filed by the RIAA across the country, and the Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by being required to produce more specific evidence.  In both instances, the court again mentioned the language that the Plaintiff’s complaint was based on “information and belief.”

Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted under Rule 12(b)(6)

The more telling section of the opinion is the court’s ostensibly sua sponte (i.e., of its own accord) analysis of whether the Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This rule generally gives the defendant a right to raise this defense in a response to a complaint.  scales5 Ostensibly, the court raised this issue in the context of possible meritorious defenses.

Justice Arterton cites the recent Supreme Court opinion that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, [but] a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65 (2007).  She then observed that Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was almost identical to the one filed in Interscope Records v. Rodriguez, where the court held:

Plaintiff here must present at least some facts to show the plausibility of their allegations of copyright infringement against the Defendant. However, other than the bare conclusory statement that on “information and belief” Defendant has downloaded, distributed and/or made available for distribution to the public copyrighted works, Plaintiffs have presented no facts that would indicate that this allegation is anything more than speculation. The complaint is simply a boilerplate listing of the elements of copyright infringement without any facts pertaining specifically to the instant Defendant. The Court therefore finds that the complaint fails to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief can be granted and entry of default judgment is not warranted.

Rodriguez, No. 06-2485, 2007 WL 2408484, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007).  Citing the Second Circuit case Greyhound Exhibit Group, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty
Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992), which held that the entry of default “constitute[s] a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability,” Justice Arterton ruled that Plaintiff’s complaint was “speculative” and “inadequate.”

Eric Bangeman, of Ars Technica reports that the RIAA plans to file a brief, probably accompanying a motion for reconsideration, and possible an amended complaint, as they did in Interscope v. Rodriguez.  The amended complaint provided additional details about dates, times, and IP addresses.  Whether the additional details of that amendment will alter the application of Rule 12(b)(6) is still unknown, as the judge in that case has since retired.

The U.S. House of Representatives introduced a 69-page bill entitled the “Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2007.”  The legislation is significant in that it increases civil penalties for copyright infringement, expands criminal enforcement, and creates both a new federal agency and a new division of the Attorney General’s office of the Department of Justice.   The full text of the proposed legislation is here:  H.R. 4279.  I have established an RSS feed in the column of my blog for tracking purposes. 

copyright_symbol It is important to realize that, up front, that this is proposed legislation.  This is the first step in the legislative process. The first step in the life of a bill, if you recall your Schoolhouse Rock song, I’m Just a Bill, is referral to a committees that deliberates, investigates, and revises the proposed legislation before it is recommended that it proceed to general debate by the full House of Representatives.  This process can take a long time, or get stalled.  In fact, the majority of bills never make it out of committee.  The ones that do often do not resemble the proposed legislation very much at all, as sometimes the text goes through numerous iterations before it gets recommended, if at all. Other times, sections of a proposed bill may be incorporated into another bill, and in those cases the original bill, as it was introduced, is abandoned.  That is say that a lot can happen before this process ends.  Once a bill is approved by the House of Representatives, the process starts all over again in the Senate!

The major sections of the proposed legislation are:

* TITLE I—Enhancements to Civil Intellectual Property Laws  One of the more significant amendments to Section 104 of the Copyright Act, pursuant to this proposed legislation, is that it would allow courts to make “multiple awards of statutory damages” when compilations are infringed or when both derivatives and the original are infringed.  

 

TITLE II—Enhancements to Criminal Intellectual Property Laws   This is one of the more extensive expansions of the proposed legislation, allowing for stricter enforcement of willful, criminal infringement. 

TITLE III—Coordination and Strategic Planning of Federal Effort Against Counterfeiting and Piracy

This title is perhaps the most sweeping part of the proposed legislation.  The effect would be the creation of a new federal bureaucracy called the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Representative (other reports state that is it called the “White House Intellectual Property Enforcement Representative, or WHIPER, but that designation does not appear in the proposed legislation). The head of this new agency would be a member of the Executive Branch and, therefore, would be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

The new post would report directly to the president and serve as his or her principal advisor and spokesman regarding intellectual property matters, including, for example, identifying countries that don’t adequately protect IP rights or are not in compliance with international treaties.

As part of this new agency, a new “interagency” committee would be established for the purpose of intellectual property enforcement.  The new committee would be composed of the enforcement representative, who would chair the committee, and senior representatives of various departments and agencies involved in intellectual property enforcement, appointed by the respective heads of those departments and agencies.  Those agencies include the DOJ, the Trademark Office, the Copyright Office and Homeland Security, just to name a few.

TITLE IV—International Enforcement and Coordination

Under this section, the Trademark Office will appoint 10 intellectual property attachés to serve in United States embassies. The 10 appointments shall be in addition to personnel serving in the capacity of intellectual property attaché at United States embassies or other diplomatic missions on the date of the enactment of this Act.

TITLE V—Department of Justice Programs

In this section, the proposed legislation would created within the U.S. Justice Department’s an “Intellectual Property Enforcement Division” to subsume the IP-related functions that the department’s computer crime section in the criminal division currently performs. The new division would receive $25 million per year to start with.

This is by no means an exhaustive analysis of this proposed legislation, so take the time to read it for yourself and, if appropriate, contact you local representative to comment on the proposed legislation.

 

On Monday, January 28th, the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) began what will be four weeks of hearings.  The CRB will hear testimony from interested parties on both sides of issues which will ultimately determine the statutory mechanical rates for songwriters and music publishers. The CRB sets these rates periodically, but these particular hearings are more critical than usual because, in addition to setting rates for physical products, rates will be set for the first time ever for digital products such as digital downloads, subscription services and ringtones.

On one side of the issue is the Recording Industry Association of America (the “RIAA”), which represents the major record labels’ interest,  is proposing that the current rate of 9.1 cents per mechanical copy produced be reduced to 6 cents!  That reduction would roll back the rates to, well, let’s just say to well before the birth date of most of the college students the RIAA is prosecuting across the country for downloading.  For digital reproductions, the RIAA is proposing an even lower rate of 5 to 5.5 cents per track.

On the other side of the issue, representing the publishers and songwriters, is the National Music Publishers Association, the NMPA.  In contrast, the NMPA proposes increasing the statutory rate to 15 cents, and for digital reproductions, a rate of the greater of 12.5% of revenue, 27.5% of content costs, or a micro-penny calculation based on usage.

This are important issues, and I’ll try to keep you posted here on Law on the Row as developments happen.

The Recording Industry v. the People, an anti-RIAA blog operatRIAA ed by New York attorney, Ray Beckerman, is cooperating with the Boston-based non-profit, The Free Software Foundation, to establish “a fund to help provide computer expert witnesses to combat RIAA’s ongoing lawsuits, and to defend against the RIAA’s attempt to redefine copyright law.”

The Free Software Foundation was established to promote the development and use of free software.  It manages several campaigns to achieve that goal, including one called “BadVista.org,” fighting the adoption of Microsoft Vista, and “DefectivebyDesign.org” which was established for the purpose of eliminating digital rights management in music and movies from “Big Media.”

As of the end of November, the fund had raised over $4,000.  The fund will be administered by Mr. Beckerman and will be disbursed to technical witnesses hired by RIAA litigation defense teams on a variety of criteria, including the basis of the importance of the case to critical legal issues.

To donate to the fund, click here.